Napoleonic Literature
Waterloo Excerpts
The Belgian Account
Head-Quarters, Nivelles, 17th June, 1815,
Two in the morning.
 "Very early on the morning of the 15th, the Prussian army was attached in its position, which it abandoned, and retired from Charleroi, by Gossilies, as far as the environs of Fleurus. As soon as I was apprised of this attack, I gave the necessary orders to the corps of troops under my command. In consequence of what took place in the Prussian army, the battalion of Orange Nassau, which, together with a battery of light artillery, occupied the village of Frasné, were attacked at five o'clock in the evening of the 15th. These troops maintained themselves in their position on the height of this village, called Quatre Bras. 1Only a part of the second division was enabled to move thither immediately, in consequence of the brigade, under the orders of Major-general Byland, not being able to leave Nivelles prior to the arrival of other troops at that place.

"The firing of the tirailleurs commenced at five o'clock yesterday morning on this point, and was kept up on both sides until mid-day, without any result. About two o'clock the attack became much more severe, especially on the part of the cavalry and artillery. The brigade of light cavalry, under the command of General Van Merlen, was not able to come up before four o'clock; previous to which time I had no cavalry to oppose to the enemy. Seeing of how great importance it was to preserve the position on the heights of the road, called Quatre Bras, I was fortunate in maintaining them against an enemy who was in every respect superior to me in force.

"Having been attacked by the two French corps, commanded by Generals D'Erlon and Reille, and having succeeded in checking them, the Duke of Wellington had time to assemble a sufficient force to foil the projects of the enemy. The result of this attack has been, that, after a very obstinate contest, which lasted till nine o'clock in the evening, we not only checked the enemy, but even repulsed him.

"The Prussian army, which was also attacked yesterday, maintained its principal position; and there is no doubt, that Napoleon, with very considerable forces, will direct an attack upon the whole line.

"Our troops bivouacked upon the field of battle, whither I shall immediately proceed, in expectation of the probability that Napoleon will endeavour to execute to-day the project of yesterday. The Duke of Wellington has concentrated upon this point as many troops as he was able to collect.

"I experience a lively pleasure in being able to announce to your majesty, that your troops, and the infantry and artillery in particular, fought with great courage.

"Circumstances having prevented my receiving the reports from the different corps concerning their loss, I am unable to acquaint you with it: but I shall have the honour of doing it as soon as possible.

(Signed) "WILLIAM, Prince of Orange."
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Brussels, June 22, 1815.
"After the battle of the 16th, of which I had the honour of giving an account to your majesty on the 17th, at two in the morning, from the head-quarters at Nivelles, the Duke of Wellington, keeping his line with the Prussian army, made a movement in the morning, the result of which was, that the army found itself in position upon the heights in front of Waterloo, where it bivouacked; the enemy's cavalry, which followed the movements of the army, was in different attacks repulsed with loss by the British cavalry.

"On the 18th, a day-break, we discovered the enemy in our front: at ten o'clock he shewed a disposition to attack. The army of Buonaparte was composed of the first, second, third, fourth, and sixth, corps, the Imperial Guards, nearly the whole of his cavalry, and a train of artillery, consisting of many hundred pieces of cannon. About eleven o'clock, the enemy unmasked a small battery, under the cover of the fire of which, his tirailleurs advanced against our right wing, and, immediately after, his attack was directed against a farm surrounded with copse-wood, which was situated a short way in front of this wing, and on the left of the read leading to Nivelles. The enemy made the most furious, but fruitless, attacks, to possess himself of this farm. At noon, the cannonade became violent; and, before half-past twelve, the battle was extended along the whole line. The French repeatedly attacked our two wings; but, as their principal object was to pierce the right of our centre, they employed all their means to accomplish it. Some columns of the enemy's cavalry advanced boldly against us: but, notwithstanding the inconceivable violence with which they renewed their attacks, from three o'clock in the afternoon until the end of the battle, they never succeeded in making our line waver. The enemy was constantly repulsed, as well from the fire of the squares as by the charges of our cavalry: it is impossible to depict to your majesty the fury with which they fought, especially during the last six hours.

"I was unfortunate in not being able to see the end of this glorious and important battle, having received, half an hour before the defeat of the enemy, a ball through my left shoulder, which compelled me to quit the field of battle.

"It is with the most lively satisfaction that I am able to inform your majesty, that your troops, of all arms, have fought with the greatest courage. In the charges of cavalry, the brigade of carabineers attracted particular notice. The division of Lieutenant-general Chassé was not engaged until late; and, as I was not personally able to quit the centre, I had placed it, for the day, under the orders of General Lord Hill, commanding the second corps of the army. I have heard that this division likewise conducted itself with much bravery, and that Lieutenant-general Chassé, as also the two commanders of brigades, very satisfactorily acquitted themselves of their duty. 2

"I cannot, at this moment, make any detail to your majesty of the loss we have sustained, not having received the returns. I am obliged, nevertheless, with the most profound regret, to state that it is considerable.

"I have charged my adjutant, Van Hooft, to transmit this report to your majesty. I take my liberty of recommending him to your favourable consideration.

(Signed) "WILLIAM, Prince of Orange."

1. This is a fabrication, or, to be blunt, the Prince of Orange is lieing and taking credit for the very fortunate decision of a subordinate. The Prince of Orange was in Brussels on the 15th of June and didn't leave there until after 0200 on the 16th, when the Duke of Wellington ordered him to proceed to Quatre Bras to join his troops. On the afternoon of the 15th, the Prince of Orange had received intelligence from his corps that the French were advancing and had engaged the Prussians in the vicinity of Charleroi. Therefore, in the late afternoon of the 15th, fearing that Napoleon was about to cut his line of retreat, Wellington ordered the Prince of Orange LTG Hill to concentrate their corps, I Corps and II Corps respectively, west and southwest of Brussels and retained the Army Reserve at Brussels. The Prince or Orange and LTG Hill duly forwarded these orders for concentration. It is important at this point to understand that the intent of Orange was to concentrate his corps west of where they were needed, as ordered by Wellington. When Orange's chief of staff, MG Constant-Rebecque received Wellington's orders, he was shocked. Being close to the action, it was clear to Rebecque that Wellington was directing his concentration to the wrong point, and that they should be concentrating at Quatre-Bras, which was the key to Brussels. Rebecque therefore decided to disobey Wellington's orders and concentrate I Corps at Quatre-Bras instead of Nivelles. He discussed this with LTG Perponcher, commander of the 2d Dutch-Belgian Infantry Division, who agreed with Rebecque's estimate of the situation. Rebecque then ordered Perponcher to send Prince Bernard of Saxe-Weimar's brigade to Quatre-Bras for a reconnaissance in force. This is the force that Ney ran into, which he thought was superior to his own but was not. Word was quickly sent back to Rebecque that the French were arriving in force at Quatre-Bras and he immediately ordered the rest of Perponcher's division there. Then, he wrote a quick dispatch to the Prince of Orange. This dispatch was delivered into the hands of Orange at the ball of the Duchess of Richmond, some time after 0100 on the 16th. Without reading it, he handed it Wellington, who, apparently to put on a "front," put it in his pocket for several minutes and then read it. The message, which was addressed to the Prince of Orange, stated that the French were advancing on Quartre- Bras, which was lightly defended, and would not have been that if he had not been insubordinate and disregarded Wellington's orders. It was at about this time that Wellington ordered Orange to join his Corps at Quatre-Bras. Return to paragraph text.

2. Historians have always been mystified concerning the disposition that Wellington made of Perponcher's division at Mont St. Jean. Wellington's main line was on the reverse slope of the Ohain Road, which is an east-west highway. This is to say that, except for the artillery and Perponcher, all troops were positioned on the north side of the Ohain Road, facing south. The second line was sufficiently down the slope so that they could not be seen by the French, whose positions on the ridgeline across the valley was slightly higher than that on which the Anglo-Allied army was situated. Anyone who has read about Wellington knows that he was a master of the defense, and especially of the use of reverse slopes to protect his troops from artillery fire as well as to disguise his true strength and dispositions. Being the master of the use of the reverse slope, why did Wellington put Perponcher's division in front of the rest of the line, to include the artillery? Saxe-Weimer's brigade was stationed in the valley, between the very end of the Wellington's left flank and the farms of Papelotte and La Haye. It is easy to see that something was needed here to ensure the French didn't slip through this chink in the armor and outflank Wellington's left. The real mystery is Bijlandt's brigade, which was stationed on the forward slope, completely exposed to the French artillery and cavalry charges that were sure to come. Why? Just two days before, on the 16th, Wellington had ridden over to Ligny to confer with Blucher. At that time, Wellington pointed out to Blucher that he had picked a poor place for a defensive battle and that he would be beaten. In particular, he pointed out the fact that Blucher had stationed many of his units on forward slopes where they would be mown down by the French artillery. So, if putting formations on the forward slope was so bad for the Prussians, why was it acceptable for Wellington? Let's take another look at who was out there in no-man's land: Perponcher, Bijlandt and Saxe-Weimer. Ring a bell? If not, then take another look at footnote 1. In my estimation, Perponcher and the rest of his division was being punished for disobedience of orders on the 15th and 16th. Even though by disobeying orders they had saved Wellington's skin, I believe he was extremely upset and used this opportunity to punish them. I further believe that if Rebecque had been on that side of the battlefield instead of with the Prince of Orange, that he would also have been thrown to the wolves. Return to paragraph text.
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