The operations in Silesia were left at the surrender of Breslau on the 7th January.

Brieg, invested by Vandamme with the Wurtemberg division and a few Bavarian battalions towards the end of January, surrendered, with large quantities of artillery and ammunition, on the 8th February.

The Prince of Anhalt-Pless was still in the field. He was attacked and driven into Glatz by the Bavarian cavalry under Lefebvre-Desnouettes, who remained in observation of the fortress, whilst Vandamme laid siege to Kosel, Neisse and Schweidnitz. The last-named surrendered on the 11th April. A vigorous attempt to succour Neisse from Glatz was beaten off, but the fortress held out bravely till the 16th June. Glatz was then attacked, and surrendered on the 28th June.

The army of Silesia had, as already noted, been weakened by a Bavarian division sent to Masséna, in place of which Jerome was directed to recruit 8000 Poles. [1]

It is unnecessary to go farther into the details of the operations in Silesia. [2] As the fortresses fell, the artillery captured in them was utilised for the sieges, not only of the other Silesian fortresses, but also for those of Danzig, Graudenz, and Colberg. The Emperor further drew from Silesia immense resources in kind and in money. [3]
 
 

In Pomerania, Mortier was last mentioned as holding, up to the end of January, the line of the Peene.

A good deal of trouble was experienced from the enterprise of the Prussian garrison of Colberg, which sent raiding expeditions far and wide.

In the middle of February an Italian division, under Teulié, was sent to blockade the place, which it succeeded in doing after some sharp actions during its advance.

On the 28th January, Mortier, deciding to blockade Stralsund, passed the Peene at Anklam and Demmin, and between them. Granjean on the right, driving the Swedish outposts before him, reached Greifswalde, which he carried with slight loss. Dupas, on the left, advanced parallel to Granjean, without encountering any resistance. The two columns next day, after a slight combat, arrived in front of Stralsund. On the 30th, the blockade of the land side was completed, but the communications by sea with the island of Rugen remained open, and Mortier was much annoyed by fire from gunboats.

For two months he continued before Stralsund, completing the lines of investment, and occasionally engaging in small combats with the garrison, which was no means inactive. During this period 3 French infantry, and 1 cavalry regiment were taken from him to the Vistula, and replaced by Dutch troops.

On the 29th March, he was ordered to leave only Granjean’s division [4] before Stralsund, and to proceed, with the rest of his corps, to Colberg. No sooner was he gone than Essen, the Swedish general in command of Stralsund, issued from the place, with greatly superior numbers, against the weak division of Granjean. The latter, attacked in front and threatened on his left, was compelled to fall back by Greifswalde on Anklam across the Peene. Attacked there on the 3rd April, he was again driven on Uckermunde. Once more threatened on both flanks with interruption of his line to Stettin, he retired to that place, reaching it on the 7th April. He now received orders from Mortier to move on Pasewalk. The marshal himself started on the 11th to his assistance at Stettin, which he reached on the 13th with one French and one Italian infantry regiment, and a regiment and a half of cavalry. Granjean was reinforced the same day by a French infantry regiment from Berlin. Mortier, including Granjean’s division, now had 12,000 or 13,000 men, about equal to the strength of the Swedes.

Leaving at Pasewalk a provisional regiment which had just arrived, Mortier advanced against the enemy, and, in a series of actions, drove him upon Anklam. The weather was very bad, constant hail and rain, but the Swedes were steadily forced back across the Peene on the 17th April.

Mortier had been authorised to propose to Essen an armistice, and to raise the blockade of Stralsund. The Swedes were discontented at the want of support from England, and the French successes decided Essen, with the consent of his sovereign, to treat.

Between the 18th and the 29th April, the negotiations ended in an armistice terminable only after a month’s notice, and confining the Swedes to the line of the Peene. They also made over to the French the islands of Usedom and Wollin, engaging to render no assistance to the beleaguered garrisons in Colberg and Danzig.

This armistice was a great relief to Napoleon, enabling him, as it did, to utilise the greater part of Mortier’s corps on the Lower Vistula. No further mention of operations in Swedish Pomerania will be necessary. Mortier may henceforward be considered as forming part of the main army on the Vistula.
 
 

When Napoleon, satisfied that the enemy in front of him was at last settling down for the rest which both armies so badly needed, had himself withdrawn his corps to their cantonments, he adhered generally to his original scheme of the 20th February.

He carried on, during this period of rest, some desultory negotiations, not so much, probably, with any hope or desire of success, as with the wish not to irritate Austria by a refusal of her mediation, which had been offered and accepted. [5] He was busy, as ever, directing the siege of Danzig, and ordering the fortification of his line of cantonments [6] so that the position became almost impregnable.

Supplies, which had been very scarce in February and March, [7] now arrived regularly, as the means of transport were organised and improved. The Imperial headquarters were removed on the 1st April to Finkenstein. [8]

It was only on the 11th May [9] that Napoleon saw indications of an early attempt to relieve Danzig from the sea. The measures which he took to reinforce Lefebvre have already been described in the history of the siege.

Though, on the 11th May, there were no signs visible to Napoleon of a movement in his own front, he was naturally not surprised when they appeared a few days later. It was to be expected that a demonstration at least, if not a serious attack, would be made by Bennigsen to withdraw the Emperor’s attention from Danzig, and to prevent him, if possible, from reinforcing Lefebrve. On the same day, 11th May, there were assembled at Heilsberg the Russian 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 14th divisions, and the cavalry of the left wing; whilst the 7th and 8th divisions, with the right wing cavalry, concentrated at Burgerswalde. On the 13th, a forward movement was made from Heilsberg the Launau, and from Burgerswalde towards Wormditt and Arensdorf; but, as it was reported that Napoleon also was on the point of advancing in great force, the movement was abandoned; on the 14th, the troops returned to their former cantonments.

On the 13th, Platow had successfully attacked a Polish post and had driven in Gazan’s outposts in front of Willemburg. [10] A somewhat more decided movement, to be described presently, had been made against Masséna; but, on the whole, the diversion to cover the operations for the relief of Danzig by Kamenskoi was most feeble. Napoleon had expected something much more serious, and was prepared for it.

Had it been more positive in its nature, Ney was to concentrate in a strongly entrenched position about Guttstadt and Wolfsdorf. Davout in similar positions at Hohenstein, Allenstein, and Osterode; Soult at Elditten; Bernadotte on the Lower Passarge. Murat, with a great part of his cavalry reserve supported by infantry, would advance through Willemburg and Wurtemberg, followed by Zayonchek from Neidenburg, and with Gazan moving, on his right, from Willemburg on Oertelsberg, [11] thus threatening that left wing which, since the operations before Eylau, had always been a source of anxiety to Bennigsen.

After these futile threats on the part of Bennigsen, both armies settled down again into a tacit cessation of hostilities until the time came, early in June, for the opening of the final campaign.

During the months from the battle of Ostrolenka till June, the course of events on the Narew had not been very active. On the 8th March, the Bavarian division which Napoleon had ordered from Silesia reached Warsaw, between 7000 and 8000 men, under the Crown Prince of Bavaria and General Wrede. Masséna fixed his headquarters at Prasznitz. The Bavarian division he posted with one brigade on the Narew, from Sierock to Pultusk; the other, and the cavalry, partly at Praga, partly at Prasznitz. Suchet’s division held the Narew from Pultusk to the Omulew at Zawady. Along the Omulew from Zawady to Willemburg was Gazan’s division, with Becker’s dragoons between Janow and Chorzel. The link between Gazan’s left and Davout’s right, at Allenstein, was supplied by Zayonchek’s Poles. A third brigade of Bavarians, arriving early in April, remained at Warsaw. On the Russian side, a line of Cossack posts watched the French on the Omulew, and had behind it Wolkonski’s troops in support. More Russians, between the Narew and the Bug, watched the course of the former river from Ostrolenka to Sierock. On the 14th Apri1, [12] the Emperor directed Masséna to clear the space in front of the Pultusk and Sierock bridges. This was done by 200 Polish cavalry driving back the cossacks on Wyszkowo, whilst Lemarrois, from Warsaw, followed in the same direction on the 10th May. Popowo was reached that day, and the Russians concentrated on Wyszkowo. On the 12th they moved out, under General Loewis, against the Bavarians, pushing them back on Nowavics, and, on the following day, to the bridge-head at Sierock. [13]

Masséna, to check this movement, sent troops across the river at Pultusk, towards Poplawy and Psary. [14] Before the superior forces now arrayed against them, the Russians fell back after a sharp fight. After this, Masséna cleared the peninsula between the Bug and the Narew for some distance, and was not seriously molested during the rest of the month of May. [15]

[1]  Corr. 12,305, dated 5th April. [Back to paragraph text]

[2]  Very full details of the sieges will be found in Hœpfner (vol. iv. ), who, as a Prussian, was specially interested in them, and who gives throughout much fuller accounts of Prussian than of Russian movements. [Back to paragraph text]

[3]  By June, Jerome’s corps had been very much reduced by drafts to Masséna, etc. The return for the 15th June (Arch. Hist.) gives his strength ?s—
                             Bavarians:           2629
                             Wurtembergers:  5640
                                                       8269 [Back to paragraph text]

[4]  Two French and two Dutch infantry regiments, and one of Dutch cavalry. [Back to paragraph text]

[5]  Corr. 12,391, dated 16th April. [Back to paragraph text]

[6]  Corr. 12,144, dated 24th March, gives detailed orders regarding the entrenched camp at Praga. Corr. 12,321, dated 6th April, again alludes to the strengthening of the front about Osterode. Davout fortified the château at Allenstein (Davout, pp, 187 and 190). Bridge-heads were constructed at Braunsberg and Spanden. Ney fortified Guttstadt. The ground being generally frozen, wood and manure were used for works (Davout, p. 187). Numerous other works on the Alle were constructed (ibid., p, 190). [Back to paragraph text]

[7]  “The Russians appear to be like us, and not to have eaten for several days” (Corr. 11,895 dated 27th February). More complaints of shortness of food (Corr. 11,897, dated 27th February). Ney is told, on the 7th March, that he must be patient in his deficiency of supplies, which are at Osterode, detained by want of transport (Corr. 11,967). Even on the 27th March it is noted that Ney is hard up for food (Corr. 12,194). [Back to paragraph text]

[8]  Corr. 12,263, dated Finkenstein, 2nd April. [Back to paragraph text]

[9]  Corr. 12,572, dated 11th May. Even then Napoleon saw no signs of an advance in front of himself. [Back to paragraph text]

[10]  Masséna, v. 328. [Back to paragraph text]

[11]  Hœpfner, iii. 529. [Back to paragraph text]

[12]  Corr. 12,378, dated 14th April. [Back to paragraph text]

[13]  Masséna’s memoirs (Koch) say that, on the 12th May, another attack was made at the mouth of the Omulew, which, though successful at first, was eventually repulsed by Girard. On this day Gazan, as already mentioned, was also attacked at Willemburg. Masséna himself was in front of Chorzel with a Bavarian force, to prevent the turning either of Suchet on his right or of Gazan on his left (Masséna, v. 328). [Back to paragraph text]

[14]  The date of this action is given in the memoirs of Masséna as the 16th May (Masséna, v. 329). [Back to paragraph text]

[15]  Napoleon’s fresh instructions to Masséna are well worthy of study (Corr. 12,596, dated 17th May, 1807). His duties are laid down as: (a) to cover Warsaw; (b) to form the right of the army; (c) to hold an offensive position, alarming the enemy for his left, and preventing him from weakening it to support his centre and right.
     The enemy could advance on Warsaw either by the Bug or by the Narew. To cover the city, therefore, Sierock would be the best point. The next best position would be astride of the Narew, between Pultusk and Rozan, at the extremity of the great bend which was only 8 or 9 miles from the Bug. The third best would be Pultusk, but it would be inferior owing to its distance from the Bug. Last of all would come Ostrolenka: it, however, would be as far from there to Brok as to Sierock.
     But there was also to be taken into consideration Masséna’s third object, and for that Ostrolenka would be by far the best position. Therefore, Suchet should occupy the right bank in force, with outposts in forts at Ostrolenka. Seven Bavarian battalions should hold Ostrykow, at the angle of the Narew, three should be at Krasnosielsk, two at Pultusk, two at Sierock, a light infantry battalion in Ostrolenka. “Should it be asked why Ostrolenka is to be occupied, the answer is simple; it is, in the first place, that the enemy may not occupy it; next, it is in order to occupy both banks of the Narew, without the navigation of which it is impossible to live; lastly, the occupation of both banks acts as a menace to the enemy.” [Back to paragraph text]