During the last four miles of the route from Domnau to Friedland, the general slope of the country is downwards towards the Alle, on the left bank of which stands the little town of Friedland. [1] Two miles before it is reached, a slight elevation, in rear of Posthenen, affords a clear and uninterrupted view over the whole battlefield, and down to Friedland, lying directly to the spectator’s front. On the right front, some 500 paces from the village of Posthenen, is the great wood of Sortlack, extending down to the village of the same name, at the head of a re-entrant angle of the Alle, which here flows between high and steep banks. A mile and a quarter to the left (north) of Posthenen is the village of Heinrichsdorf. Two-thirds of the distance, in a direction but slightly north of east, from Heinrichsdorf to the Alle, is the small wood of Damerau. Behind the line joining Posthenen and Heinrichsdorf are large woods.

The whole space, between the left bank of the river and the points which have just been denoted, is a gently undulating, open plain, with no gradients sufficient to impede the free movement of troops of all arms.

On the 14th June, the whole of this plain was one sheet of crops, rye and wheat.

Open as the plain generally was, there was one feature in it the supreme importance of which was at once recognised by Napoleon. Rising west of Posthenen, a small stream, known as the Millstream, flowing through the village, thence takes a course direct for Friedland. It divides the plain into two portions, the greater extending northwards to the Damerau wood, the lesser southwards to that of Sortlack. In its passage from in front of Posthenen till it reaches the outskirts of Friedland, the brook flows between steep banks, and, though narrow, is a serious military obstacle, entirely obstructing the free passage of troops. At Friedland, it expands into a semicircular pond, covering the greater part of the north side of the town. On the south side is the Alle, flowing at this point from west to east, and then turning north after passing the town. Friedland is thus built at the end of a peninsula, of which the north and south sides, respectively, are closed by the Millstream and by the Alle.

On the opposite bank of the Alle there is a plain similar to that on the left bank, backed by a great wood on the Allenburg road. The large village of Allenau stands back from the river, opposite Sortlack; a smaller village, Kloschenen, is on the brink of the high right bank, 2000 paces below Friedland.

It was 6 p.m. on the 13th June when the head of Bennigsen’s army, under Gallitzin, began to reach the neighbourhood of Friedland. Lannes’ cavalry had already ejected from the town the few Russian troops guarding the magazines there. A French patrol was surrounded and captured on the right bank of the river. Passing into Friedland, Gallitzin captured 60 cavalry in it; beyond the town, on the west, he found the French 9th Hussars, which he forced back on Lannes’ corps at Domnau, taking post with his cavalry at Posthenen.

Kologribow detached small bodies to Wohnsdorf, Allenburg, and Wehlau, to watch the lower passages of the Alle, and to gain communication with Lestocq. There then remained at Friedland, 28 squadrons, and 17 guns.

Towards 8 p.m., Bennigsen himself reached Friedland. Informed of the proximity of Lannes’ corps, he ordered the first troops which arrived to cross the river in support of the cavalry, and directed the construction of three pontoon bridges, one above and two below the permanent bridge. It was not till 11 p.m. that the head of the Guard infantry column arrived at Friedland. One battalion was sent over at once to the support of the cavalry, and three more regiments as day dawned (about 3.30), and the French began to appear in force. It was 5 a.m. before the first battalions of the main Russian body came up.

As soon as Lannes had heard, from his retiring cavalry, of the Russian passage at Friedland, he despatched Ruffin’s brigade, and part of Oudinot’s grenadier division, towards that point. Scarcely had they started, when a despatch from Napoleon warned Lannes that Bennigsen appeared to intend crossing at Friedland, and marching direct on Koenigsberg. [2] The Emperor had promptly ordered Grouchy, from Eylau, with his own dragoon division and Nansouty’s cuirassiers, to join Lannes as quickly as possible. Lannes followed shortly, with the rest of Oudinot’s and Verdier’s divisions.

It was still night when Oudinot, between 2 and 3 a.m., debouched on the Friedland plain, to find Ruffin in front of him, advancing against the Russian cavalry. He pushed forward two battalions into the Sortlack wood, and held his main body in front of Posthenen, on the near bank of a small brook, which issues from the wood towards the Millstream. In front, he placed 2 batteries, and behind them were 5 or 6 battalions, and 1 gun, somewhat to the left, with their backs to the Bothkeim wood. From the Russian side also, skirmishers were sent into the Sortlack wood, where they met the French. Musketry and artillery fire broke out all along the line. The Russian skirmishers were from the Guard infantry, which had been sent over to the left of the cavalry. They were exhausted by a long march without rest, and they were ignorant of the ground.

At 3 a.m., Grouchy arrived with French and Saxon dragoons. At this hour Lannes had on the ground 9000 infantry, and 3000 cavalry. [3] The next to arrive were Oudinot’s dragoons, who took post behind his right, on the south bank of the Millstream.

This cavalry moved out, between 5 and 6 a.m., across the little brook in front of the guns, against the Russian cavalry. They were not as yet strong enough to beat Kologribow’s horsemen. As they were being driven back, they received timely succour by the arrival, at 6 o’clock, of Fresia’s Dutch cavalry (of Mortier’s corps), who made a fresh addition to the strength of the French right, and forced Kologribow to retire. Whilst these cavalry combats were in progress, Grouchy had observed that the Russians, who were now rapidly crossing the river, were advancing in force on Heinrichsdorf by the road to Koenigsberg. From the village they would be in a position to gain the French rear through the Georgenau wood.

Sending Nansouty forward from the Domnau road, Grouchy followed towards Heinrichsdorf, direct from Posthenen. Nansouty, passing through the Georgenau wood, drove out of it, through Heinrichsdorf, the advanced troops of the Russians, until he was stopped by infantry and artillery. Ordering Nansouty to form front towards the enemy at the village, Grouchy himself charged their guns as they entered it; whilst Nansouty, aided by Albert’s dragoons, now sent up by Lannes, attacked in front. Disordered by a successful onslaught, the French were, in turn, charged by Russian cavalry, who, however, only succeeded in facilitating the withdrawal of most of their own guns before they were beaten off. Grouchy then drew up his men on either side of Heinrichsdorf at its eastern entrance.

All this time a desultory combat, without any decisive result on either side, had been in progress along Lannes’ whole front. That marshal found himself in a position in some ways similar to that which he had held at Pultusk. As at Pultusk, he was facing a very superior force, for the Russians were now hurrying across the Friedland bridges, Bennigsen hoping and believing that only Lannes was at hand. But there was this great difference between the two cases, that, at Pultusk, Lannes felt he had nothing to fall back on, whilst, at Friedland, he knew that the Emperor was hurrying up an overwhelming force to his aid.

It was now 9 a.m., and there were on the field 9000 French infantry and 8000 cavalry. Lannes had made the most of his small force. He covered the whole of his front with an unusually dense line of skirmishers; the troops behind them were able to give the impression of larger numbers, owing to the detached groups of trees, the inequalities of the ground, and the high crops. Lannes also, by moving them about and deploying them in different positions, conveyed the impression of the arrival of more troops. Their business was to fight a delaying action, to keep Bennigsen occupied, and to induce him to bring across the river his whole army, very inferior in numbers to the corps which Napoleon, in a few hours, would be able to collect against it. By 9 o’clock, Bennigsen had passed across the river 46,000 men, a force amply sufficient to overwhelm Lannes, with whom alone he still believed he would have to deal. [4] Six divisions of infantry, and most of the cavalry, had crossed. As his troops arrived, the Russian commander drew them up on the plain between Sortlack and the Damerau wood. On the northern half of this space, between Damerau and the Millstream, the 8th, 7th, 6th, and 3rd divisions, under Gortchakow, stood, whilst the smaller southern portion, from the Millstream to Sortlack, was occupied by the 1st and 2nd divisions, the advance guard, and part of the cavalry under Kologribow. The greater part of the cavalry was in the northern portion, under Uwarow and Gallitzin. The infantry were drawn up in two lines; in the first the regiments stood with their first and third battalions deployed, the end battalion in column behind. The second line consisted of entire regiments in columns of battalions, behind the 3rd battalions of the front line. The greater part of the cossacks were about the Damerau wood. In the Sortlack wood were about 3000 picked jägers, who had been driven back into it, and were fighting there. In support of them, at Sortlack, stood two battalions, five squadrons, and four guns.

To obliterate, as far at possible, the separation of the left from his centre and right, Bennigsen threw four small bridges across the Millstream. On the right bank of the Alle remained the 14th division and 20 squadrons, on the Schippenbeil road, as well as Platow’s flying column, and a large part of the artillery. The detachments which Kologribow had made to Wohnsdorf and Allenburg, were reinforced by a Guard infantry regiment, 3 cavalry regiments, some cossacks, and a part of the Guard artillery. [5] Some of the guns covered the pontoon bridges, a battery at Kloschenen supported the right wing across the river, another fired on the French issuing, from Sortlack wood, against the left flank.

The fight in that wood had oscillated backwards and forwards: at one moment the Russian jägers had driven the French out of it; a few moments later the latter had returned, and again made their way deep into the covert, only once more to be driven back to its edge. So the fight swayed backwards and forwards.

About 9 o’clock, the whole Russian army moved forward, bringing its left into line with the front then held by the jägers in Sortlack wood, whilst the right wing stood 500 or 600 paces short of Heinrichsdorf.

The cossacks, pushing into and through that village, arrived on the rear of the French line towards Schwonau, as the Russian cavalry of the right wing attacked it in front. Beaumont and Colbert, with 2500 cavalry of the 1st and 6th corps, quickly drove off the Cossacks, and then, joining in the severe cavalry fight which was in progress, they turned the balance in favour of the French.

Mortier’s corps [6] was now beginning to appear on the scene, Dupas’ division of it reaching Heinrichsdorf just in time to arrest the progress of the Russian infantry. Dupas then took his stand on the right of the village, which was still occupied by 3 battalions of grenadiers. The remainder of the grenadiers returned to their own division, on the right, whilst 3 Polish regiments, of Dombrowski’s division, placed themselves behind the battery in front of Posthenen. The French now had 23,000 infantry and 10,500 cavalry present when, at 10 a.m., Verdier’s division, the rear of Lannes’ corps, at last put in an appearance, raising the French to 40,000 against 46,000 Russians. Bennigsen at last began to see that he was likely to have more on his hands than be could manage. He could only hope that Napoleon would not be able to overwhelm him before night should afford him an opportunity of retrieving the error which he had committed in crossing the river. Meanwhile, officer after officer had been despatched to inform Napoleon of the position of affairs.
 
 

He reached the field about noon, [7] and, from the height in rear of Posthenen, scanned the battlefield. A very different sight was before him on this bright summer morning from that which he had witnessed under the wintry sky of Eylau, and he was in very different spirits. To his staff he had remarked at Domnau, “The enemy appears to wish to give battle to-day; so much the better, it is the anniversary of Marengo.” His wonderful power of grasping the points of a battlefield at once showed him the faultiness of Bennigsen’s position, split in two by the Millstream, with his left wing across the opening of the triangular peninsular ending at Friedland, bounded on one side by the Millstream, on the other by the Alle. He saw that this wing was cut off from the support of the rest of the army by the stream, and that the four bridges, by which Bennigsen had attempted to remedy this fatal defect, were almost useless. He saw that, as the left wing was forced back, it would be driven closer and closer together, until it was enclosed in Friedland, where its defeat, with the capture of the town, must infallibly bring disaster upon the centre and right, if they attempted to maintain their position, with the river, unfordable as he believed it to be, close behind them. He felt that Bennigsen had lost his only chance of escape by neglecting to fall upon Lannes with far greater vigour, and to destroy him before the rest of the army could arrive.

By this time, Napoleon had sufficient strength to hold back the wearied Russians until the arrival of Ney, Victor, and the Guard. Till then, he was not anxious to press the fight, in which a lull now occurred. By 2 p.m. the orders for the battle were dictated and issued. They were as follows: [8]

“Marshal Ney will take the right from Posthenen towards Sortlack, and will rest on the present position of General Oudinot. Marshal Lannes will form the centre, which will commence at the left of Marshal Ney, from Heinrichsdorf, up to about opposite the village of Posthenen; the grenadiers of Oudinot, at present forming the right of Marshal Lannes, will lean insensibly to the left, in order to draw upon themselves the attention of the enemy.

“Marshal Lannes will close in his divisions as much as possible, by this closure enabling himself to form two lines.

“The left will be formed by Marshal Mortier, holding Heinrichsdorf and the Koenigsberg road, and thence extending opposite the Russian right wing. Marshal Mortier will never advance, as the movement will be by our right, pivoting on the left.

“The cavalry of General Espagne, and General Grouchy’s dragoons, united to the cavalry of the left wing, will manœuvre so as to cause as much harm as possible to the enemy when he, pressed by the vigorous attack of our right, shall feel the necessity of retreat.

“General Victor and the Imperial Guard, horse and foot, will form the reserve, and will be placed at Grünhof, Bothkeim, and behind Posthenen.

“Lahoussaye’s division of dragoons will be under the orders of General Victor; that of General Latour-Maubourg will obey Marshal Ney. Nansouty’s division of heavy cavalry will be at the disposal of Marshal Lannes, and will fight alongside the cavalry of the reserve, in the centre.

“I shall be with the reserve in the centre.

“The advance must be always from the right, and the initiative of the movement must be left to Marshal Ney, who will await my orders to begin.

“As soon as the right advances against the enemy, all the artillery of the line will redouble its fire in the direction most useful for the protection of the attack on the right.”

But the Emperor was still in some doubt as to what force was in front of him. On the previous evening, his cavalry had not been able to give him any precise information as to the enemy’s movements. [9] Murat, according to Savary, [10] had informed him, on the morning of the 13th, that the bulk of the Russian army was marching direct on Koenigsberg. The cavalry had, apparently, over-estimated Kamenskoi’s 9000 men. The fact of his detaching two entire corps and three cavalry divisions to deal with the enemy at Koenigsberg shows that Napoleon believed the Russians to be in much greater strength in that direction than they really were. When he reached the front, at Posthenen, Oudinot had told him there were 80,000 men in front of him. Savary, sent out to see if the enemy were, as Napoleon could hardly believe possible, determined to fight a great battle with the river close behind them, reported that they were still crossing the bridges in great numbers. [11] The Emperor’s doubts are clearly exhibited by a despatch dated, “Before Friedland, 3 p.m., June 14th,” [12] which is worth quoting in full.

“The cannonade has been in progress since 3 a.m.; the enemy appears to be here in order of battle with his army; at first he wished to debouch towards Koenigsberg; now he appears to be seriously meditating the battle which is about to commence. His Majesty hopes that you are already in Koenigsberg (a division of dragoons and Marshal Soult are sufficient to enter that town), and that, with two cuirassier divisions and Marshal Davout, you will have marched for Friedland; for it is possible the battle may last over to-morrow. Endeavour, therefore, to arrive by 1 a.m. We have not, as yet, any news of you to-day. Should the Emperor be led to suppose that the enemy is in very great force, it is possible he may rest satisfied to-day with bombarding him, and wait for you. Communicate part of this letter to Marshals Soult and Davout.”

From noon till 5 p.m. the action was maintained in a desultory fashion, chiefly by the artillery of both sides. The Russians who had been marching all night, and most of the previous day, were exhausted. At 4 p.m., Victor’s corps and the French Guard arrived.

As Bennigsen saw column upon column arriving on the edge of the woods behind Posthenen, moving into line, and forming a “deep girdle of glittering steel,” [13] on the horizon, he bitterly repented his passage of the river, and had already given orders to attempt a retreat. They had scarcely been issued when they had to be cancelled.
 
 

At 5 o’clock, [14] the comparative silence was broken by three salvoes of 20 guns, the signal for the advance. The echo of the last had not died away before, from the whole line of French artillery, there burst forth a furious fire. At the same moment, Ney’s corps, already collected in the clearings of the nearer portion of the Sortlack wood, [15] dashed forward with loud cheers, driving the jägers slowly back. By 6 o’clock the wood was cleared, and Ney’s columns began to debouch on the farther side. The supporting Russian troops, at Sortlack, were powerless to stop their movement, but a battery on the farther bank of the Alle caused them some annoyance.

In mass of divisions, Marchand leading on the right, Bisson on the left, Latour-Maubourg behind, Ney pushed on. Marchand, overwhelming the retiring Russians at Sortlack, drove them in wild confusion into the Alle below the village. To accomplish this he had to diverge to his right, into the eastward bend of the river, thus leaving an open space between himself and Bisson. Into this space dashed Kologribow at the head of his cavalry but he was promptly met by Latour-Maubourg, moving up to fill the gap. Charged by this force in front, fired into by Marchand and Bisson on his flanks, Kologribow’s attempt to split Ney’s infantry failed. Marchand, as the Russians retired again, moving westwards along the river, effected, once more, his union with Bisson, and the two ranged themselves across the neck of the Friedland peninsula, from the re-entrant angle of the Alle to the Millstream. The Russians in the peninsula, now bent back at an obtuse angle from the line north of the brook, were gradually being compressed by the narrowing space into compact masses on which the French artillery wrought fearful havoc.

As Ney advanced, Napoleon had moved up Victor’s corps, on the right of the Eylau road, in two lines, with Lahoussaye’s dragoons in 3rd line. Durosnel’s cavalry followed. Ney’s corps, with a cloud of skirmishers in front, again moved forward towards Friedland, Latour-Maubourg following some way behind. Marchand, on the ground sloping towards Friedland and the Alle, was suffering heavily by case from the Russian batteries beyond it, to silence which Ney moved his corps artillery to the bank. Bisson, protected by the slope towards the Millstream, was less exposed.

Both divisions, however, lost heavily from this artillery fire, as well as from the infantry and artillery fire, against their front. They were already wavering when Bennigsen’s reserve cavalry, standing beyond the brook, crossed it and fell upon their left flank. It wanted but this blow to complete the repulse of Ney. His troops were retreating in considerable disorder when help reached them. Dupont, with his division of Victor’s corps, had pushed forward his guns, which had barely time to fire a round of case before the Russian cavalry was upon them. Dupont, with great promptitude, for which he earned the special approval of Napoleon, [16] changing direction to the right, hurried up his infantry at the double into the gap, on Ney’s left, cut by the cavalry. This division was specially enthusiastic in its attack, for, up to the surrender of Ulm, it had belonged to Ney’s command. [17] The men felt, therefore, that on them depended the safety of old friends and comrades in the glorious fields of 1805. Latour-Maubourg and Durosnel also galloped forward against the Russian cavalry, which was now carried back on the infantry across the neck of the peninsula, spreading disorder in its ranks. The confusion was still further increased by the fire of 38 guns, which Senarmont, holding 6 more in reserve, [18] and escorted by Lahoussaye’s cavalry and a battalion of infantry, moved steadily forward, opening fire first at 600 paces, then at 300, at 150, and, finally, at 60. The Russian cavalry made a desperate effort against this battery, but the French gunners, calmly awaiting their approach, mowed them down with a volley of grape. [19]

The Russian left, in the peninsula, was now, in hopeless confusion, making the best of its way into Friedland, pursued hotly by Ney’s rallied troops, as well as by Dupont and the fire of Senarmont’s guns. [20]

Dupont, having restored the fight here and completed the Russian disaster, wheeled to his left, across the Millstream, a movement which brought him upon the left flank and rear of the Russian centre, still maintaining its forward position.

Ney, pressing on into Friedland, and engaging in a fierce fight in the streets, was in possession of the town by 8 p.m. The Russian cavalry and infantry in front of him streamed towards the now burning bridges. At 7.30, the Russian artillery, beyond the river, had set fire to the houses nearest the bridges, and the flames had spread to the bridges themselves. [21] The river was too deep to ford with safety; great numbers of the Russians, failing to reach the bridges whilst they were still passable, were drowned in the attempt to cross by swimming. Their heavy accoutrements dragged down the infantry. [22]

The battle, as designed by Napoleon, was as good as won when Friedland was captured.
Lannes and Mortier had intelligently carried out their orders by fighting a waiting action, [23] merely detaining Gortchakow north of the Millstream, though harassing him with a terrible artillery fire, to which he could but feebly respond. [24] It was only when he saw the thick smoke rising from the houses and the bridges of Friedland, that he realised that his retreat in that direction was cut off. He had already fallen back to the position of the early morning before the overwhelming fire of the artillery of the 1st and 6th corps. Dupont was north of the pond, at Friedland, on his left flank.

Leaving his cavalry to hold in check, as far as possible, the corps of Lannes and Mortier, he sent his two nearest divisions of infantry to the recapture of Friedland. These brave men, charging with the bayonet Dupont’s and Ney’s troops, carried them back into the town, and re-occupied the part of it nearest the lower pontoon bridge, only to find the bridge burning and impossible to cross. Some sought to cross to the right bank there, the majority wended their way, still fighting, down the river to Kloschenen, where, fortunately for Bennigsen, late in the evening, there had been discovered a deep ford, the existence of which had previously been unknown. Bad, and deep, as it was, it proved the salvation of the Russian army; for it not only gave a chance of crossing to its infantry and cavalry, but also enabled Bennigsen, with infinite difficulty, to get back many of his guns. These he managed to get up the steep right bank, and range there as a cover to the retreat, though it was for long impossible for them to fire on the confused throng of friends and foes. Much of the ammunition was rendered useless by water in the deep ford. [25]

Instant retreat was now the only course open to Gortchakow, with his remaining two divisions of infantry, his artillery, and his cavalry. The last he still left, to cover him against Mortier and Lannes. First he withdrew his guns, then his infantry. The latter slowly retired in great masses, through which the French artillery tore wide lanes, marking every halting-place with heaps and lines of dead and wounded.

It was now the moment for Napoleon to slip the leash in which he had, so far, held his centre and left. Rejoicing to be at last allowed to take an active part, the infantry of Lannes and Mortier poured over the plain towards the Alle, to complete the destruction which the artillery had begun. They found their enemy in no mood for surrender; the brave Russian infantry preferred death by the bayonets of their opponents, or to take their chance of drowning in the river, to yielding themselves prisoners; few were taken. Part of the cavalry crossed with the broken infantry near Kloschenen; the majority retreated down the left bank, to Allenburg. Had Napoleon’s cavalry, beyond Heinrichsdorf, shown the energy which might have been expected from them, this retreat by the left should have been impossible. There were 40 French squadrons in this direction, opposed to but 22 Russian. Even Savary, no friend of Murat, deplores his absence. [26] He would have seen the opportunity and have rolled up the Russian right, so that scarcely a man could have escaped. As it was, the French squadrons remained dismounted during the greater part of the renewed battle, content with what they had accomplished in the morning, doing nothing. The reason given, forsooth, was that they had no orders. [27] Murat at least would not have waited for orders with such a chance before him.

The defeated Russians who succeeded in crossing the river, united with the reserve in the Gnatten wood. Thence, in two columns, they marched for Wehlau, their rear covered by Platow’s flying column, which, during the day, had made a futile attempt to cross the river behind Ney’s right, but had been easily beaten off. [28]

At Allenburg, the retreat was joined by the cavalry, which had followed the left bank. At noon, on the 15th, Bennigsen had got together, at Wehlau, his broken army. Pursuit, there was none worth mentioning. A French general is said to have remarked that Friedland was “a battle gained and a victory lost.” [29]

During the night, the French corps occupied the following positions when the battle at last, about 11 p.m., ceased. Lannes on the Koenigsberg road, between Friedland and Heinrichsdorf. Mortier beyond Friedland, on both banks of the river. Victor at Posthenen. Ney in and behind Friedland. The Guard, surrounding their victorious Emperor, slept on the plain where had stood the Russian centre.

The permanent bridge at Friedland was quickly rendered serviceable; for the flames had failed to destroy the strong buttresses built to protect it against floating ice in the winter. Over it, early on the 15th, part of the cavalry set out to follow the Russians, whilst the rest went down the left bank. Before it could reach Bennigsen, he had passed his troops across the Pregel at Wehlau, and was, for the time being, safe.

The battlefield of Friedland [30] presented, on the morning of the 15th, a ghastly spectacle. The French had lost considerably, though less than they had at Heilsberg. On the Russian side the destruction had been fearful. Friedland was filled with dead and wounded; but the most terrible spectacle was on the plain, north of the Millstream. There, long lines of corpses marked where the troops had been mown down by artillery fire, as they patiently stood for hours, unable to advance, unwilling to retire. Farther to their rear, the positions where their squares had halted in their retreat, to resist the pursuing French, were outlined by dead; between these places a broad trail of food and bodies marked their line of movement. [3l]

Before Friedland, about the Eylau road, the dead, lying thick and close, marked where Senarmont’s and Ney’s batteries had ploughed great furrows through the masses of fleeing Russians, crowded together in the narrow peninsula, or where Bennigsen’s cavalry had temporarily arrested Ney’s victorious advance.
 
 

Bennigsen’s object in crossing the Alle at Fríedland is the first point requiring notice in dealing with this battle. It his been said that he proposed to attempt a direct march on Koenigsberg, instead of, as he certainly intended when he wrote to Lestocq on the 11th June, [32] after Heilsberg, crossing the Pregel first. Napoleon himself was evidently under this impression, when he wrote from Posthenen, at 3 p.m. on the 14th, to Murat. [33] This view seems to be erroneous. What Bennigsen really appears to have meant was to crush Lannes, whom alone he believed to be within reach of Friedland, and then to continue his march on Wehlau. A general action on a favourable field was what Napoleon desired above all things. At Friedland, Bennigsen gave him precisely what he wanted. [34]

Though it was absolutely necessary for Bennigsen to stop any French passage of the Alle in force at Friedland, he would have been wiser to content himself with holding that point strongly, whilst his army defiled past it, en route for Wehlau. To stop and attack Lannes, even had he alone been there, was to waste valuable time. Moreover, Bennigsen’s men, exhausted by a march of 34 miles [35] in 48 hours, in oppressively hot weather, [36] were hardly fit to undertake a day of fighting.

If Bennigsen was badly informed as to the French movements, Napoleon was equally in doubt as to the distribution of the two Russian forces, towards Koenigsberg, and on the Alle.

Bennigsen’s position at Friedland, with a considerable river close behind his back, with his only line of retreat, so far as he knew, behind his left wing, and with his front split in two by a serious obstacle to the free movement of troops, was as bad as it could be. [37] It is true he had another line of escape by the Allenburg road, on the left bank of the Alle; but that, again, led from a wing parallel to his line, and was close against the river. His one chance was to overpower Lannes, whilst that officer was still in very inferior force in the early morning, and thus clear for himself space for a less unfavourable field of battle.

Napoleon had, perhaps, rarely been more happy in appreciating, at the first glance, the features of a battlefield. His orders for the renewal of the attack show, by their reiteration of the caution to his left not to press forward, how completely he had estimated the vital importance to Bennigsen of Friedland, and the tongue of land on which it stood. Yet he failed at first, as is shown by his letter to Murat, to value correctly the strength of the force to which he was opposed. It was not till the action recommenced that he saw that Bennigsen had delivered himself into his hands. Could he have been certain of the Russians remaining another 24 hours on the hither side of the river, he might, even as it was, have preferred waiting till the arrival of Murat and Davout gave him a still greater Preponderance of numbers, [38] and until his own troops, many of whom (Victor’s corps especially) had had much fatiguing marching, were rested. But he had too often experienced the Russian general’s capacity for slipping away during the night from the most dangerous positions to risk a repetition of these tactics. When, therefore, Ney’s advance had shown him his great superiority of force, he had no longer any hesitation in pressing home his assault.

Dupont’s action in support of Ney, without any orders from Victor, [39] reflected credit on that unfortunate general, whose great reputation was afterwards destroyed at Baylen.

The inaction of the French cavalry at Heinrichsdorf, in the evening, is almost inexplicable. All that can be said is that Napoleon seems to have been so busy with the operations of his infantry, as to neglect to insist on compliance with his orders. Murat would have acted even without orders. Grouchy, possibly, did not consider he was in a position to warrant his doing so; though, as already pointed out, he had orders.

The failure to pursue during the night is, on the face of it, still more difficult of explanation. No general ever was more alive than Napoleon to the advantages of pursuing a defeated enemy, “l’epée dans les reins,” to use the forcible French expression. If his infantry were tired, his cavalry had no reason for being so. They had neither marched an excessive distance, nor had any very heavy fighting.

Is it possible that the Emperor’s slackness, in this respect, was due to political considerations? He felt that Bennigsen was badly beaten, and could not again face him short of the Niemen. The Russian army was worn out by marching and fighting. A pursuit, such as that of the Prussians after Jena, must have caused the enemy much loss, and given rise to very bitter feelings towards the French in the breasts of the leader, as well as of the Russian soldiery. At this period Napoleon did not yet contemplate the invasion which he attempted in 1812, with such disastrous results. He still had doubts as to Austria, and it would have ill suited him to be involved in a fresh campaign beyond the Niemen. A murderous pursuit might have so incensed the Czar as to induce him to continue the struggle which, he must have known, would eventually be stopped by winter, and to adopt the Fabian tactics, afterwards so successfully employed in 1812.

Napoleon did not wish to make a permanent enemy of Russia. He had already written to Talleyrand [40] that he would prefer the Russian to the Austrian alliance, if he had to choose between the two. He wanted Russia, as a sea power with a large seaboard and a great trade with England, to join him in his campaign against the commerce of his detested enemy. In these conditions, is it not probable that the Emperor thought that the destruction of a few thousand Russians, in a night pursuit, was not worth the risk of a continuation of the war?

The strategy of the first few days of the campaign requires but little comment. Napoleon had left Ney in a somewhat exposed position, according to some authorities, [41] as a bait to the Russians. That marshal was the best man to be placed thus; for he could always be relied on to make the most of a rear-guard action, to hold the enemy and delay him to the utmost, without compromising himself. He showed his mastery of such tactics on the 5th and 6th of June. Davout’s position enabled him to support Ney’s right, and to threaten the left flank and rear of the Russians as they advanced to the Passarge.

Napoleon did not expect Bennigsen to assume the offensive. The Russian general had, he considered, lost his opportunity, if he ever had one, in failing to make a general advance in support of Kamenskoi’s attempt to relieve Danzig. If he was going to attempt the offensive at all, then was his chance. He was, but for the absence of Kamenskoi’s 7000 or 8000 men, as strong on the 15th May as he was on the 5th June. Napoleon, on the other hand, was weaker by the corps of Lannes, Mortier, and all of Lefebvre’s except what was required for the garrison of Danzig after its fall – quite 40,000 men in all. In June, Napoleon had an enormous preponderance of numbers over his adversary, and if he began to concentrate rearwards towards Osterode, “il ne reculait que pour mieux sauter.” If Bennigsen’s forward move had not stopped at the Passarge, it must inevitably have done so before the lakes at Osterode.

When the tide turned, Napoleon’s movement was a simple one to the front with the bulk of his army, whilst he endeavoured, by holding Lestocq and Kamenskoi on the Lower Passarge with the 1st corps, to separate them from the rest of Bennigsen’s army. Lestocq had been dealt with in a precisely similar manner in the two earlier phases of the campaign, before Pultusk and before Eylau. [42]

When the French reached the bend of the Alle at Guttstadt, there were, according to Jomini, two courses open to the emperor, between which he hesitated for a moment. Napoleon himself has nowhere indicated that he had any such doubts. He might, says Jomini, have pushed forward, establishing his line with its left at Guttstadt, and his right towards Bischofstein. “It would have been absolutely the same movement as that of Jena and Naumburg against the Prussians, with better chances of success; for the Russian army, beaten on its left and driven back on the Lower Passarge and the Frisches-Haff, would have been thrown into the sea. Koenigsberg, no doubt, offered it a refuge; but that place itself, with the Baltic behind it on the west, and the Curisches-Haff on the north, would have offered no issue to this beaten army; for I should have forestalled it at Wehlau, as soon as it began to retreat.

“The second course to take was to advance direct against the entrenched camp of Heilsberg, whilst 50,000 men manœuvred by my left on Eylau, to menace the line of operations of the allies, to force them to abandon their redoubts without fighting, to press them vigorously in their retreat, and to strike them heavily at the passages of the Pregel and the Niemen. This last course was less advantageous; it was even contrary to the rules of strategy, which do not allow of compromising a considerable corps by passing it between the enemy and the sea. I preferred it, because my left was already in that direction, and, in order to manœuvre by my right, I should have to describe a long circle round the Russian army, to uncover the roads which served for communication with Thorn and Warsaw, and to threw myself into the wooded country on the right bank of the Alle. However, I must admit I should have acted in a better military spirit in adopting the first course.

“One of the motives which contributed most to determine me in favour of the second was that I had already remarked, at the time of the battle of Eylau, that Bennigsen showed a pusillanimous anxiety for Koenigsberg; but, as it was not a military point, I thought that he had special motives, whether of policy towards Prussia, or of consideration for the great magazines. In depriving the enemy of his magazines, I should procure them for my own troops, which, in a distant country, is essential; I should overturn the enemy’s system of operations. On the other hand, it was possible that the march of Soult on Koenigsberg might decide the Russians to retreat to their right, to cover that city, and I was always master of the power to throw forces on their left flank, threatening to cut them from Tilsit. For these subsidiary reasons I disregarded strategical principles, and decided to advance on Heilsberg by the left bank of the Alle. [43]

The arguments in favour of the course actually adopted are, no doubt, valid; but it may be doubted if Napoleon ever hesitated in his choice, or if the first course really was the best strategically. His lines of communication were not at this period with Warsaw primarily, or even with Thorn. They were by Marienwerder, Marienburg, and Danzig. The proposed movement to the right would have laid them all open, that to the left covered completely the Marienwerder, Marienburg, and Danzig lines.

Moreover, Bennigsen, if he were not bold enough to attack the lines of communication, would probably have taken fright and retreated down the Alle long before the extended movement round his left could have been completed. He would then have had the advantage of the shorter line to the Pregel, and would have been joined on it by the Prussians. As has already been said, Bennigsen could probably have been manœuvred out of Heilsberg, without the bloody battle of the 10th June.

When Napoleon divided his army at Eylau, marching partly on Koenigsberg, partly on Friedland, it seems almost impossible to doubt that, as before at Pultusk, he was under an entirely erroneous impression as to the distribution of the two portions of the enemy. His cavalry could give no precise account of the enemy’s march, [44] and probably exaggerated the strength of Kamenskoi’s 9000 men marching past Eylau on the 12th. It is difficult to believe that the Emperor would have deliberately detached 60,000 men to deal with less than half their number. His despatch to Murat from Posthenen seems to show that he recognised his mistake. With Murat, and half the cavalry he had at Koenigsberg, on the field at Friedland, it is likely that that battle would have resulted in a still greater disaster for the Russians. Soult’s corps, with a cavalry division, and, perhaps, the addition of one division of Davout’s infantry, could easily have dealt with Lestocq and Kamenskoi, had the Emperor known how small their force was. Had he detached 30,000 or 35,000, under Soult or Davout, against Koenigsberg, he would have been quite safe in that direction, and would have disposed of an additional 25,000 or 30,000 men at Friedland, not to mention the advantage of having Murat to lead the cavalry of the left wing.

[1]  The chief materials for this account of the battle of Friedland are the narratives of Dumas, Hœpfner, Savary, Victor (Arch. Hist.), Jomini, Wilson, Marbot, Kausler (atlas and text), etc. [Back to paragraph text]

[2]  Corr. 12,573. To Lannes, dated Eylau, 13th June, 9 p.m. The Emperor is, he says, uncertain whether it is the whole Russian army or only a detachment that is at Friedland. He promises to send on Ney at 1 a.m., and to have Victor at Domnau by 10 a.m., in case he is required. He presumes Lannes will seize Friedland, if the enemy is not in force there. [Back to paragraph text]

[3]  Hœpfner, iii. 653.
     The numbers engaged at Friedland are, as in the case of every other action in this campaign, most variously stated, thus—
     Thiers gives 75,000 Russians and 80,000 French.
     Alison takes the French at 80,000 and the Russians at 55,000, including the detachments to Allenburg, etc.
     Dumas puts the Russians at 61,000.
     Hœpfner gives Bennigsen 46,000 on the left bank of the Alle, besides the 14th division and other troops on the right bank, and the detachments to Allenburg, etc.
     Plotho (pp. 162-165), guessing the French force at 70,000 or 80,000, says that, after Heilsberg, Bennigsen still had 76,000. Of these he detached 9000 under Kamenskoi, and 6000 to Allenburg, which would give him 61,000 on both banks of the Alle at Friedland, or, say, 55,000 actually engaged on the left bank. Considerable deductions must, however, be made for stragglers in the long march from Heilsberg.
     The text of Kausler’s Atlas des Plus Mémorables Batailles, etc., gives 75,000 Russians and 85,000 French.
     Marbot allows Napoleon 80,000.
     There is a close agreement as to the French numbers, and it will not be far wide of the mark to call them 80,000. As for Bennigsen, considering all the authorities, it seems doubtful if his numbers were higher than these:—
                          On the left bank of the Alle . . . . 46,000
                          On right bank . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6,000
                          Detachments to Allenburg, etc. .   6,000
                                                                            58,000 [Back to paragraph text]

[4]  At 9 a. m. all the divisions had passed except one. The 6000 men detached towards Allenburg were sent back from the left bank (Wilson, p. 155). [Back to paragraph text]

[5]  Hœpfner, iii. 656. Wilson (p. 155) says Bennigsen detached 6000 men to guard the lower passages of the Alle at Allenburg, This number may perhaps fairly represent the detachments made and thus reinforced. [Back to paragraph text]

[6]  The return for the 15th June (Arch. Hist.) shows this corps as comprising only one weak French division of 3976 men, besides cavalry and artillery. The other two divisions, the numbers of which are not stated, were Poles. [Back to paragraph text]

[7]  Hœpfner, iii. 659. Marbot (i. 282) says 11 a.m. Jomini (Vie de Napoleon, ii. 413) gives 1 p.m. as the hour. [Back to paragraph text]

[8]  Corr. 12,756, dated “Bivouac behind Posthenen, 14th June.” [Back to paragraph text]

[9]  Savary, iii. 84. “Our cavalry could give no precise account of the enemy’s march.” [Back to paragraph text]

[10]  Loc. cit. [Back to paragraph text]

[11]  Savary, iii. 87. [Back to paragraph text]

[12]  Dumas, xix. 327. [Back to paragraph text]

[13]  Wilson, p. 157. [Back to paragraph text]

[14]  5.30 according to Wilson, p. 159. [Back to paragraph text]

[15]  Ney formed his columns in the wood. Only the artillery were on the roads through it; but, fortunately, there were three broad clearings, each sufficiently wide to allow of a column of infantry and one of cavalry, as well as the artillery, standing in them (Savary, iii. 87-88). [Back to paragraph text]

[16]  Savary, iii. 89. [Back to paragraph text]

[17]  Jomini, Vie de Napoleon, ii. 419. [Back to paragraph text]

[18]  Victor, Arch. Hist. At 60 yands Senarmont used nothing but grape, which told with awful effect on the crowded Russians. [Back to paragraph text]

[19]  Ibid. He says that when Senarmont had dispersed this cavalry, he was supported by a battalion of Frère’s brigade and the 4th division of dragoons. Dupont lost 649 killed and wounded altogether. [Back to paragraph text]

[20]  “Senarmont’s and Ney’s artillery sowed terror and death amongst the battalions and squadrons of the enemy, which, with their backs to the town, to the river, or to the brook, knew not by which way to escape front destruction” (Jomini, Vie de Napoleon, ii. 419). [Back to paragraph text]

[21]  Hœpfner, iii. 667. Jomini says, “Bagration, having withdrawn, fired the bridges to stop our pursuit” (Vie de Napoleon, ii. 419). “During this contest the bridges were ordered to he fired” (Wilson, p. 160). [Back to paragraph text]

[22]  Savary, iii. 91. [Back to paragraph text]
 

[23]  Lannes and Mortier had even allowed Gortchakow to gain some success, to draw him farther into the trap (Jomini, Vie de Napoleon, ii. 420). [Back to paragraph text]

[24]  The fire was tremendous. Victor alone had 48 guns in one great battery. Bennigsen, trying to make the best of his bad position, formed squares flanking one another; in doing so, he lost a great part of his front of infantry fire (Savory, iii. 90).
     The French, until the battle recommenced in the evening, had been concealed from the view and the fire of the Russians by the trees, the high crops and grass, and the inequalities of the ground, of which they took every advantage. The Russians, on the contrary, were fully exposed, standing in lines and column, on the open plain (Wilson, p. 150). [Back to paragraph text]

[25]  Wilson, p. 161. [Back to paragraph text]

[26]  Savary, iii. 92. [Back to paragraph text]

[27]  This was not even correct, for Napoleon’s orders had directed Grouchy, Espagne, and the cavalry of the left wing, to “manœuvre so as to cause as much harm as possible to the enemy when he, pressed by the vigorous attack of our right, shall feel the necessity of retreat.” Their inaction was certainly no compliance with this order.
     The cavalry reserve engaged at Friedland, according to Murat (Arch. Hist.), consisted of the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd heavy divisions, the 1st, 2nd, and 4th dragoon divisions. The last-named was with Victor. [Back to paragraph text]

[28]  Wilson, p. 159, note. [Back to paragraph text]

[29]  Wilson, p. 162. [Back to paragraph text]

[30]  The respective losses of the armies in this battle are, as usual, very variously stated, and it is only possible, by a comparison of the different authorities, to arrive at an approximation to the truth.
     The French losses were probably about 7000 or 8000. Plotho (p. 168) puts that of the Russians at 18,000 to 20,000. The French claim that it was 25,000. [Back to paragraph text]

[31]  See Savary’s description of the fìeld (iii. 92). [Back to paragraph text]
 

[32]  Wilson, p. 150. [Back to paragraph text]

[33]  Vide supra, p. 321. [Back to paragraph text]

[34]  Bennigsen himself wrote: “I freely admit that I should have done better not to undertake the affair of Friedland; I had the power, and I should have been safer to maintain my resolution not to undertake a serious battle, since it was not necessary for the safety of the march of my army; but false reports, with which every general is often beset, had raised in me the erroneous view, which was confirmed by all my intelligence, that Napoleon had, with the greater part of his army, taken the road towards Koenigsberg” (Hœpfner, iii. 656).
     Wilson fairly describes the action as “a battle undertaken from an error of information, persevered in from an apprehension of retreat, but whose catastrophe was alleviated by the extraordinary valour of the officers and troops” (pp. 161, 162).
     “The weakness of the French column suggested to Bennigsen the idea of fighting a fortunate battle en passant” (Rustow; i. 322).
     Adams (Great Campaigns, p. 154) puts very clearly the object of Napoleon. “Hœpfner blames him (Napoleon) for not continuing the battle of Heilsberg on the 11th June instead of manœuvring; but his abstention is a proof of his sense of the precarious nature of his position, and he was, moreover, anxious to economise force.
     “Without Bennigsen’s blunder, the Russians would have arrived safely on the Pregel, whilst Napoleon’s line, already extended, would have been still further stretched. The point had been reached when the occupation of territory was of no further value, but in this poor district rather the contrary, and a general action was the sole object worth striving for. This object was attained at Friedland by good fortune, which, according to Bennigsen, was owing to his misinformation as to Napoleon’s movements on Koenigsberg.”
     It may be said Napoleon had his chance of a general action at Heilsberg. True! but Heilsberg was a very unfavourable field for him. Friedland was all that he could desire. [Back to paragraph text]

[35]  Left Heilsberg midnight, 11th-12th—
                                                                              Miles.
                     Reached Bartenstein noon 12th . . . . . 13
                     Reached Schippenbeil . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
                     Schippenbeil to Friedland . . . . . . . . .  13
                                                                               34 [Back to paragraph text]

[36]  The day of Friedland was oppressively hot (Marbot, i. 279). [Back to paragraph text]

[37]  Wilson (p. 153,) says of it: “His (Bennigsen’s) own feeble army was lodged in a position that was untenable, from which progress could not be made against an equal force, nor retreat be effected without great hazard, and where no military object would be attained for the interests or reputation of the Russian army, whose courage had been sufficiently established, without tilting for fame as adventurers who have nothing to lose and everything to win.”
     “There was in his (Bennigsen’s) conduct a mixture of rash imprudence and of irresolution quite irreconcilable”(Jomini, Vie de Napoleon, ii. 421).
     “Bennigsen, ill at the time, seemed to have forgotten that he had come to the left bank to fight” (Rustow, i. 323). [Back to paragraph text]

[38]  “Perhaps I should have done better to wait for Davout and Muraat. I should not have hesitated had I thought Bennigsen would dare to continue his march towards Koenigsberg viâ Abschwang. Reinforced by 40,000 men, including my cavalry, I should have driven him on the marshy forests of Zehlau and Frischind, from which he could never have emerged” (Jomini, Vie de Napoleon, ii. 413). [Back to paragraph text]

[39]  Savary, iii. 89. [Back to paragraph text]

[40]  Corr. 12,028, dated 14th March, 1807. [Back to paragraph text]

[41]  Jomini, Vie de Napoleon, ii. 406. [Back to paragraph text]

[42]  Adams (Great Campaigns, p. 153, 154.) says, “It is difficult to see, moreover, the object the allies had in assigning a detached sphere of action to the Prussian contingents. The German authorities agree that, in spite of constant defeat, the individual German soldier retained the confident feeling of physical superiority; but the cause may probably be found in a superannuated system, by which the Prussian leaders were first of all punctiliously unwilling to serve other than independently, fearful lest such a course would imply inferiority; and next, showed a reluctance to adopt anything new after a long period of peace.” [Back to paragraph text]

[43]  Jomini, Vie de Napoleon, pp. 406-408. [Back to paragraph text]

[44]  Savary, iii. 84. [Back to paragraph text]