Napoleon had begun to contemplate a renewal of the campaign so early as the 29th April, when he wrote to Soult to send his sick to the rear, preparatory to a general advance. [1] But he did not wish to push on towards Russia so long as Danzig remained untaken on his rear, and he was disappointed as to the progress of the siege. By the 8th May, he was able to judge, approximately, when Danzig would fall. He wrote that he hoped to have it by the 20th, and to commence his general movement in the first half of June. He had fixed on the 10th, thinking that, now Danzig had fallen, it was extremely improbable the enemy would take the initiative. [2] So little did he apprehend this, that he paid a two-days’ visit to Danzig so late as the 31st May. [3] Everything was, however, in readiness, whether for an advance or for meeting an attack by the enemy.

Rapp, now appointed Governor of Danzig, had been instructed to put the place in a state to stand a fresh siege from the sea or from the Nehrung. [4] Pile bridges were under construction at Dirschau and Marienburg, which had acquired an entirely new importance as lines of communication, since the capture of Danzig. [5] The fullest instructions had been issued for the collection and forwarding of supplies. [6]

All the troops required for the front had arrived, or were on the march, and the corps recently engaged in the siege of Danzig were now available, except in so far as they were required for a garrison for the fortress. Lefebvre’s corps was distributed to the garrison and to the corps of Lannes and Mortier. [7]

Facing one another on the line of the Passarge and the Alle, on the Omulew and the Narew, were 220,000 French and auxiliary troops, and 115,000 Russians and Prussians. [8] For the operations north of Masséna’s charge there were 190,000 under the Emperor in person, against 100,000 under Bennigsen.

On the 2nd June, Bennigsen, having determined to attack the advanced corps of Ney, had concentrated his army about Heilsberg, excepting the advanced guard, Platow’s flying column, and the right wing under Lestocq.

His plan for the destruction of Ney was extremely complicated. Whilst Lestocq held the French on the Lower Passarge, 6 columns were to converge on Ney.

1st column – Dochtorow, with 24 battalions and 4 batteries, the 7th and 8th divisions – was to advance from Olbersdorf [9] (Albrechtsdorf), south of Wormditt, driving the French across the Passarge and barring their return with small detachments. He was then to ascend the right bank of the stream, and take up a position between Elditten and Schwendt (Schwenkitten), [10] opposite the bridge of Pithenen. He would thus prevent the junction of Soult and Ney.

2nd column – Sacken, with the 2nd, 3rd, and 14th divisions, and the cavalry of both wings, in all 42 battalions, 140 squadrons, and 9 batteries [11] – was to march by Arensdorf, and attack Ney, supporting the advance guard and the 1st column.

3rd column – Bagration’s advance guard, 42 battalions, 10 squadrons, and 6 regiments of cossacks – leaving its support about Peterswalde, to march by Grünau and Altkirch, so as to cut off the troops which Ney had in Peterswalde. As soon as Altkirch should be taken, the supports to advance and uphold the main body, attacking the enemy between Knopen and Glottau.

4th column – Gortchakow, with the 6th division, 12 battalions, 20 squadrons, and 3 regiments of cossacks – passing the Alle above Guttstadt, to fall upon Ney’s right, detaching a brigade towards Seeburg in support of Platow.

5th column – Platow, 3 battalions, 10 squadrons, 9 regiments of cossacks, and 12 guns, besides the brigade (Knorring’s) above mentioned – masking his movement from Masséna’s (Gazan’s) outposts about Willemburg, to pass the Alle at Bergfried, and assist in the envelopment of Ney.

6th column – the Grand Duke Constantine, with the 1st division (Guard), 28 battalions, 28 squadrons, 3 batteries – to follow, as reserve, in two columns from Benern, Arensdorf, and Sommerfeld to Petersdorf.

Lestocq, meanwhile, would advance against Bernadotte on the Passarge from Braunsberg to Spanden, holding him there, preventing him from crossing to the right bank, and, at the same time, covering the roads to Zinten and Koenigsberg.

The scheme had in its favour the fact that Ney, his front being surrounded by forests, could not see what was going on at any considerable distance. Nevertheless, he obtained sufficient information from his outposts to convince him that some serious movement was in progress before him. He accordingly took measures for the concentration of his corps, with the intention of taking up a position behind Ankendorf, and there holding out till he could receive support from the rest of the army. He also requested Soult to support his left from Elditten, and Davout to strengthen his position at Bergfried on the right.

Bennigsen, originally intending to attack on the 4th of June, had sent orders to Lestocq to alarm the enemy on the Lower Passarge on that day. He now postponed the movement till the 5th, informing Lestocq, but does not seem to have formally cancelled his previous order for the 4th. On that day, [12] therefore, the Prussian outposts and their supports advanced, whilst the main body moved somewhat to its left, so as to be more in touch with the Russians, and available for their assistance in the hour of battle.

Rembow’s division was assembled in the night of the 3rd-4th behind Mehlsack, in all about 3000 infantry, 1500 cavalry, and 2 batteries. At 1 a.m. it started for Spanden in four columns. The attack on the bridge-head had already commenced when a message from Dochtorow at Wormditt, inquiring the cause of the cannonade, showed clearly that the attack was premature. Rembow, accordingly, broke off the action and retired, leavìng strong outposts watching Spanden. On the same day Dupont had been bombarded at Zagern. These unfortunate premature attacks had no other effect than to put Bernadotte on the alert, and give him time to prepare against a serious advance.

On the 5th June, about 10 a.m., the attack on the Spanden bridge-head was renewed. [13] The works there crossed the neck of a peninsula re-entrant towards the French. A central redoubt, about 1000 paces from the bridge, was connected by parapets with the river on either side. Behind this, immediately in front of the bridge, was another work, open at the gorge, covering the bridge completely.

The direction of the river facilitated the flanking of the work by troops on the left bank; but as it was, in this neighbourhood, and at this season, fordable in places, its value as a defence was much impaired. In the works beyond the bridge was the 27th light infantry, with 4 guns, and one howitzer. On the left bank, partly above and partly below the bend, was the rest of Villatte’s division and artillery. [14]

After two hours’ heavy bombardment of the outer work, the Prussians moved to the assault. Waiting till the enemy were at point-blank range, the 27th received them with such a murderous fire that they were driven off with heavy loss, [15] and pursued by the 17th dragoons issuing from the bridge, towards Wusen. In this fight Bernadotte, wounded in the head by a musket ball, had to make over command of the corps to Dupont, who, next day, handed it over to Victor. [16]

Whilst this combat was in progress, Dupont was held fast, at Petelkau and Zagern, by another considerable body of Prussians. [17]

These, of course, were only false attacks; the real one fell upon the advanced corps of Ney, and on that of Soult on his left.

During the night of the 4th-5th Dochtorow had moved on Wormditt. At 6 a.m. he issued from the forest at Albrechtsdorf towards Lomitten, driving in the French outposts. The bridge here was covered by a work, as at Spanden, except that the advanced work consisted of redoubts at either extremity of a breastwork, another work thrown forward on the high ground on the right bank, and another on the corresponding ground of the left bank. On the left front of the bridge, the wood had been fortified by abattis. One battalion of the 57th was, with 4 guns, in the bridge-head and works; the other held the wood on the left. A battalion of the 4th light infantry was in the wood on the Liebstadt road, on the left bank. The other watched the river from Sporthenen to Alken. The remainder of Carra St. Cyr’s division was on the plateau in front of Liebstadt, and from it reinforcements of 3 battalions, and 2 guns, were sent, as soon as the artillery duel began.

The battle was opened, at 8 a.m., [18] by the Russians advancing against the abattis and the works in 3 columns, whilst part of the cavalry forded the river near Sporthenen, and a detachment of infantry with artillery threatened a passage lower down, towards Alken. In the wood, and before the works, a long and sanguinary fight ensued. The abattis, carried at the first onslaught, was recaptured from the Russians by French reinforcements. Against the enemy who had passed at Sporthenen, the 24th light infantry charged with the bayonet, driving them again to the right bank, and burning the bridge which they had partially constructed. Meanwhile the abattis had once more fallen before the Russian attack, and the victors were about to force the passage at Lomitten when the reinforcements sent by St. Cyr came up. The 2nd battalion of the 57th once more cleared the wood, and for four hours maintained itself behind the abattis. At the same time, a battalion of the 46th, and one of the 24th drove on the enemy from in front of the bridge at Lomitten.

Again and again the Russians attempted the storm of the bridge-head. This fierce combat had raged for eight hours when a final effort was made in a single column. Success was almost within its grasp, when a splendid charge, by two French battalions, snatched victory from it.

Dochtorow, during this action, marched off with the greater part of his troops, towards Kalkstein and Elditten, with the intention of seconding the attack on Ney’s left. The motive of his movement was correctly appreciated by Soult, who was informed of it by St. Hilaire, standing with his division behind the bridge at Pithenen. Measures were at once taken for defending the passage at this place, which had been protected by earthworks. St. Cyr, at Lomitten, was told to confine himself to the defence of the bridge-head, and even to retire to the left bank, if hard pressed. He evacuated the wood on his left, and was finally forced to leave the earthworks on the right bank, which had become untenable owing to the destruction wrought on them by the enemy’s artillery, and by the fires which it had caused in the village of Lomitten. The bridge, protected by the works on the left bank, still remained closed to the Russians. About 8 p.m. the action died out, and the Russians fell back on Albrechtsdorf. According to French accounts, St. Cyr lost about 1200 men, the enemy 2800. [19] Dochtorow does not appear to have made any attempt on Pithenen, finding it too strongly held.

The actions at Spanden and Lomitten were but a cover to the more serious attempt, which was simultaneously made, to cut off Ney’s corps in its exposed position about Guttstadt. If the attack had many points in its favour, it had the disadvantage of being opposed by a general who was a consummate master of the art of conducting a rear-guard action, and of delaying, to the last safe moment, the enemy’s march.

Ney’s positions were—

At Guttstadt: headquarters and Marchand’s division, which was also partly in Altkirch and Neuendorf, and had one cavalry and one infantry regiment in front of Schmolainen;

Bisson’s division occupied Queetz, Lingnau, Glottau, and Knopen.

Leaving his supports to watch the Schmolainen wood in front, Bagration, with the rest of the advance guard, moved, about 6 a.m., [20] on Altkirch, which he took without much difficulty, driving its defenders on Guttstadt, where Marchand’s division now concentrated. At Altkirch, Bagration halted, waiting for Sacken and Gortchakow, who had started too late to keep in line with him, and without whose help he did not feel strong enough to continue his enveloping movement against Guttstadt. Sacken was only between Dietrichsdorf and Petersdorf when Altkirch was stormed.

Ney, seeing the danger to which his advanced cavalry and infantry at Schmolainen were exposed, seized the opportunity to withdraw them to Guttstadt. To cover the retirement, and his concentration, Ney made a strong counter-attack on Bagration, causing him a loss of about 500 killed and wounded.

As Sacken arrived, the marshal, finding himself greatly outnumbered, fell back in first-rate order on Ankendorf, fighting every step of the way, and holding every fold of the ground with strong swarms of skirmishers; Gortchakow, meanwhile, occupied Guttstadt, which Ney had abandoned.

At Ankendorf, and Heiligenthal Ney halted, whilst the Russians took post, towards 3 p.m., about Queetz, with Gortchakow in reserve. Platow, who had crossed the Alle at Bergfried, and arrived nearly in Ney’s rear, joined the left of the position at Queetz.

Ney, leaning his right, at Ankendorf, on a wood which he held, was covered by the Queetz lake on his right. His centre and left extended, along a marshy brook, to the Passarge. In front of his left, where the road from Waltersmühl to Deppen crosses the brook, was a small wood. His retreat lay over two bridges, one behind either wing. He had still about 16,000 men; he had lost heavily, some 400 killed and wounded, and 1000 prisoners, besides 2 guns, and a great part of his baggage. The Russian loss had been about 2000 killed and wounded, amongst the latter being Osterman Tolstoi, and Somow.

On the morning of the 6th, the Russian advance guard found Ney still in position. The attack was thus ordered: on the right, a column, under Gallitzin, moved on the small wood in front of Ney’s left, seeking to drive it on the bridge at Deppen, and cut off the retreat there. Sacken was sent against the centre, Gortchakow against the right, whilst Bagration and the Grand Duke Constantine served as reserve. Fighting commenced at 5 a.m.

Gortchakow assaulted the wood on the French right front, but was brought to a standstill by Ney’s moving forward there also. Steady progress was made by the Russian centre and right columns. Gortchakow, after his failure at the wood, wandered round the further side of the Queetz lake, hoping to turn Ney’s right, and avoid the wooded marshy land in front of it. He thus put himself, for several hours, out of action, and left Ney’s right in safety. The marshal, who, falling back of necessity before the enemy’s immense superiority, had already passed Heiligenthal, at once saw the fault of Gortchakow, and utilised it by returning to Heiligenthal with his right, thus covering the retreat of his centre and left into the valley and across the Passarge. His whole corps got safely across with small loss.

Bennigsen was furious at the ill-success of his plan, and seems to have expressed himself so freely that Sackers left the army temporarily. [21]

The Prussians and Kamenskoi did nothing during this day beyond assembling about Mehlsack. On the evening of the 6th, Bennigsen’s advance guard was on the right bank of the Passarge, headquarters at Heiligenthal, the reserve behind it. Gortchakow at Guttstadt and Knopen, with a detachment observing Davout; Dochtorow, leavin; Cossacks to watch the Passarge from Elditten, had joined the Russian right wing.
 

Bennigsen’s offensive had expended its force and come to a standstill. Napoleon had not been idle. He had, as soon as he heard the attack on Ney, on the 5th, directed Murat to assemble his reserve cavalry at Marienburg, Christburg, Elbing, Bischofswerder, Strasburg, and Soldau. [22]

The guard cavalry to assemble at Finkenstein. [23]

Lannes to march at once on Christburg, where he should arrive by 9 a.m. on the 6th. [24]

Mortier to march towards Christburg, halting 5 or 6 miles short of it for orders. [25]

On the 6th, Soult was ordered, if he had been forced to retreat, to cover Mohrungen as long as possible, utilising the defiles between the lakes. [26]

Ney’s retreat to Deppen was approved. If he was again attacked, he would defend the defile south of the Narien lake. [27] Davout would support his right. [28]

Similarly, Bernadotte, if forced back, would gain time by a slow retreat on Pr. Holland. [29]

Writing to Davout, at 8 p.m. on the 6th, [30] Napoleon asks whether the enemy will dare to march on Allenstein with the French on their flank at Deppen and Leibstadt. If the enemy advances on Osterode, Davout will choose a position for its defence on the Russian flank. Above all, he must “maintain Alt Ramten, for it is the head of Osterode.” In this despatch, the Emperor mentions that his lines of operations are through Marienwerder, Marienburg, and Danzig.

Gazane [31] and Zayonchek [32] had already been ordered to concentrate.

All commanders were required to fill up ammunition and supply waggons, and see that their men had plenty of cartridges. The Emperor himself, sending his heavy baggage to Danzig, went to Saalfeld and Seegerswalde, at which latter place he gave up his carriage and mounted his horse. [33]

Davout had been fully alive to the situation. When Platow, on the 5th, had forced the bridge at Bergfried, he had threatened the connexion between Ney and Davout. The latter, anticipating the order received on the 6th from the Emperor, assembled the 1st and 3rd divisions at Allenstein, and sent the 2nd on to the Passarge above Ramten. [34]

On the morning of the 7th, he marched his 1st and 3rd divisions to the left, taking up a position on a small tributary of the right bank of the Passarge, thus effectually threatening the left flank and rear of the Russians in front of Deepen. On the previous evening he had sent a despatch to Ney, saying that, if the enemy continued his movement, he would have Davout with 40,000 men on his rear. This was a considerated exaggeration of numbers for the benefit of Bennigsen. Davout took care to send the despatch by a route on which the luckless bearer was certain to be captured, as he actually was. [35]

Bennigsen had gone to Guttstadt in the night of the 6th-7th, leaving the Grand Duke in command. His lieutenants, thinking the offensive movement was to continue, were preparing to march on the Passarge and on Allenstein, when the commander-in-chief, returning on the evening of the 7th, ordered a retreat. [36]

Napoleon, informed of the hesitation of the enemy to advance against Ney, himself went to Deppen, sending orders to Victor and Soult to force the passage of the Passarge in their front.

The Guard and Mortier were ordered to march on Deepen, as well as the cavalry of Lasalle, Grouchy, and Nansouty. Espagne’s and Saint Sulpice’s cavalry to Mohrungen.

Latour-Maubourg’s cavalry was placed at the disposal of Soult, Milhaud’s at that of Davout. Zayonchek’s division was ordered to occupy the now deserted Osterode.

On the morning of the 8th, there was no longer any doubt that the Russians were retreating. [37] Napoleon took up the offensive.

Soult had his light cavalry at Waltersdorf, where he had sent it after the affair at Lomitten on the 5th.

On the morning of the 8th, his whole corps passed the Passarge at Elditten, and Pithenen, marching on Wolfsdorf, the left covered by Latour-Maubourg’s cavalry. To Guyot, commanding his light cavalry, Soult sent orders to confine himself to observing the enemy. That general, however, incautiously involving himself in an action at Kleinenfeld, without making a proper reconnaissance, was surrounded by cossacks, and his brigade very severely handled, he himself being killed. [38]

Legrand and St. Hilaire (both of Soult’s corps), seizing Wolfsdorf, held fast there, with St. Cyr in second line.

This movement against his right flank finally determined Bennigsen to retreat. The news reached him about midday, when he had already seen great masses of French assembling on the farther side of the Passarge. They confined themselves, however, to reconnaissances, and there was no fighting worth mention.

Gortchakow was now ordered direct to the entrenched camp at Heilsberg, by the right bank of the Alle, sending a detachment of two infantry regiments, and one of cavalry, with some cossacks and 6 guns, under Barasdin, to hold the defile of Launau on the left bank. The rest of the army fell back on Guttstadt, except Bagration with the rear-guard, who only moved in the evening to Queetz.

At noon, orders were sent to Lestocq to watch the Lower Passarge, as well as Soult’s movement. At 3 p.m., another order was sent, announcing that Bennigsen meant to fight a battle at Guttstadt next day, and desiring Lestocq to advance against Soult. The bearer of this despatch, passing through Mehlsack, came upon Kamenskoi there. There was a good deal of confusion on this side, with orders and counter-orders, the final result being that Kamenskoi and Lestocq were left behind, intending to attack Soult’s left and rear in the battle which they expected next day at Guttstadt.

On the morning of the 9th, Bennigsen drew up his army for battle at Guttstadt. Finding the position not sufficiently satisfactory, he changed his mind, and retreated by the right bank of the Alle to Heilsberg, which he reached in the evening. Expecting the French to follow on the right bank, he, at first, only passed over one division to the left bank at Heilsberg, as a support to Barasdin’s detachment at Launau. Bagration’s rear-guard was left to cover the retreat.

At 3 a.m. on the 9th, Napoleon commenced the passage of the Passarge at Deppen, moving towards Guttstadt. Murat led the way, supported by Ney. Behind him came Lannes and the Guard. Mortier was still a day’s march in rear, at Mohrungen. Davout passed the river at and above Hasenburg, for he had fallen back on its left bank on the 8th, one division going so far as Osterode, whilst the others were at the southern extremity of the Schilling lake. He had, on the 8th, received his orders to cross the Passarge next day. Soult, also, was ordered to Guttstadt. Just as he was starting, Kamenskoi appeared, from the direction of Dietrichsdorf, on his left rear. St. Hilaire’s division, the nearest, was moved against the enemy, whilst the light cavalry, and Latour-Maubourg, went against Dietrichsdorf.

Kamenskoi’s men had already passed the wood of Dietrichsdorf, and were approaching Wolfsdorf. A powerful battery, which he had established in front of the latter village, was quickly silenced by the French guns. St. Hilaire, at this moment, impetuously attacked the Russians with the bayonet, and drove them back, with heavy losses, in confusion. The cavalry continued the pursuit to Wormditt. Soult did not allow himself to be diverted from his march on Guttstadt. Kamenskoi, unmolested beyond Wormditt, after a few hours’ rest there behind the Drewenz stream, continued his march to Heilsberg by Migenen, Raunau, and Reimerswalde, [39] arriving there next morning, after a very long march. Meanwhile, Murat was following Bagration, who halted at Glottau to fight an action covering the passage of the rest of the army at Guttstadt. Bravely supporting him, Platow’s cossacks were at first driven back towards the Alle, and began to lose order. Platow, seeing the danger, himself dismounted, and, by his personal example, restored order. Bagration’s cavalry, too, made a gallant resistance; it was only when Ney’s infantry arrived in support that Murat finally succeeded in driving Bagration into Guttstadt. The Russian general successfully passed the river, covered and followed by Platow’s cossacks, who destroyed the bridges behind them. [40]

On the night of the 9th, the French occupied these positions:—

Soult at Altkirch;

Ney, Murat, and the Guard at Guttstadt;

Davout held the left bank of the Alle above Guttstadt, and the villages of Knopen and Ankendorf;

Mortier was approaching Guttstadt.

Napoleon’s design now was, cutting the Russian army from Koenigsberg and its resources, to drive it from the sea and across the Pregel.

While, therefore, he proposed, next day, to attack Bennigsen in front with 50,000 men forming Murat’s cavalry, Soult’s, Lannes’, and Ney’s corps, and Savary’s grenadiers, he would keep in hand, at Guttstadt and Altkirch, the corps of Mortier and Davout, destined to be interposed between Bennigsen’s right and Koenigsberg. The Guard in reserve. Victor, on the Lower Passarge, would retain there the Prussians, and presently force them back on Koenigsberg, where they would be hopelessly severed from their allies.

[1]  Corr. 12,496. [Back to paragraph text]

[2]  On the afternoon of the 5th June, Napoleon wrote to Soult, “Everything leads to the belief that the enemy is on the move, though it is ridiculous on his part to engage in a general action now that Danzig is taken. . . . I shall he very glad if the enemy spares us the trouble of going to him. My design was to set myself in motion on the 10th” (Corr. 12,731). [Back to paragraph text]

[3]  In Corr. 12,710, dated 2nd June, the Emperor writes that he had been two days at Danzig; and was returning that evening to Finkenstein. [Back to paragraph text]

[4]  Corr. 12,728, dated 5th June. This seems to be merely a written reminder; for the Emperor, during his visit to Danzig, had, no doubt, discussed this question fully. [Back to paragraph text]

[5]  Corr. 12,662 and 12,663, dated 28th May. [Back to paragraph text]

[6]  These instructions to Daru (Corr. 12,689, dated 29th May) are a good example of Napoleon’s methods. He states that he wishes to provision his army for eight months. He will require, therefore, for current expenditure and collection of a reserve, a daily supply of 80,000 rations at Warsaw for the right, of 100,000 at Thorn, Wroclavik, and Bromberg for the centre, and of 80,000 for the left at Danzig, Marienburg, Elbing, Marienwerder, etc. The first thing to be done is to settle and mark on a map the areas from which each point is to be supplied. To Warsaw would be assigned a breadth extending from Warsaw to Wroclavik, and a depth including the districts (arronaissements) of Warsaw and Kalisch; for the centre, the districts of Posen and Bromberg to a breadth represented by the line Wroclavik-Graudenz; the left would draw from the country between Marienwerder and the sea, with a depth including the whole of Pomerania. Next, the best places for magazines must be selected in each circle.
     Of supplies there are five sources: (1) what is actually in existence on the 1st June; (2) what can be supplied by each Polish district; (3) what can he demanded from Pomerania; (4) what can be brought up from magazines in rear; (5) what must be brought to supply the existing Polish markets or to start new ones. Before setting up a market, a careful calculation of cost of carriage from Breslau, Custrin, or Magdeburg must be made, and compared with the cost of supplies, if any, procurable in the neighbourhood, the cheapest being chosen. Then follow detailed remarks as to the Lest way of starting markets and searching out the resources of a country. [Back to paragraph text]

[7]  Jomini, Vie de Napoleon, ii. 403. [Back to paragraph text]

[8]  The numbers of the Russians anal Prussians are given in detail by Hœpfner (iii. 555. etc. ), and his statement may probably be accepted as fairly correct. It shows these numbers.
     On the Lower Passarge 15,000 Prussians, exclusive of a detachment on the Nehrung. In support of them was Kamenskoi’s division, returned from Danzig, at Lilienthal. The total of this right wing is estimated at 20,000 and 98 guns, including 7500 cavalry. There were, far in rear, the garrison of Koenigsberg  and 6000 reserve troops at Gumbinnen.
     The Russian main army was as follows:—
            Bagration (Launau), advance guard           12,537
            Uwarow (cavalry  of right wing)                  3,836
           Dochtorow, 7th division                               4,653
           Sacken, 3rd division                                     6,432
           Essen III., 8th division                                  5,670
           Osterman Tolstoi, 2nd and 14th divisions      9,615
           Galitzin, cavalry of the left wing                     2,982
           Gortchakow, 6th division and cossacks       10,873
           Guard, Grand Duke Constantine                 17,000
           Platow’s flying column, chiefly cossacks        6,347
           On the Narew, under Tolstoi                      15,800
     Another 30,000 men, under Lahanov, were on their way, but were still far behind the Russian frontier.
     Altogether, allowing for sick, straggler, etc., there were about 89,000 regular troops (11,000 of them cavalry), and 8000 cossacks facing Napoleon. Including the force on the Narew, there were thus about 111,000, not including the Koenigsberg and Graudenz garrisons, the 6000 at Gumbinnen, the detachment on the Nehrung, and the reinforcements under Labanow. (Dumas (xviii. 221) puts the allies at 118,000, including the detachment on the Narew. Danilewski (see note, Hœpfner, iii. 562) gives, as the combined force in the middle of May, 125,000. The discrepancies are not very marked, and it seems safe to take the army at the numbers given in the text. Jomini (Vie de Napoleon, ii. 400) says that the Russians, during the three months after Eylau, had been reinforced by an infantry division and the Guard. Still they were not above 120,000 or 130,000, including Lestocq and the corps on the Narew.
     The French numbers, according to the table at the end of Dumas, vol. xviii., were, on the Vistula:—
           Infantry        123,073
           Cavalry         30,390
           Artillery           4,909
                              158,372
     This does not include officers. Adding for these, and for Dombrowski’s division of the 8th corps, the numbers of which are not stated, it is probable that the army beyond the Lower Vistula was quite 170,000 strong, with about 300 guns. Masséna had about 30,000 on the Narew, and Zayonchek, connecting the two, had perhaps 20,000 Poles. The latter were afterwards used to replace the French at Osterode, Guttstadt, etc., as the Emperor advanced. The exact French numbers at this period are of comparatively little importance, for there can be no doubt that their total beyond the Lower Vistula, excluding the garrison of Danzig and Zayonchek’s Poles, exceeded those of Bennigsen by at least 65,000 or 70,000.
     Rustow (i. 319) gives Napoleon only 158,000, against 101,000 Russians and Prussians on the Vistula, but he, apparently, does not include the troops from Danzig. [Back to paragraph text]

[9]  So the name is written in all the old accounts and maps. In the modern map of 1881, as well as in the copy of the staff map in Moltke’s Tactical Problems (Map No. 27), from which the 1881 map is reduced, it is written “Albrechtsdorf. [Back to paragraph text]

[10]  “ Schwenkitten” on modern maps. [Back to paragraph text]

[11]  Of 12 to 14 guns each = (say) 120 guns. [Back to paragraph text]

[12]  Victor (Précis of operations, 1st corps, Arch. Hist.) dates these operations the 3rd, which seems to be an error. [Back to paragraph text]

[13]  In a despatch, dated 5th June, to Lannes, Berthier gives the hours at which the various attacks commenced that day on the French corps:—
         1st corps  . . . Bernadotte . . . 10 a.m.
         3rd corps . . . Davout . . . . . .   9 a.m.
         4th corps . . . Soult . . . . . . .     8 a.m.
         6th corps . . . Ney . . . . . . . .    6 a.m.
                                                    (Arch. Hist.) [Back to paragraph text]

[14]  The precise dispositions are thus given by Victor (Arch. Hist.):—
     Girard’s brigade (94th and 95th regiments) on the left, in a wood between Spanden and Schlodien.
     63rd regiment, on heights behind the bridge.
     17th dragoons, with the 63rd infantry.
     2 guns, on a height behind the works.
     19th dragoons, in front of Deutschendorf.
     18th and 20th dragoons, in front of Schlòdien, on the left of Girard’s brigade. [Back to paragraph text]

[15]  500 killed and wounded (Hœpfner, iii. 575). 700 or 800 according to Dumas (xviii. 234). [Back to paragraph text]

[16]  Dumas, xviii. 234. Hœpfner, iii. 575. Victor, Arch. Hist. Victor’s appointment was ordered in Corr. 12,743, dated 9th June, in which the Emperor mentions that he is assembling all his reserves at Mohrungen, and hopes to make an end of the enemy, who seems to be striking a mad blow. [Back to paragraph text]

[17]  Victor (Arch. Hist.). [Back to paragraph text]

[18]  See p. 278, note [note 12 above in this electronic text]. [Back to paragraph text]

[19]  Hœpfner, iii. 579. The same authority alleges that Soult admitted that he had been so severely engaged as to be unable to assist Ney. I have been unable to find the letter to Napoleon referred to by Hœpfner (iii. 579, note), but, in a letter to Ney (Arch. Hist.), dated June 6th, 3 a. m., the marshal makes the statement referred to. [Back to paragraph text]

[20]  See note, p. 278 [note 12 above in this electronic text]. Also Corr. 12,729, dated 5th June, 2 p.m., in which the Emperor rightly assumes that the attack on Bernadotte was a feint, and that the real assault would be on Ney. [Back to paragraph text]

[21]  Hœpfner, iii. 583. [Back to paragraph text]

[22]  Berthier to Murat, printed, Dumas, xix. 317. [Back to paragraph text]

[23]  Berthier to Bessières, ibid., xix. 318. [Back to paragraph text]

[24]  Berthier to Lanes, ibid., xix. 318 and 321. In the first despatch the Emperor was uncertain if the enemy meant seriously; in the second, he was certain. [Back to paragraph text]

[25]  Berthier to Mortier, ibid., xix. 323. [Back to paragraph text]

[26]  Berthier to Soult, Dumas, xix. 325. [Back to paragraph text]

[27]  Berthier to Ney, ibid., xix. 326. Also Corr. 12,736. [Back to paragraph text]

[28]  Corr. 12,730, dated 5th June. [Back to paragraph text]

[29]  Berthier to Bernadotte, ibid., xix. 327. [Back to paragraph text]

[30]  Corr. 12,741. [Back to paragraph text]

[31]  Berthier to Gazan, ibid., xix, 321. [Back to paragraph text]

[32]  Berthier to Zayonchek, ibid., xix. 321. [Back to paragraph text]

[33]  Corr. 12,735, dated Finkenstein, 6th June. The movements of the Emperor’s headquarters were as follows, up to the 29th June:—

     6th, Finkenstein.
     7th, Mohrungen.
     8th, Klein Krickau.
     9th, Guttstadt.
    10th, in front of Heilsberg.
    11th,        ”              ”
    12th, Pr. Eylau.
    13th, Pr. Eylau.
    14th, Friedland.
    15th, near Wehlau.
    16th, Wehlau.
    17th, Toplicken.
    18th, Schwarzlauken.
    19th, Tilsit.
(Itinerary of route of Imperial headquarters kept by Berthier, Arch. Hist.). [Back to paragraph text]

[34]  Davout, p. 192, and Friant’s report, dated Lochen, 7th June, 1807, at p. 352 of the same volume. [Back to paragraph text]

[35]  Ibid., p. 193. He gives his real strength as 28,891, p. 194. [Back to paragraph text]

[36]  The Emperor at first found it difficult to believe Bennigsen really meant a serious offensive. He says it seems impossible that he should do so, after letting Danzig fall without an attack on the main army (Corr. 12,731, dated the 5th June). [Back to paragraph text]

[37]  Corr. 12,744, dated 8th June, to Soult. The Emperor says he has forced the enemy to disclose a body of 13,000 infantry and 7000 or 8000 cavalry, and he learns from prisoners that the rest are at Guttstadt. [Back to paragraph text]

[38]  Soult, reporting on this affair, under date 8th June, treats it as a serious reverse. He attributes it entirely to Guyot’s carelessness. The losses he puts at 25 killed and 250 prisoners. (Soult to Berthier, 8th June, Arch. Hist.). [Back to paragraph text]

[39]  According to Hœpfner (iii. 599), the French victory was hardly so complete here as is alleged by Dumas (xviii. 261). Kamenskoi, he says, retreated in good order to Wormditt, which he reached at 1 p.m. It was only at 2 p.m. that he received a despatch from Bennigsen announcing his abandonment of the intention to stand at Guttstadt. [Back to paragraph text]

[40]  There were two bridges in the town, and three had been constructed above it (Wilson, p. 141). P1atow, who had been on the left on the 5th-7th, passed to the right on the 8th (ibid., p. 140).
     In the rear-guard action of the 9th, the forces engaged on the Russian side were:—
                     Bagration     Infantry     5000
                                        Cavalry     1500
                     Platow        Cossacks   2000
During the night, Bagration fell back about halfway to Heilsberg, covered by the cossacks (ibid., pp, 141-143). [Back to paragraph text]