"The left wing, commanded by the Marshal Duke of Elchingen, 1and consisting of the first and second corps of infantry, and the second corps of cavalry, occupied the positions of Frasné.

"The right wing, commanded by Marshal Grouchy, and composed of the third and fourth corps of infantry, and the third corps of cavalry, occupied the heights in the rear of Fleurus.

"The emperor's head-quarters were at Charleroi, where were the Imperial guard and the sixth corps. The left wing had orders to march upon Les Quatre Bras, and the right upon Sombref. The emperor advanced to Fleurus with his reserve.

"The columns of Marshal Grouchy being in march, perceived, after having passed Fleurus, the enemy's army, commanded by Field-marshal Blucher, occupying with its left the heights of the mill of Bussy, the village of Sombref, and extending its cavalry a great way forward on the road to Namur; its right was at St. Amand, and occupied that large village in great force, having before it a ravine which formed its position.

"The emperor reconnoitred the strength and the positions of the enemy, and resolved to attack immediately. It became necessary to change front, the right in advance, and pivoting upon Fleurus.

"General Vandamme marched upon St. Amand, General Girard upon Ligny, and Marshal Grouchy upon Sombref. The fourth division of the second corps, commanded by General Girard, marched in reserve behind the corps of General Vandamme. The guard was drawn up on the heights of Fleurus, as well as the cuirassiers of General Milhaud.

"At three in the afternoon, these dispositions were finished. The division of General Lefol, forming part of the corps of General Vandamme, was first engaged, and made itself master of St. Amand, whence it drove out the enemy at the point of the bayonet. It kept its ground during the whole of the engagement, at the burial-ground and steeple of St. Amand; but that village, which is very extensive, was the theatre of various combats during the evening; the whole corps of General Vandamme was there engaged, and the enemy fought there in considerable force.

"General Girard, placed as a reserve to the corps of General Vandamme, turned the village by its right, and fought there with his accustomed valour. The respective forces were supported on both sides by about fifty pieces of cannon each.

"On the right, General Girard came into action with the fourth corps, at the village of Ligny, which was taken and retaken several times.

"Marshal Grouchy, on the extreme right, and General Pajol, fought at the village of Sombref. The enemy shewed from eighty to ninety thousand men, and a great number of cannon.

"At seven o'clock, we were masters of all the villages situated on the bank of the ravine which covered the enemy's position; but he still occupied with all his masses the heights of the mill of Bussy.

"The emperor returned with his guard to the village of Ligny; General Girard directed General Pecheux to debouch with what remained of the reserve, almost all the troops having been engaged in that village.

"Eight battalions of the guard debouched with fixed bayonets, and behind them four squadrons of the guards, the cuirassiers of General Delort, those of General Milhaud, and the grenadiers of the horse-guards. The old guard attacked with the bayonet the enemy's columns which were on the heights of Bussy, and, in an instant, covered the field of battle with dead. The squadron of the guard attacked and broke a square, and the cuirassiers repulsed the enemy in all directions. At half-past nine o'clock we had forty pieces of cannon, several carriages, colours, and prisoners, and the enemy sought safety in a precipitate retreat. At ten o'clock the battle was finished, and we found ourselves masters of the field of battle.

"General Lutzow, a partisan, was taken prisoner. The prisoners assured us, that Field-marshal Blucher was wounded. The flower of the Prussian army was destroyed in this battle. Its loss could not be less than fifteen thousand men. Our's was three thousand killed and wounded. 2

"On the left, Marshal Ney had marched on Les Quatre Bras with a division which cut in pieces an English corps that was stationed there; but, being attacked by the Prince of Orange with twenty- five thousand men, partly English, partly Hanoverians in the pay of England, he retired upon his position at Frasné. 3There a multiplicity of combats took place; the enemy obstinately endeavoured to force it, but in vain. The Duke of Elchingen waited for the first corps, which did not arrive till night; he confined himself to maintain his position. In a square attacked by the eighth regiment of cuirassiers, the colours of the sixty-ninth regiment of English infantry fell into our hands. The Duke of Brunswick was killed. The Prince of Orange has been wounded. We are assured that the enemy had many persons and generals of note killed or wounded. We estimate the loss of the English at from four to five thousand men. On our side it was very considerable, it amounts to four thousand two hundred killed or wounded. 4The combat ended with the approach of night. Lord Wellington then evacuated Les Quatre Bras, and proceeded to Gemappe. 5

"In the morning of the 17th, the emperor repaired to Les Quatre Bras, when he marched to attack the English army: he drove it to the entrance of the forest of Soignes with the left wing and the reserve. 6 The right wing advanced by Sombref in pursuit of Field-marshal Blucher, who was going towards Wavre, where he appeared to wish to take a position.

"At ten o'clock in the evening the English army occupied Mont St. Jean with its centre, and was in position before the forest of Soignes: it would have required three hours to attack it; we were therefore obliged to postpone it till the next day.

"The head-quarters of the emperor were established at the farm of Oaillon, 7near Planchenoit. The rain fell in torrents. Thus, on the 16th, 8the left, wing, the right, and the reserve, were equally engaged, at a distance of about two leagues."

"At nine in the morning, the rain having somewhat abated, the first corps put itself in motion, and placed itself with the left on the road to Brussels, and opposite the village of Mont St. Jean, which appeared the centre of the enemy's position. The second corps leaned its right upon the road to Brussels, and its left upon a small wood, within cannon-shot of the English army. The cuirassiers were in reserve behind, and the guards in reserve upon the heights. The sixth corps, with the cavalry of General D'Aumont, under the order of Count Lobau, was destined to proceed in the rear of our right to oppose a Prussian corps, which appeared to have escaped Marshal Grouchy, and to intent to fall upon our right flank; an intention which had been made known to us by our reports, and by the letter of a Prussian general, enclosing an order of battle, and which was taken by our light troops.

"The troops were full of ardour. We estimated the force of the English army at eighty thousand men. We supposed that the Prussian corps, which might be in line towards the right, might be fifteen thousand men. The enemy's force then was upwards of ninety thousand men; our's less numerous.

"At noon, all the preparations being terminated, Prince Jerome, commanding a division of the second corps, and destined to form the extreme left of it, advanced upon the wood of which the enemy occupied a part. The cannonade began. The enemy supported, with thirty pieces of cannon, the troops he had sent to keep the wood. We made also, on our side, dispositions of artillery. At one o'clock, Prince Jerome was master of all the wood, and the whole English army fell back behind a curtain. Count D'Erlon then attacked the village of Mont St. Jean, and supported his attack with eighty pieces of cannon, which must have occasioned great loss to the English army. All our efforts were made on the opposite eminence. A brigade of the first division of Count D'Erlon took the village of Mont St. Jean; a second brigade was charged by a corps of English cavalry, which occasioned it much loss. At the same moment a division of English cavalry charged the battery of Count D'Erlon by its right, and disorganized several pieces; but the cuirassiers of General Milhaud charged that division, three regiments of which were broken and cut up.

"It was three in the afternoon. The emperor made the guard advance to place it in the plain upon the ground which the first corps had occupied at the outset of the battle; this corps being ready in advance. The Prussian division whose movement had been foreseen, then engaged with the light troops of Count Lobau, spreading its fire upon our whole right flank. It was expedient, before undertaking any thing elsewhere, to wait for the event of this attack. Hence, all the means in reserve were ready to succour Count Lobau, and overwhelm the Prussian corps when it should have advanced.

"This done, the emperor had the design of leading an attack upon the village of Mont St. Jean, from which we expected decisive success; but, by a movement of impatience, so frequent in our military annals, and which has often been so fatal to us, the cavalry of reserve having perceived a retrograde movement made by the English to shelter themselves from our batteries, from which they had suffered so much, crowned the heights of Mont St. Jean, and charged the infantry. This movement, which, made in proper time, and supported by the reserves, must have decided the day, made in an isolated manner, and, before the affair on the right was terminated, became fatal.

"Having no means of countermanding it, the enemy shewed many masses of cavalry and infantry, and our two divisions of cuirassiers being engaged, all our cavalry ran at the same moment to support their comrades. There, for three hours, numerous charges were made, which enables us to penetrate several squares, and to take six standards of the light infantry, an advantage out of proportion with the loss which our cavalry experienced by the grape-shot and musket-firing. It was impossible to dispose of our reserves of infantry until we had repulsed the flank-attack of the Prussian corps. This attack always prolonged itself perpendicularly upon our right flank. The emperor sent thither General Dehesme with the young guard, and several batteries of reserve. The enemy was kept in check, repulsed, and fell back—he had exhausted his forces and we had nothing more to fear. This was the moment that indicated for an attack upon the centre of the enemy. As the cuirassiers had suffered by the grape-shot, we sent four battalions of the middle-guard to protect them, to keep the position, and, if possible, disengage and draw back into the plain a part of our cavalry.

"Two other battalions were sent to keep themselves in force upon the extreme left of the division, which had manœuvred upon our flanks, in order not to have any uneasiness on that side—the rest was disposed in reserve, part to occupy the eminence in rear of Mont St. Jean, and part upon the ridge in rear of the field of battle, which formed our position of retreat.

"In this state of affairs, the battle was gained; we occupied all the positions, which the enemy had possessed at the outset of the battle. Our cavalry having been too sone and ill employed, we could no longer hope for decisive success; but Marshal Grouchy, having learned the movement of the Prussian corps, marched upon the rear of it, ensured us a signal success on the next day. After eight hours' fire and charges of infantry and cavalry, all the army saw with joy the victory gained, and the field of battle in our power.

"At half-after eight o'clock, the four battalions of the middle guard, who had been sent to the ridge on the other side of Mont St. Jean, to support the cuirassiers, being greatly annoyed by the grape- shot, endeavoured to carry the batteries with the bayonet. At the end of the day, a charge directed against their flank, by several English squadrons, put them in disorder. The fugitives recrossed the ravine. Several regiments, which were near at hand, seeing some troops belonging to the guard in confusion, believed it was the old guard, and, in consequence, fled in disorder. Cries of All is lost, the guard is driven back, were heard on every side. The soldiers even pretended that on many points ill-disposed persons cried out, Save who can. However this may be, a complete panic at once spread itself throughout the whole field of battle, and the troops threw themselves in the greatest disorder on the line of communication; soldiers, cannoneers, caissons, all pressed to this point; the old guard, which was in reserve, was infected, and was itself hurried along.

"In an instant, the whole army was nothing but a mass of confusion; all the soldiers, of all arms, were mixed pêle-mêle, and it was utterly impossible to form a single corps. The enemy, who perceived this astonishing confusion, immediately attacked with their cavalry, and increased the disorder; and such was the confusion, owing to night coming on, that it was impossible to rally the troops, and point out to them their error. Thus terminated the battle, a day of false manœuvres was rectified, the greatest success ensured for the next day, yet all was lost by a moment of panic terror. Even the body-guard drawn up by the side of the emperor, was disorganized and overthrown by an overwhelming force, and there was then nothing else to be done but to follow the torrent. The parks of reserve, all the baggage which had not repassed the Sambre, in short every thing that was on the field of battle, remained in the power of the enemy. It was impossible to wait for the troops on our right; every one knows what the bravest army in the world is when thus mixed and thrown into confusion, and when its organization no longer exists.

"The emperor crossed the Sambre at Charleroi, at five o'clock in the morning of the 19th. Philippeville and Avesnes have been given as the points of reunion. Prince Jerome, General Morand, and other generals, have there already rallied a part of the army. Marshal Grouchy, with the corps on the right, is moving on the lower Sambre.

"The loss of the enemy must have been very great, if we may judge from the number of standards we have taken from them, and from the retrograde movements which they have made;—ours cannot be calculated till after the troops shall have been collected. Previous to the confusion which took place, we had already experienced a very considerable loss, particularly in our cavalry, so fatally, though so bravely, engaged. Notwithstanding these losses, this brave cavalry constantly kept the position it had taken from the English, and only abandoned it when the tumult and disorder of the field of battle forced it. It the midst of the night, and the obstacles which encumbered their route, it could not preserve its organization.

"The artillery was as usual covered with glory. the carriages belonging to the head-quarters remained in their ordinary position; no retrograde movement being judged necessary. In the course of the night they fell into the enemy's lands.

"Such was the result of the battle of Mont St. Jean, so glorious for the French armies, and yet so fatal."

"M. Le Duc

"Compelled to break silence, while it is always painful to speak of oneself, and particularly to repel calumnies, I address myself to you, sir, as the president of the provisional government, in order to lay before you a brief and faithful relation of the events I have witnessed. On the 11th of June, I received an order from the minister of war to repair to the imperial head-quarters. I had no command, and hod no information upon the force and composition of the army. Neither the emperor nor his minister had given me any previous hint, from which I could anticipate that I should be employed in the present campaign; I was consequently taken unprepared, without horses, without equipage, and without money; and I was obliged to borrow the necessary expenses of my journey. I arrived on the 12th at Laon, on the 13th at Avesnes, and, on the 14th, at Beaumont. I purchased, in this last city, two horses from the Duke of Treviso, with which I proceeded on the 15th, to Charleroi, accompanied by my first aide-de-camp, the only officer I had with me. I arrived at the moment when the enemy, attacked by our light troops, was retreating upon Fleurus to Gosselies.

"The emperor immediately ordered me to put myself at the head of the first and second corps of infantry, commanded by Lieutenant-Generals d'Erlon and Reille, of the divisions of light cavalry of Lieutenant-General Pire, of the division of light cavalry of the guard under the command of Lieutenants-General Lefebvre Desnouettes and Colbert, and of two divisions of cavalry of Count Valmy, forming altogether eight divisions of infantry and four of cavalry. With these troops, a part of which only I had as yet under my immediate command, I pursued the enemy, and formed him to evacuate Gosselies, Frasne, Millet, and Heppiegnies. There I took up a position for the night, with the exception of the first corps, which was still at Marchiennes, and which did not join me until the following day.

"On the 16th, I was ordered to attack the English in their position at Les Quatre Bras. We advanced towards the enemy with an enthusiasm difficult to be described. Nothing could resist our impetuosity. The battle became general, and victory was no longer doubtful; when, at the moment that I intended to bring up the first corps of infantry, which had been left by me in reserve at Frasne, I learned that the emperor had disposed of it, without acquainting me of the circumstance, as well as of the division of Girard of the second corps, that he might direct them upon St. Amand, and to strengthen his left wing, which was warmly engaged with the Prussians. The shock which this intelligence gave me confounded me. Having now under my command only three divisions, instead of the eight upon which I calculated, I was obliged to renounce the hopes of my victory; and, in spite of all my efforts, notwithstanding the intrepidity and devotion of my troops, I could not do more than maintain myself in my position till the close of the day. About nine o'clock, the first corps was returned to me by the emperor, to whom it had been of no service. Thus twenty-five or thirty thousand men were absolutely paralyzed, and were idly paraded, during the whole of the battle, from the right to the left, and the left to the right, without firing a shot.

"I cannot help suspending these details for a moment, to call your attention to all the melancholy consequences of this false movement, and, in general, of the bad disposition during the whole of the day. By what fatality, for example, did the emperor, instead of directing all his forces against Lord Wellington, who would have been taken unawares, and could not have resisted, consider this attack as secondary? How could the emperor, after the passage of the Sambre, conceive it possible to fight two battles on the same day? It was to oppose forces double ours, and to do what the military men who were witnesses of it can scarcely yet comprehend. Instead of this, he had left a corps of observation to watch the Prussians, and marched with his most powerful masses to support me, the English army would undoubtedly have been destroyed between Les Quatre Bras and Gemappe; and that position, which separated the two allied armies, being once in our power, would have afforded the emperor an opportunity of outflanking the right of the Prussians, and of crushing them in their turn. The general opinion in France, and especially in the army, was, that the emperor would have bent his whole efforts to annihilate first the English army; and circumstances were favourable for the accomplishment of such a project: but fate ordered it otherwise.

"On the 17th, the army marched in the direction of Mont St. Jean.

"On the 18th, the battle commenced at one o'clock, and though the bulletin which details it makes no mention of me, it is not necessary for me to say that I was engaged in it. Lieutenant-General count Drouet [Drouot] has already spoken of that battle in the chamber of peers. His narration is accurate, with the exception of some important facts which he has passed over in silence, or of which he was ignorant, and which it is now my duty to disclose. About seven o'clock in the evening, after the most dreadful carnage which I have ever witnessed, General Labedoyere came to me with a message from the emperor, that Marshal Grouchy had arrived on our right, and attacked the left of the united English and Prussians. This general officer, in riding along the lines, spread this intelligence among the soldiers, whose courage and devotion remained unshaken, and who gave new proofs of them at that moment, notwithstanding the fatigue with which they were exhausted. What was my astonishment, (I should rather say indignation,) when I learned, immediately afterwards, that, so far from Marshal Grouchy having arrived to our support, as the whole army had been assured, between forty and fifty thousand Prussians were attacking our extreme right, and forcing it to retire!

"Whether the emperor was deceived with regard to the time when the marshal could support him, or whether the advance of the marshal was retarded by the efforts of the enemy longer than was calculated upon, the fact is, that at the moment when his arrival was announced to us, he was still only at Wavre upon the Dyle, which to us was the same as if he had been a hundred leagues from the field of battle.

"A short time afterwards, I saw four regiments of the middle guard advancing, led on by the emperor. With these troops he wished to renew the attack, and to penetrate the centre of the enemy. He ordered me to lead them on. Generals, officers, and soldiers, all displayed the greatest intrepidity; but this body of troops was too weak long to resist the forces opposed to it by the enemy, and we were soon compelled to renounce the hope which this attack had for a few moments inspired. General Friant was struck by a ball at my side, and I myself had my horse killed, and fell under it. The brave men who have survived this terrible battle, will, I trust, do me the justice to state, that they saw me on foot, with sword in hand, during the whole of the evening, and that I was one of the last who quitted the scene of carnage at the moment when retreat could no longer be prevented. At the same time, the Prussians continued their offensive movements, and our right sensibly gave way. The English also advanced in their turn. There yet remained to us four squares of the old guard, to protect our retreat. These brave grenadiers, the flower of the army, forced successively to retire, yielded ground foot by foot, until finally overpowered by numbers, they were almost completely destroyed. From that moment the retrograde movement was decided, and the army formed nothing but a confused mass. There was not, however, a total rout, nor the cry of Save who can, as has been calumniously stated in the bulletin. As for myself, being constantly in the rear-guard, which I followed on foot, having had all my horses killed, worn out with fatigue, covered with contusions, and having no longer strength to walk, I owe my life to a corporal, who supported me in the march, and did not abandon me during the retreat. At eleven at night, I met Lieutenant-General Lefebvre Desnouettes; and one of his officers, Major Schmidt, had the generosity to give me the only horse that remained to him. In this manner I arrived at Marchienne-au-Pont, at four o'clock in the morning, alone, without any officers of my staff, ignorant of the fate of the emperor, of whom, before the end of the battle, I had entirely lost sight, and who, I had reason to believe, was either killed or taken prisoner. General Pamphile Lacroix, chief of the staff of the second corps, whom I found in this city, having told me that the emperor was at Charleroi, I supposed that his majesty intended to place himself at the head of Marshal Grouchy's corps, to cover the Sambre, and to facilitate to the troops the means of rallying near Avesnes; and with this persuasion I proceeded to Beaumont; but parties of cavalry following us too closely, and having already intercepted the roads of Maubeuge and Philippeville, I became sensible of the total impossibility of arresting a single soldier on that point to oppose the progress of the victorious enemy. I continued my march upon Avesnes, where I could obtain no intelligence concerning the emperor.

"In this state of things, having no intelligence of his majesty, nor of the major-general 9the disorder increasing every instant, and, with the exception of some veterans of the regiments of the guard and of the line, every one pursuing his own inclination, I determined to proceed immediately to Pris by St. Quentin, and disclose, as quickly as possible, the true state of affairs to the minister of war, that he might send some fresh troops to meet the army, and rapidly adopt the measures which circumstances required. At my arrival at Bourget, three leagues from Paris, I learned that the emperor had passed through that place at nine o'clock in the morning.

"Such, M. le Duc, is a faithful history of this calamitous campaign.

"I now ask those who have survived that fine and numerous army, how I can be accused of the disasters of which it has been the victim, and of which our military annals furnish no example. I have, it is said, betrayed my country—I who, to serve it, have shewn a zeal which I have perhaps carried too far; but this calumny is not and cannot be supported by any fact or any presumption. Whence have these odious reports, which spread with frightful rapidity, arisen? If, in the inquiries which I have made on this subject, I had not feared almost as much to discover as to be ignorant of the truth, I should declare that every circumstance proves that I have been basely deceived, and that it is attempted to cover, under the veil of treason, the errors and extravagancies of this campaign; error which have not been avowed in the bulletins that have appeared, and against which I have in vain raised that voice of truth which I will yet cause to resound in the chamber of peers. I expect from the justice of your excellency, and from your kindness to me, that you will cause this letter to be inserted in the journals, and give it the greatest possible publicity. 10

"Marshal Prince of the MOSKWA.

"I halted in this situation until day-light. Wavre and Bielge were occupied by the Prussians, who, at three in the morning of the 18th, 12attacked in their turn, wishing to take advantage of the difficult position in which I was, and expecting to drive me into the defile, and take the artillery which had debouched, and make me repass the Dyle. Their efforts were fruitless. The Prussians were repulsed, and the village of Bielge taken. The brave General Penney was killed.

"General Vandamme then passed one of his divisions by Bielge, and carried with ease the heights of Wavre, and, along the whole of my line, the success was complete. I was in front of Rozierne, preparing to march on Brussels when I received the sad intelligence of the loss of the battle of Waterloo. The officer who brought it informed me, that your majesty was retreating on the Sambre, without being able to indicate any particular point on which I should direct my march. I ceased to pursue, and began my retrograde movement. The retreating army did not think of following me. Learning that the enemy had already passed the Sambre, and was on my flank, and not being sufficiently strong to make a diversion in favour of your majesty, without compromising the army which I commanded, I marched on Namur. At this moment, the columns in the rear were attacked. That of the left made a retrograde movement sooner than was expected, which endangered for a moment the retreat of the left; but good dispositions soon repaired every thing, and two pieces which had been taken, were recovered by the brave twentieth dragoons, who, besides, took an howitzer from the enemy. We entered Namur without loss. The long defile which extends from this place to Dinant, in which only a single column can march, and the embarrassment arising from the numerous transports of wounded, rendered it necessary to hold for a considerable time the town, in which I had not the means of blowing up the bridge. I intrusted the defence of Namur to General Vandamme, who, with his usual intrepidity, maintained himself there till eight in the evening; so that nothing was left behind, and I occupied Dinant.

"The enemy has lost some thousands of men in the attack on Namur, where the contest was ver obstinate; the troops have performed their duty in a manner worthy of praise. 13

Ney then accounts for the entire day of the 17th by stating, "On the 17th, the army marched in the direction of Mont St. Jean." The 17th was a very important day. Positive action on the part of Ney on the 17th also could have changed history by preventing the battle of Waterloo from occurring. Ney had just fought a tremendous battle against Wellington the day before and knew that Wellington was occupying Quatre Bras when the sun rose on the 17th. He knew that Napoleon had defeated the Prussians at Ligny the night before and was looking forward to finishing off Wellington on the 17th. He knew that it was his responsibility to put pressure on Wellington until Napoleon could arrive with the reserve. However, just as on the previous day, Ney spent the entire morning doing nothing. When Napoleon arrived in the area at about 1300, he found Ney's soldiers eating their rations. It is obvious that Napoleon must also be blamed for lack of activity on this day, since it is obvious that he should have been at Quatre Bras long before 1300. By the time he arrived, however, Wellington had pulled most his army back from Quatre Bras; a fact that was plainly and painfully obvious to the furious Napoleon. Napoleon was finally able to get a cavalry pursuit going at about 1400. But luck was against him again. A torrential downpour began which continued throughout the night and into the next morning. This made it impossible to move on anything by the main thoroughfare, which itself was almost impassable. Moving the artillery was a super-human effort. So that's how Ney blew it on the 17th.

In his account of the 18th, that is, the Battle of Waterloo, Ney conveniently fails to mention the several massive cavalry charges that he started on his own initiative, without, or with insufficient, infantry and/or artillery support. In these charges, he threw away almost all of the French cavalry. By doing this, even if Napoleon had won the battle, it could not be decisive because he now had no cavalry with which to pursue the fugitive enemy.

Taking all of the above into account, it is obvious that Ney did not do his job. As an experienced Corps commander, a Marshal of the Empire, there is no excuse for his actions and inaction. Return to paragraph text.