On the 7th December the French army occupied a line extending from Neidenburg, on the left, down the valley of the Orezyc, to Pultusk on the right. There was already a bridge head at Okunin, on the Lower Bug; others were at once commenced, on the Bug at Sierock, and on the Narew at Pultusk. The 5th and 7th Russian divisions reached a point about eight miles north-west of Rozan. Bennigsen was at Rozan, where he was joined by the divisions of Anrepp and Essen from Popowo.

On the 28th, Napoleon stopped the advance of his troops.

Bennigsen, finding he was not pursued with any energy, first took position in the angle between the Omulew and the Narew, opposite Ostrolenka. Buxhowden’s army was on his right, between Ostrolenka and Myszienec. [1]

Marshal Kamenskoi reappeared for a few hours at Ostrolenka, but, as it was ascertained that the orders he gave did not emanate from the Tsar, it was decided to disregard them. He again returned to Grodno, finally disappearing from the scene.

Of the two Russian generals, Buxhowden was the senior. Bennigsen, however, was not inclined to serve under him, and looked for the chief command, which he considered his stand at Pultusk would ensure to him. Consequently, he, with his own army and the 8th and 14th divisions of Buxhowden’s, which had been prevented from crossing by the destruction of the Ostrolenka bridge, marched up the left bank of the Narew to Nowogrod, reaching it without mishap on the 1st January. Buxhowden was 9 miles to the north-east of Nowogrod, at Plock. The two portions of the army were connected by a temporary bridge, the frequent destruction of which, by floating ice, furnished Bennigsen with a convenient excuse for not joining Buxhowden, and for thus maintaining a semi-independent command. He could not, however, disobey his senior’s summons to a council at which the future plan of operations was discussed. What it was, and how it was carried out, may be left for description until the French settlement in winter quarters has been detailed.

Napoleon, now out of touch with the Russians, flattered himself that he would be allowed, without further molestation, to take up his quarters, for the rest of the cold season, in the broad stretch of country between the Vistula and the Omulew. [2] His army was discontented at the hardships it had to undergo in terrible weather, and he himself required time to complete the organisation of his magazines, hospitals, and transport. [3]

From Pultusk, and from Warsaw, he issued numerous orders, detailing the position of each corps in the cantonments which he proposed to occupy. [4] They were finally summarised in a note by Berthier, dated 7th January, on the general disposition of cantonments, of which the following is an abstract.

I. Cavalry without Infantry

Latour-Maubourg, with the 5th and 7th Hussars, in the country between Plock and Wyszogrod; cantonments not to extend far, and this brigade to refit and rest.

Milhaud, with the two regiments of his brigade which had suffered most, to rest on the right bank of the Vistula between Plock, Dobrzyn, and Borkowo.

Klein–Dobrzyn to Bobrownik, guarding the small stream running from Gollub to the Vistula.

Nansouty, with his heavy cavalry division, on the Pilica about Rawa, on the road from Warsaw to Breslau.

D’Hautpoult’s cuirassiers, with their artillery, about Thorn – the regiments in Gollub, Rypin, and Sierps.

Espagne’s cuirassiers to move forward from Posen to Petrikau, behind Nansouty.

Guard cavalry, excepting four squadrons at Warsaw, with artillery, ambulances, etc., between Warsaw and Biela, along the left bank of the Vistula and the Pilica.

All the small depôts of cavalry, with the artillery park of the army, to collect at Lenczyca.

Each command to concentrate at its headquarters, and await orders, should the enemy take the offensive.

II. Infantry Corps with Cavalry attached

Bernadotte with Sahuc’s dragoons; headquarters at Osterode, occupying the districts of Elbing and Marienwerder. [5]

Ney, having his supplies, depôts, park, and workshops at Thorn, to occupy Soldau, Mlawa, Chorzel and their neighbourhood, with outposts at Willemburg. His corps would link that of Bernadotte to Soult, with whom he would settle the limits of cantonments.

Soult, using Plock in the same way as Ney used Thorn, to occupy Prasznitz, Makow, Sochoczin, Noviemasto, and the Plock district, having in front of him, beyond the Orezyc, Lasalle’s light cavalry and Milhaud’s brigade, with the exception of the two regiments ordered to rest on the Vistula.

Augereau, using Wyszogrod as his base, to occupy the surrounding district up to the right bank of the Ukra, not carrying his left beyond the stream passing Bodzanow. Should he find himself cramped here, he was at liberty to extend to the rear, on the Bszura, west of the Vistula, as far as Lowicz.

Davout’s limits were, in rear, the left bank of the Ukra, from its mouth to the little river Ziclini. Thence to near Golymin, and on to near Pultusk. He was also to occupy the whole country between the Narew and the Bug, up to Ostrolenka.

Lannes to hold Sierock and the neighbourhood. His light cavalry in the villages on the right bank of the Bug from Sierock to Brok. Gazan’s division, of the same corps, was to hold the triangle between the Bug, the Vistula, and the Austrian frontier. Suchet’s division in Praga and the suburbs of Warsaw. There also was Gudin’s division of Davout’s Corps and the infantry of the Guard.

Orders issued for the collection of supplies, and the establishment of hospitals at the bases fixed for the various commands, at Marienwerder for Bernadotte, at Thorn for Ney, at Plock for Soult, at Wyszogrod and Lowicz for Augereau, at Pultusk for Davout, and at Warsaw for Lannes.

It will be noted that, with the exception of Pultusk, all these centres were on or behind the Vistula. The Emperor’s desires were clearly stated to be, “not to have any encumbrance on the right bank of the Vistula, so that there might be no obstacle to the evacuation of that country should His Majesty see fit to order it.” [6]

At the places named, was ordered the collection of every sort of supplies, and the preparation of workshops for the repair of harness, clothes, and artillery. Baking was to be carried on to a much greater extent than was required for the daily consumption of the army, a large supply of biscuit being thus accumulated.

In case the enemy should take the offensive, the points of concentration for the corps were – Ney at Mlawa, Soult at Golymin, Davout at Pultusk, Lannes at Sierock, Augereau at Plonsk. It will be observed that nothing is said of a point of concentration for Bernadotte, which would seem to point to Napoleon’s not believing he could be attacked without warning from the corps on his right. Any marshal attacked in force was at once to concentrate, and warn the others.

With his troops thus quartered, Napoleon’s right and centre were covering an area of country which it was well within their power to defend against any force they were likely to encounter. The corps, from Ney on the left to Lannes on the right, covered roughly the segment of a circle, the centre of which was at Wyszogrod, and the arc extended from Neidenburg and Willemburg, down the right bank of the Omulew and across the country from near Ostrolenka, to Brok, on the Austrian frontier. Bernadotte’s corps alone was unduly extended towards Elbing and the Frisches-Haff. The whole of the arc was covered by light cavalry, and any one of the corps behind it could be promptly reinforced from flank and rear. Napoleon seems to have thought it extremely improbable that the enemy would assume the offensive, still more improbable that, if he did so, he would attack Bernadotte. He would appear to have under-estimated the Russian generals’ enterprise of design.

He urged on the fortification of important points of support to his line. At Sierock a double tête de pont, on the Bug and the Narew, was to be constructed; another on the Narew, at Pultusk; a third at Modlin. The passage of the Vistula at Warsaw was to be covered by a strongly fortified camp at Praga, supported by works on the left bank. Finally, Thorn was to be fortified as a bridge head. [7] Even should he be forced to abandon temporarily the right bank of the Vistula, Napoleon looked to being able to hold the left, as well as bridge heads on the right bank at all important points from Warsaw to Thorn. Thus, when he recommenced operations in the spring, he would not have to force the passage of a great river.

The object of Bernadotte’s extension towards the Baltic was to cover the siege of Danzig, which place, as a standing menace, whilst in the enemy’s hands, to his communications, the Emperor desired to capture before the time came for a fresh advance. For this siege, and for the blockade of Colberg and Graudenz, the 10th Corps was now constituted, and placed under the orders of Lefebvre. [8]

Napoleon himself took up his quarters at Warsaw on the 2nd January, 1807.

Great as were the attractions of the Polish capital and its delightful society, [9] it is certain that Napoleon, had he been left undisturbed there, would have taken good care that it should not have become a Capua, either for himself or his army. There was no rest for him. He was employed night and day in making innumerable arrangements, and conducting business of every sort, from the provision of supplies for his army to the supervision of affairs at home and abroad.

Here he may be left for the short period of cessation of serious hostilities, whilst the course of events elsewhere than at the principal seat of war is briefly sketched.

Though Napoleon’s chief efforts against Russia were made on the Vistula, it must not be forgotten that he was, at the same time, carrying on operations, military or diplomatic, in furtherance of his projects over the whole of Europe, from France to Turkey, from Swedish Pomerania to Southern Italy, and even to Persia. It is with the operations on the Vistula alone that this history can deal in detail, but a brief outline of events elsewhere is essential.

Silesia, when the advance to the Vistula commenced, was still unsubdued. Though not held by any important Prussian force in the open field, its fortresses [10] were strongly garrisoned, and would afford rallying-places for Prussian levies, to say nothing of being a strong support for Austria, should she make up her mind to intervene. Obviously, these places could not be left on the right rear of the French army.

The first siege undertaken was that of Glogau, which surrendered, after some bombardment, on the 2nd December, to Vandamme and the Wurtemberg troops. The two Bavarian divisions had, at this time, moved with Jerome to Kalisch. Until Napoleon was in possession of Warsaw, he required these divisions to protect his right flank as it moved eastwards. At Warsaw, he was able to rest it on the Austrian frontier in safety, so long as that power remained neutral. Jerome was, therefore, at liberty, in the beginning of December, to return to the assistance of Vandamme and the Wurtemberg division, who had at once, on the surrender of Glogau, proceeded to partially invest Breslau. On the 10th, Jerome reached Breslau. On the 15th, the bombardment was continued, the governor having refused to surrender. Deroi’s division and Mazanelli’s cavalry brigade, which had been left at Kalisch, were now summoned, as it appeared that the Prince of Anhalt Pless had raised the peasantry in support of detachments from the other garrisons. Vandamme, left alone owing to the departure of Jerome in response to the Emperor’s summons, attempted an assault of Breslau on the night of the 22nd-23rd, but it was delayed by various accidents, and was beaten off. The Prince of Anhalt was approaching. On the 24th, his badly organized levies were routed by Minucci’s division, and their 6 guns captured.

The batteries in front of Breslau had now been strengthened by some of the artillery taken at Glogau, the ditches were frozen over, and the governor negotiated for a surrender. The negotiations were broken off on his hearing that the Prince of Anhalt was again advancing to his relief with rallied and increasing forces. The Prince, evading the troops sent to meet him, arrived near Breslau, whence he was repulsed, and in his retreat was badly cut up by the detachments which he had escaped in his advance.

The governor of Breslau, now losing all hope of succour from without, and fearing that the thick ice on the ditches would expose the place to an assault, surrendered on the 7th January. The corps of Jerome now had at its disposal the captured artillery for the sieges of the remaining fortresses. Napoleon, considering the subjugation of Silesia practically complete, appointed his brother Jerome governor of the province, and left Vandamme to carry out the sieges. [11]

Protection for his left flank was equally essential to the Emperor. To Mortier, with the 8th Corps, [12] was confided the task of occupying and defending the conquered country between the mouths of the Elbe and the Oder, including the territory to the east of Stettin as far as Colberg. He had to watch Swedish Pomerania, and to threaten Stralsund and the Island of Rugen, which might be used as bases for descent by the English and Swedes.

On the 12th December, he occupied a central position on the right back of the Peene, his right at Uckermunde, left at Demmin, and headquarters at Anklam. The Swedish troops on the opposite bank fell back on Stralsund. Between the 16th December and the 4th January, Mortier was reinforced by four infantry regiments. [13] To put a check on the frequent expeditions from Colberg, he occupied Usedom, Schweinmunde, and Wollin, at the mouths of the Peene and the Oder. On the 6th January, a detachment, attacked by Prussians from Colberg, at Wollin, successfully drove them off. Mortier, refusing to be drawn into petty fights, occupied a line behind the Peene, from Uckermunde to Treptow. Nothing more occurred here before the end of January.

At the Ottoman Court, Napoleon was must ably represented by his Corsican compatriot, General Sebastiani. The Ambassador’s clever combinations of threats and promises were aided by the injudicious invasion, towards the end of November, of Moldavia and Wallachia by Michelson with 50,000 or 60,000 men. [14] The demands of England and her threats of bombarding Constantinople were also of assistance to him.

The action of Russia, in this imposing upon herself the task of observing Turkey with a considerable force, at a time when she wanted every available man to oppose the French in Poland, was most unwise. Sebastiani was able, by the end of December, 1806, to persuade the Sultan to declare was against his Northern neighbor. The Tsar, compelled by the pressure in Poland to withdraw two out of the five divisions with Michelson in Moldavia and Wallachia, sought to procure a diversion by England towards Constantinople. On the 29th January, the Sultan, egged on by Sebastiani, declared war against England also. [15]

In February a British fleet passed the Dardanelles, and appeared before Constantinople. All was at once confusion there. Sebastiani, in imminent danger of his life, kept his head, urged on the defence of the capital, and amused the British Admiral, Duckworth, with negotiations, until the latter found the defences so strong that there was no course left by a retreat again through the Dardanelles – no easy matter, under the heavy fire of the now completed batteries on either shore.

On the Danube, nothing of importance occurred during the campaign in Poland; but Napoleon, by assisting the Turks with the loan of French officers, and by threats of the advance of Marmont’s corps [16] from Dalmatia, succeeded in keeping paralyzed a considerable force under Michelson, which could have been employed to much greater advantage in Poland.

With Persia, too, he carried on negotiations in the spring, which sufficed to alarm Russia in the East, and detain there troops which might otherwise have given assistance in the main theatre of war. With the affairs of Turkey and Persia it will not be necessary, now that their general bearing on the war has been indicated, to deal further.

[1]  Jomini (Vie de Napoleon, ii. 343) says the retreat on Ostrolenka was disapproved by Bennigsen, who, losing sight of the ensemble of the campaign, fancied that, in checking Lannes at Pultusk, he had gained a great victory over Napoleon. [Back to paragraph text]

[2]  “I think all is finished for this year. The army is about to take up its winter quarters” (Corr. 11,523, to Josephine). The Emperor returned to Warsaw on the 2nd January (Corr. 11,549, 48th bulletin). [Back to paragraph text]

[3]  There was great disorder, at this time, in the commissariat at Warsaw, which the Emperor had to remedy. His orders, placing under each marshal the control of supplies in his own district, did not, at first, work satisfactorily. The marshals, considering themselves supreme, hampered and interfered with the collection of supplies by the civil commissaries. Napoleon had to issue severe orders to check this (Savory, iii., 27). [Back to paragraph text]

[4]  These orders will be found printed in full in Dumas, xviii., pp. 288-309. It is not very clear in Dumas whether the note was by Berthier, but the original in Paris dispels any doubt (Arch. Hist.). [Back to paragraph text]

[5]  The Polish corps, then numbering 7000 under Dombrowski, was made over to Bernadotte for the blockade of Graudenz (Corr. 11,535 and 11,536, dated 2nd January). That fortress was effectually blockaded on the 18th January, after a small fight, in which the garrison was driven in. (Bernadotte’s report on 1st Corps, Arch. Hist.). [Back to paragraph text]

[6]  Ney, Bernadotte, and Soult, alone, owing to their distance from the river, were allowed to have small intermediate hospitals and depôts of supplies. The words quoted in the text are a good instance of the caution displayed by Napoleon, and his prevision of all possible eventualities. [Back to paragraph text]

[7]  Corr. 11,585. [Back to paragraph text]

[8]  The command was first given to Victor, but he was captured by a Prussian party from Colberg. Though he was, shortly afterwards, exchanged against Blücher, this misfortune cost him his chance of the Dukedom of Danzig, and, for a time, his marshal’s baton. A letter (Arch. Hist., daily correspondence), from him to the Emperor, describes his capture, as he was changing horses, by disguised Prussian soldiers, and peasants. He is very indignant at what he considers this unfair capture, and begs the Emperor to remonstrate with the King of Prussia. Napoleon hardly appears to have taken the same view, as he made no difficulty about exchanging Victor for Blücher. The constitution of the 10th Corps at this time was—
     (1)  Dombrowski’s Polish division, about 7000.
     (2)  A brigade of French infantry, about 4000.
     (3)  Two regiments French chasseurs.
     (4)  Baden troops (for blockade of Colberg), about 6000.
     (5)  Legion of the North, about 4000.
     (6)  A French cavalry brigade.
     About 25,000 in all. To these would be added the Hessian troops so soon as Zayonchek with his Poles could relieve them of the duty of blockading Graudenz (Corr. 11,680). [Back to paragraph text]

[9]  It was at this time that Napoleon first made the acquaintance of the beautiful Countess Walewska. Of her devotion to him, which continued even t the days of St. Helena, there can be no shadow of a doubt. Of the reality of his love for here there is, perhaps, not quite the same certainty. In any case, it is clear that he did not allow it to interfere with his energetic attention to his army and his schemes. [Back to paragraph text]

[10]  They were Glogau, Breslau, Schweidnitz, Glatz, Neisse, Brieg, and Kosel. [Back to paragraph text]

[11]  About this time Napoleon estimates his army in Silesia at over 30,000 men (Corr. 11,575). [Back to paragraph text]

[12]  It comprised Granjean’s and Dupas’ divisions; 3 cavalry regiments, 2 companies of foot artillery, and 2 of Dutch light artillery. [Back to paragraph text]

[13]  22nd and 58th of the line, and 12th and 15th light infantry. [Back to paragraph text]

[14]  Michelson at first had 90 battalions, 100 squadrons, and 306 guns. Of these, 36 battalions and 40 squadrons were withdrawn to Poland in December 1806 (Jomini, Vie de Napoleon, ii. 344 (note) and 346). According to the same author (ii. 336) Michelson at first had 80,000 men. This seems too high and estimate. Plotho (pp. 69-70) calculates the Russian forces as 500 per battalion, 80 per squadron, and 200 per battery of 14 guns. These figures would give Michelson’s original army at 58,200, and the numbers remaining later as about 35,000. Napoleon himself, in the end of January, estimated them at 30,000 (see ante, p. 13, note 1). [Back to paragraph text]

[15]  Napoleon, in seeking the co-operation of Turkey, appears to have had an eye to using her against Austria also. “Austria is muzzled; if she moves, notwithstanding my army of Italy, I will bring the Turks to the gates of Vienna, and my Poniatowski will not be for them a Sobieski” (Comeau, p. 285). [Back to paragraph text]

[16]  The 2nd. [Back to paragraph text]