Je n’ai jamais eu un plan d’opérations,” was a saying of Napoleon. He did not imply that he had no general scheme, no fixed goal towards which to direct his operations. What he did mean was, that he made no pretence to deciding beforehand precisely when and where he would meet the enemy, and how he would dispose of him when met. Whilst fixing his eye steadily on the end at which he had decided to aim and laying down the earliest movements, he recognised that, once the enemy was encountered, the further direction of operations must depend on changing circumstances, from day to day and from hour to hour.

When he first arrived in Berlin he could, until the fragments of the Prussian army had been destroyed, come to no more definite decision than that he must, sooner or later, encounter and defeat the Russians. On that point he was certain, and he did not hesitate to proclaim it publicly to his victorious army. [1]

As news of the surrender of Hohenlohe and Blücher, the capitulation of Magdeburg, the destruction of the other remains of the Prussian army west of the Oder, and of the slow advance of the Russian armies towards the Vistula came in, he began to see his way more and more clearly. From the first he had recognised the desirability of taking up his quarters, for the winter, east of the Vistula. [2] By doing so he would place himself in a position to open the campaign next spring against the Russians without having to delay his advance by the preliminary operation of forcing the passage of a great river, the Vistula. He would cover completely the operations for the subjugation of the Silesian fortresses, he would support and secure the moral and material assistance of the Poles, he would be able to cover the sieges of Danzig, Colberg, and Stralsund, from which places he had to fear a descent by sea upon his left flank and rear. Finally, he would wrest from Prussia almost all the territory from which she might hope to recruit her shattered army, leaving her nothing but the Baltic provinces of Old Prussia. His goal, for the present, was the establishment of cantonments on and beyond the Vistula, with his advanced corps pushed out far enough into Poland to leave him breathing space and to afford sufficient room to enable him, in the event of his being seriously attacked, to concentrate east of the Vistula, for the defence of its line, without risk of a disaster. Should he be able to attain that end, or even should he find himself compelled to winter between the Vistula and the Oder, or behind the latter river, he would still require a base secured by the possession of the fortresses of the Oder in its whole course. Should he winter beyond, or on the left bank of the Vistula, the Oder would form a secondary base on which to fall back, if necessary. Should he find progress beyond the Oder impossible, it would become his front line, with the Elbe in support.

In the end of October and the beginning of November he was uncertain as to the fate of the ruins of the Prussian army of Jena; Magdeburg still held out against Ney; Blücher might yet escape and threaten his communications west of the Elbe, or pass by sea to join the King beyond the Vistula. He had little information as to the situation and movements of the advancing Russians. He knew not whether he would have to meet them on a battlefield not far east of the Oder or whether they were still beyond the Russian frontier, farther to the east of the Vistula than he was to the west.

On the 5th November he writes fully to Davout, whom he had promptly sent eastwards from Berlin. He directs the marshal to advance on Driesen and Meseritz, beyond the Oder, and to scour the country in advance with 2500 dragoons under Beaumont. On no account was his infantry to pass Driesen and Meseritz without further orders. As far as the Emperor’s information at present went, it was improbable the Russians could reach Warsaw for another fortnight. On Davout’s right, Jerome, with 24,000 men, was attempting the capture of Glogau; if he succeeded he would march on Custrin, which had pusillanimously capitulated, and was temporarily garrisoned by 2000 Baden troops. If Weimar (i.e. Blücher) surrendered to Soult, Bernadotte, and Murat, they, with Lannes from Stettin, would be available to support Davout’s advance. When Magdeburg should fall before Ney, he also would be in hand. [3]

All was still uncertain as regards the extent of the advance. Two days later the clouds began to lift. Blücher had surrendered on the 7th; Magdeburg was on the point of capitulation, and actually fell next day. It seemed that Bennigsen, with the first Russian army, had not more than 50,000 men, and that it was very improbable they could all reach the Vistula before the 20th at the earliest.

Davout was, therefore, to reach Posen on the 9th, when Augereau would have arrived in support at Driesen. At Posen he was to construct enormous bakeries for the supply of the army which would concentrate on it. Nevertheless, Davout was to avoid engaging the Russians should they, perchance, have arrived on the Vistula. If they had not been brought to a halt by the result of the operations against the Prussians, the Emperor proposed, for the present, to halt at Posen, which he thought it beyond the limits of possibility for Bennigsen to attack before the 18th. Should the Russians be further delayed, the Emperor’s plans might be changed. [4] At the same time, Chasseloup was directed to fortify Stettin against a surprise, as a support to the left of the base on the Oder, [5] and numerous orders for the collection of ammunition and supplies of all sorts at Posen were issued. [6] For the protection of his left rear against the sea, precautions were also taken. To Louis Buonaparte his brother had no intention of trusting the command in this direction. On the 5th November, the Emperor wrote to Mortier, in Hanover, that Louis’ health would probably necessitate his return to Holland. [7] On the 11th, Mortier was appointed to the command on Louis’ departure. The ill health of the latter was, perhaps, diplomatic only. The army under Mortier was ordered to seize Hamburg, and confiscate all the great stores of English merchandise there. [8]

It soon became abundantly clear that no trouble to the west of the Vistula was likely to arise from a Russian advance in winter. Davout had encountered practically no opposition as far as Posen, his cavalry was well out in front of him, meeting with no serious resistance.

The occupation of Warsaw, at any rate, was of vital importance as assuring the support of the Poles. This political consideration was of paramount importance, and turned the balance in favour of an advance on the Upper Vistula. From a purely military point of view the Emperor would possibly have preferred to operate in the angle of the river about Thorn, spreading his cantonments eastward, with his flanks resting on the Vistula above and below Thorn. To the Lower Vistula, as a base, there was the objection that his communications would be more open to a raid from Pomerania than they would be farther south. It is true they were more exposed to Austria if he advanced on the southern line; but then, if Austria entered the arena, the whole advance must have been abandoned until she had been annihilated.

The Emperor, on these considerations, decided to advance, at least as far as the line of the Vistula from Warsaw to Thorn. The conduct of the Russians, when he reached Warsaw, would show whether it was safe to push on beyond the great river.

The advance was to be in echelons with Davout and Murat on the right in front. As those marshals progressed beyond the re-entrant angle of the Vistula below Thorn, their communications would be exposed to enterprise from the river. To protect them on this side, the corps of Lannes, Augereau, Soult, Bessières, Ney, and Bernadotte would move in succession on Thorn, the three first-named then turning to their right up the lift bank of the river towards Warsaw.

In this way, any attempt by the enemy, across the river between Thorn and Warsaw, against the communications of one corps, would be taken in flank by the corps following. When Davout and Murat arrived in Warsaw, the corps of Lannes, Augereau, and Soult would be along the river below it, within call, whilst Bessières, Ney, and Bernadotte would be at, or approaching, Thorn. Thorn and Warsaw would be strongly held, when taken, as the extremities of the advanced base.

To cover the right flank of Murat and Davout, the corps of Jerome was available, until the proximity of the Austrian frontier, as it turned northwards to the Bug, should form a protection, so long as Austria was quiet. Murat, who was to command the right wing of the army, would be able, should the Russians show signs of standing to fight at, or in front of, Warsaw, to dispose of 80,000 men, a force far superior to any Bennigsen was likely to have. [9]

On the 24th November, the Emperor left Berlin, on the 25th, he was at Custrin. He was, at this time, carrying on negotiations with the King of Prussia for an armistice, the
idea of which he had refused to entertain until he had gathered in all the fruits of his victories at Jena and Auerstädt. The terms which he now offered were such as Prussia could not possibly accept, unless she were prepared to cut herself loose from the Russian alliance and to throw herself on the mercy of the French. They were—

(1)  The Prussian army to be withdrawn behind the Vistula;

(2)  The French to occupy the right bank of the Vistula, from the Austrian frontier to the mouth of the Bug, as well as Thorn, Graudenz, Danzig, Colberg, Lenczyca, the Silesian fortresses of Glogau and Breslau, and all Silesia on the left bank of the Oder;

(3)  The rest of East Prussia, and Prussian Poland to be unoccupied by either party;

(4)  The King of Prussia to obtain the withdrawal of all Russian troops from his territories during the suspension of arms.

The last condition it was beyond the power of the King to comply with; the others would have the effect of leaving Napoleon master of the situation on the recommencement of hostilities, and he would naturally protract peace negotiations till the season was suitable for his advance. He would then be able, holding all the passages of the Vistula, to place his army in Poland long before the Russians could reach it, and Prussia would, meanwhile, have had little territory from which to recruit a fresh army. On the 27th November, [10] Napoleon informed Talleyrand that the King had, as he must have expected, refused to ratify the armistice. The period of negotiation had been utilised by Napoleon in vigorously pressing his advance.

On the 10th November, Davout was at Posen, where he had arrived the day before; Lannes was at Schneidmühl on his left, on the Stettin-Bromberg road; Augereau was at Custrin; Jerome, leaving 6000 Wurtemberg troops to besiege Glogau, [11] was moving towards Kalisch on Davout’s right.

On the 18th, Davout had reached Sempolno, nearly half way from Posen to Warsaw, and Nansouty’s cavalry was as far forward as Konin on the Wartha. Cavalry pushed out in all directions, especially towards Bromberg and Thorn, had forced the small bodies of Prussians in front of them to fall back towards the Vistula. Lannes was before Thorn, into which Lestocq, with the Prussians, had retired, after partially burning the pile bridge. Augereau was at Bromberg. Davout’s left was, therefore, well protected. Lannes had, however, been unable to induce the surrender of either Graudenz or Thorn. Jerome with part of his corps was at Kalisch. Ney and Soult were in second line, Bernadotte still marching, from Lubeck, on Berlin.

On the 24th November, as Davout and Murat continued their advance on Warsaw, Lannes, who had remained till then in front of Thorn, commenced his movement up the Vistula, protecting their left. The small fort of Lenczyca, surrounded by marshes, about equi-distant from Thorn and Warsaw, and about half as far from the river as it was from either place, was evacuated by the Prussians and occupied by Davout. It was at once set in order as a great advanced magazine, immense quantities of stores and ammunition being collected in it.

The first Russian cavalry were met and driven back by Murat at Blonie. On the evening of the 28th November, he entered Warsaw as the Russians passed the Vistula to the suburb of Praga on the right bank, burning the bridge after crossing. Even now, Napoleon could hardly believe that Bennigsen would leave him, uncontested, the passage at Warsaw. He wrote to Murat, on the 1st December, [12] “If the enemy commits the folly of evacuating Praga, seize the faubourg, and construct a strong bridge head.” On the 30th, Davout arrived with Morand’s division and part of Gudin’s, the rest of the infantry being between Blonie and Warsaw, the light cavalry spread along the left bank of the Vistula down to a point opposite the mouth of the Bug.

Lannes was now on the Bszura at Lowicz and Sochaczew. Augereau, from the mouth of that river to Wroclawik, above Thorn, touching, with his right, Lannes’ left at Sochaczew. His light cavalry, on the left, waiting for the arrival of Ney, manœuvred towards Bromberg.

On the 2nd December, the anniversary of the Imperial coronation and of Austerlitz, Napoleon issued to his troops one of the stirring proclamations with which he was wont to announce the opening of a new campaign. On the present occasion there was special need for a strong appeal to the enthusiasm and devotion of his soldiers who, in the past fifteen months, had served the Emperor so well. They had begun to feel the desire for a period of rest before renewing their exertions; they looked with repugnance on the idea of at once entering on a fresh campaign in the wilds of Poland, in the midst of mud and snow. They had already learnt something of the terrors of Polish weather in their march from Berlin, and there was much grumbling at the idea of going beyond the Vistula. [13]  Here is the proclamation:  “Soldiers! A year has to-day passed since you were, at this very hour, on the memorable field of Austerlitz. The Russians, fleeing in terror, or surrounded, were yielding their arms to their conquerors. Next day they sent overtures, deceitful overtures, of peace. Scarce had they, thanks to a perhaps culpable generosity, escaped from the disasters of the third coalition, when they entered upon a fourth. But their ally, on whose tactics they founded their chief hopes, is now no more. His strong places; his capital; his magazines; 280 of his standards; 700 of his guns; 5 of his great fortresses are all in our hands. The Oder, the Wartha, the deserts of Poland, the rigours of the season, have all failed to arrest for an instant your advance; you have braved all, surmounted all, everything has fled at your approach. Soldiers! we shall not lay aside our arms until a general peace has affirmed and assured the power of our allies, and restored to our commerce its liberty and its colonies. We have conquered on the Elbe and the Oder, at Pondicherry, and in our Indian colonies; at the Cape of Good Hope, and in the Spanish colonies. Who can give the Russians the hope of balancing destiny? Who can authorise them to thwart such great designs? Are not they still, as we are, the soldiers of Austerlitz?”

It is now time to examine the situation of the Russian armies and the small Prussian corps, with the outposts of which alone the French had so far come into collision.

On the 1st December began the Russian retreat from the Vistula before the French threatening a passage, not only at Warsaw, but also lower down at Wroclawik and Zakroczin. The 6th division (Sedmaratzki) fell back, from Praga, over the Narew to Sierock. The 4th division retired, between the 2nd and 4th December, from Pultusk to Ostrolenka with Bennigsen’s headquarters. The 2nd division from Plonsk to Rozan, the 3rd from Prasznitz to a post midway between Makow and Ostrolenka. The advance guard of Barclay de Tolly retired from Plock to Novemiasto, behind the Sonna. Only a few hundred Cossacks remained on the Vistula. [14] The Prussians under Lestocq had been guarding the line of the Lower Vistula from Thorn, far too long a line for their weak force. Lestocq, nevertheless, protested against Bennigsen’s orders for his retreat. [15] He was compelled to obey, especially as the retirement of Bennigsen would expose his left flank. On the 5th December, his headquarters were at Gollub, on the 6th at Strasburg. The detachments lower down fell back on Deutsch Eylau, Bischofswerder, and Löbau. [16]

On the 2nd December, Praga was occupied by a French regiment. On the 3rd, Milhaud’s light cavalry passed the Vistula and proceeded towards the Bug. Between the 3rd and 8th, Davout’s three divisions crossed the Vistula and occupied the small triangle between it, the Bug, and the Austrian frontier, which left the Bug a few miles above Sierock and met the Vistula a short way above Warsaw. Davout’s headquarters were at Jablona, his outposts stretched along the left bank of the Bug from its mouth to the Austrian frontier. As long as Austria was neutral, this frontier now safeguarded Davout’s right; Jerome’s corps could devote itself to the Silesian sieges. Lannes’ corps replaced Davout in Warsaw and Praga. Its headquarters were in Warsaw on the 5th December.

Immense energy was being displayed in repairing the bridge and in constructing redoubts, so as to make of Praga a powerful entrenched camp and bridge head. [17] This work was of the utmost importance as supporting the right of the new base on the Vistula, and as a cover to a retreat, should that be necessary.

Whilst Murat and Davout were completing the passage of the Vistula on the extreme right, Ney had arrived on the left of the line, in front of Thorn, now held only by a rearguard left by Lestocq. On the evening of the 6th December, a few French companies, commanded by Colonel Savary, passed the river in boats which had been collected under shelter of the islands. After a little sharp fighting, the Prussians, whose strength was small, were driven out of the town. More French troops passing over, a battalion and two squadrons followed the Prussian rear guard as far as Gollub. Having forced them to continue their retreat, the French returned to Thorn, and the repair of the bridge was at once taken in hand, though not, apparently, with so much energy as was desirable, for it was not completed till the 15th December. [18]

As Warsaw was required for a support to the right of the base on the Upper Vistula, so Thorn was required for the left. The old fortifications were ordered to be restored, in order to make of the place a bridge head covering the passage. [19]

To support Ney, Bessières, with the second cavalry reserve, passed at Thorn.

Bennigsen had ordered the retreat from the Vistula with a view to uniting with the 2nd Army under Buxhowden (who, in the beginning of December, had only just passed the Russian frontier, [20] and could not arrive on the Vistula before the 15th) before attempting to oppose seriously the French advance. Buxhowden, learning the retreat of the 1st Army, halted his own nearly thirty miles east of Ostrolenka, the headquarters of Bennigsen. The two commanders were vieing with one another for the chief command. Both saw it was impossible for Marshal Kamenskoi, rapidly losing his reason, to retain his position long, and, it is to be feared, their jealousy may have influenced their actions. No sooner, [21] however, had Bennigsen retreated than he perceived his mistake in allowing the French, unchallenged, to pass the Vistula. [22] No doubt he could not have prevented their passage; but he might, at least, have, for the moment, delayed their acquisition of the two important têtes de pont of Praga and Thorn. He decided again to advance. The recovery of Praga was hopeless; but he could hope to check Napoleon at the Bug, which had not yet been passed, and he might still possibly recover Thorn, where the French had shown less strength. Whilst he, with the main body of his army, again advanced to Pultusk, he sent a hurried order to Lestocq, to attempt the re-occupation of Thorn. It was too late. When Lestocq arrived before the place, which he had evacuated only two days before, he found Ney’s force too strong for him. He was forced to retreat again to Strasburg, his rearguard being roughly handled by Ney, and to take up a position towards Lautenburg, on the left bank of the Drewenz.

Bennigsen’s fresh forward movement was not more successful; for he was shortly informed of the further progress of the French, now to be narrated. Murat’s orders were, when he had passed the Vistula at Warsaw, to endeavour also to pass the Bug. [23] This operation was undertaken by Davout, on the 10th December, with Gauthier’s brigade of Morand’s division. The points selected for the passage were Okunin, about two miles above Nowydwor, and Nowydwor itself, the principal passage to be at the former.

At 5.30 a.m. on the 10th, in the dark, Gauthier sent across the river at Okunin, by boat, ninety men, with orders to take post silently one hundred paces from the river on the farther side. They were not to fire, unless attacked. Effecting the passage undiscovered, they were quickly supported by more troops, and, at 7 a.m., a sharp fusillade was opened by the French at Gora, higher up the river, in order to induce the belief of a passage being intended there. There was no such intention, and the action was confined to fire across the river.

As the force opposite Okunin gathered strength, a reconnaissance was pushed forward towards Pomiechowo, a village on the right bank of the Ukra, about four thousand paces north of the point of passage. Simultaneously, another force had crossed opposite Nowydwor, landing in safety. The Russians in Modlin, near this landing-place, were forced to fall back on Pomiechowo, their retreat to which was threatened by the French troops from the Okunin crossing. They passed the Ukra, under fire from this force, by the Pomiechowo bridge.

Davout at once hurried on the construction of a bridge at Okunin, and of a tête de pont on the opposite bank. By evening he was firmly posted, with Morand’s division, on the right bank, and had a defensible work, covering his bridge, well flanked, owing to the re-entrant angle of the river, by batteries on the left bank, above and below it.

On the 12th, Augereau’s advance guard, passing the Vistula, without opposition, at Zakroczin, was able to protect the construction of a bridge head between Zakroczin and Utrata.

Bennigsen, hoping that by seizing Modlin on the 11th, when Augereau was still beyond the Vistula, he might force the French back across the Bug, possibly even over the Vistula, sent a regiment of jägers and one of hussars across the Ukra at Pomiechowo, at 7 a.m. This force drove the French 85th regiment from Pomiechowo, and occupied a position between that village and Koszewo. Davout, reinforcing the 85th with the 5th, again attacked. By 2 p.m., after a sharp combat, the Russians were compelled to re-cross the Ukra.

Informed of Augereau’s crossing, and aware that Soult was approaching the Vistula on Augereau’s left, Bennigsen, once more abandoning his forward movement, determined to defend the line of the Ukra.

Osterman Tolstoi’s division (the 2nd) was at Nasielsk on the evening of the 11th. On the 13th, he was at Borkowo, on the Ukra, leaving Davout, unmolested, to strengthen his position opposite Okunin.

Soult marched from Posen on the 13th in echelons of divisions [24] to Wrocklavik, and was preparing to cross there, with such boats as he could collect, when he received orders [25] to march up the river, to cross as near as possible to the mouth of the Bszura, and march on Plonsk to join Augereau. Selecting as his point of passage the re-entrant angle near Dobrzyckow, he crossed unopposed there [26] with St. Hilaire’s and Legrand’s divisions, whilst Leval’s passed at Plock, some distance lower.

Bernadotte’s corps, arriving at Posen only on the 8th December, was not at Thorn till the 20th.

On the 13th December, Napoleon dictated, at Posen, [27] the following orders:—

Bessières, with the 2nd cavalry reserve from Thorn, to advance to the right on Biezun, Rypin, and Soldau. Ney’s light cavalry on Strasburg. Bessières would thus find himself midway between Thorn and Pultusk, in a position definitely to ascertain the Russian movements.

Soult, passing the Vistula on the 16th at Wrocklavik, to join Bessières at Lipno. When the junction was effected, Soult’s light cavalry would move to the right on Plonsk, to facilitate the passage of Augereau at Zakrocrin, of Wattier at Wyszogorod, and of Davout at Nowydwor. Bessières’ objects were: (a) to sweep the plain, and join Soult; (b) to push the enemy over the Ukra: (c) to reconnoitre towards Pultusk and Willemburg; (d) to compel the Prussians to retreat.

Leval (Soult’s corps), crossing at Thorn in support of Bessières, was to be at Lipno on the 7th. St. Hilaire, followed by Legrand (both of Soult’s corps), to pass at Wrocklavik on the 16th. Thus, on the 18th, Soult would be, with his three divisions, across the Vistula, his right at Dobrzyckow, his left at Rypin. Ney, Bernadotte, and Lannes in second line. Ney to make for Strasburg, his place at Thorn being taken by Bernadotte and the Guard who would arrive there on the 18th. For the present no further movements could be definitely indicated, but, if the enemy did not mean to make a stand, infantry would be useless for his pursuit.

Scarcely had Napoleon passed these orders, when he received a despatch from Murat, dated midnight of the 10th December, describing the passage of the Bug, and asserting that the enemy had evacuated the left bank of the Narew. This changed his views, and induced him to believe the enemy was in full retreat. He at once issued fresh orders. [28] Murat was directed in pursuit with all his available cavalry (about 30,000 men), including that of Davout, Augereau, and Lannes, to link himself to Bessières towards Biezun, to endeavour to interrupt the road from Pultusk to Koenigsberg, and to harass the enemy’s rear-guard to the utmost. With this great cavalry force, Murat would have such a superiority of that arm that he would be master of the situation, and could accept or refuse battle, as might seem best in the circumstances of the moment. Meanwhile, the infantry would secure as much rest as possible. Davout to occupy Sierock, and, possibly, send one division to Pultusk. Augereau to halt at Zakrocrin and Wyszogorod, drawing supplies from Plonsk and Blonie. Soult towards Plonsk. Lannes to concentrate at Warsaw. Napoleon had himself intended going to Thorn, but the reported retreat had changed his views, and he was bound for Warsaw. To Ney he wrote that his infantry would be useless for the pursuit, and he could protect his left with his light cavalry. [29]

It was time for the Emperor to be at the front. He left Posen on the 16th. The roads were so bad that he had to travel in a country conveyance, and Duroc, overturned in his carriage, broke his collar-bone. [30] Late at night on the 18th, the Emperor reached Warsaw, where, notwithstanding the hour, there was the wildest enthusiasm amongst the Poles. Next day, he was besieged with petitions and deputations seeking the reconstitution of the Polish kingdom. He replied to them as he had replied from Berlin. His one desire, as well as that of his soldiers, at this time, was to be allowed peaceably to occupy cantonments for the remainder of the cold season; but it was, at the same time, necessary to gain space and drive the Russians from his front. [31] He had discovered the inaccuracy of Murat’s report as to the general retreat of the enemy, and had once more modified his orders, thus—

Ney to move on Gollub with advance guard at Rypin, light cavalry towards Strasburg and Culm. [32] Leval to occupy Thorn between the departure of Ney and the arrival of Bernadotte; then to join his own corps and support Ney at Gollub. [33] Bernadotte to arrive at Thorn, and await orders there, after relieving Leval on the evening of the 17th. [34] Soult to march between the Vistula and Biezun, so as to reach Plonsk on Ney’s right. [35] Bessières, with his cavalry, to drive the enemy on Soldau, and to send parties along the Ukra and towards Plonsk, to meet the cavalry of Augereau. Murat to cover Ney’s advance. [36] Further orders were sent to Bernadotte, on the 17th, to leave one division at Thorn, and, with the other two, to support Ney and Bessières, who would be subordinate to him as the senior marshal. [37] Augereau was ordered to be at Plonsk on the 22nd with Milhaud from the cavalry reserve. [38] Davout to pass all his corps, except one regiment, to the right bank of the Bug. [39] Murat also to send over Lasalle, Klein, Nansouty, and Beaumont. [40] Lannes to move from Warsaw to the left bank of the Bug towards Jablona and Zegrz, and the Guard to take his place at Warsaw, [41] which would be defended by Poles. [42] All was now ready for the French advance.

As for the Russian positions, Marshal Kamenskoi had, at last, joined his armies on the 21st December at Pultusk. Old and worn out in body and mind as he was, he was yet all for a forward movement towards the Ukra in support of the troops there. Gallitzin, with an infantry regiment, 2 cavalry regiments and 18 guns, was sent from Pultusk to Glubowo, 6 miles north-east of Novemiasto, to support the 3rd division; Sedmaratzki, with the 6th division, was ordered to advance to Zbroski; Buxhowden’s 5th and 7th divisions to march from Ostrolenka on Novemiasto, whilst his 8th and 14th divisions marched on Pultusk. [43]

Barclay de Tolly was, with 6 battalions, 1 hussar and 1 cossack regiment, and 6 guns, on the Ukra about Kolozomb and Sochoczin. Dorochow, with 3 battalions, 1 cavalry, 1 cossack regiment, and 6 guns, part of the 2nd and 4th divisions, at Borkowo. Osterman, with the rest of the 2nd division, stood from Borkowo on the Ukra to the Narew. Bagavout, with 3 battalions, one regiment of Cossacks, and one gun, was at Zegrz, supported in rear by another battalion and a regiment of Cossacks. Litow, with two infantry regiments, supported Barclay and Dorochow. Sacken, at Srenszk, stretched a hand to the Prussians, whose left was there and right at Lautenburg. [44]

[2]  “It was desirable for the success of ulterior operations not to allow the enemy to cross the Vistula; otherwise we should have been obliged to take cantonments in a bad position between the Vistula and the Oder, or else to recross the Oder and winter in Prussia. That would have uncovered the operations in Silesia, and have allowed the Prussians to recruit all the Poles who came under our standards” (Savary, iii, 20).
     “If I let the Russians advance I lost the support and the resources of Poland; they might decide Austria, which only hesitated because they were so far off; they would carry with them the whole Prussian nation which would feel the necessity of doing everything it could to retrieve its disasters” (Jomini, Vie de Napoleon, ii. 334).  [Back to paragraph text]

[3]  Napoleon to Davout, dated Berlin, 5th November, 1806 (Corr. 11,176).  [Back to paragraph text]

[4]  Corr. 11,196 and 11,199, both to Davout, darted Berlin, 7th November, 1806.  [Back to paragraph text]

[5]  Corr. 11,178, dated 5th November, 1806.  [Back to paragraph text]

[6]  Corr. 11,187 to 11,190, dated 5th November, 1806.  [Back to paragraph text]

[7]  Corr. 11,175, dated 5th November, 1806.  [Back to paragraph text]

[8]  Corr. 11,269, dated 16th November, 1806.  [Back to paragraph text]

[9]  Corr. 11,302, to Murat, dated 24th November, 1806. In this letter the Emperor shows Murat the strength of his wing this;—
         1st Cavalry Reserve (Murat)—
             Beaumont’s and Klein’s dragoons . . . . . . 4800
             Becker’s dragoons . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1200
             Nansouty’s cavalry  . . . . . . . . . . . . 2400
             Milhaud’s cavalry . . . . . . . . . . . . .  800
                                                Total    9200
                                       Infantry.      Cavalry.
             3rd Corps (Davout). . . . . 22,000  . . . . 1200
             5th Corps (Lannes). . . . . 16,000  . . . . 1200
             7th (Augereau). . . . . . . 16,000  . . . . 1200
 Part of the 9th Corps (Jerome). . . . . 12,000  . . . . 2000
                                Totals   66,000  . . . . 5200
 Grand totals – 66,000 infantry, and 14,400 cavalry = 80,400 men.
     The Russians could not, Napoleon thought, have more than 30,000 or 40,000 men at Warsaw. The remaining French forces might be expected to be as follows:—
     Ney at Posen on the 24th. Soult at Frankfort on the 25th. Sahuc’s cavalry at Posen on the 29th. Lasalle’s [at Posen] on the 20th. Grouchy’s [at Posen] on the 29th. Bernadotte was still behind.  [Back to paragraph text]

[10]  Corr. 11,311, dated Meseritz, 27th November, 1806.  [Back to paragraph text]

[11]  Glogau surrendered on the 2nd December, and Vandamme, with the Wurtemberg division, moved to the siege of Breslau, where he was joined by Jerome from Kalisch, with the Bavarian division. Breslau did not surrender till the 9th January.  [Back to paragraph text]

[12]  Corr. 11,332, dated Posen, 1st Decembcr, 1806.  [Back to paragraph text]

[13]  “Our soldiers were less satisfied; they showed a lively repugnance to cross the Vistula. Misery, the winter, the bad weather, had inspired them with an extreme aversion for this country” (Rapp, 118).  [Back to paragraph text]

[14]  Hœpfner, iii. 69.  [Back to paragraph text]

[15]  Hœpfner, iii. 67.  [Back to paragraph text]

[16]  Ibid., iii. 70.  [Back to paragraph text]

[17]  Dumas, xvii. 111, 112.  [Back to paragraph text]

[18]  De Fezensac (p. 128) gives this date, mentioning that even on the 13th troops had still to cross in boats. The wooden bridge had been burnt, and its restoration was no easy matter.  [Back to paragraph text]

[19]  Chasseloup was instructed to take in hand the fortification of the bridge head at Thorn; but first he was to attend to Praga, where an intrenched camp, large enough for 40,000 men, was required. He was also to submit a plan for fortifying one of the islands at the mouth of the Bug. Another téte de pont was required on the Bug, at the mouth of the Ukra (Corr. 11,463, dated 13th December, 1806).  [Back to paragraph text]

[20] The Russian western frontier in 1806 was very different from what it now is. Starting from the Baltic some 10 miles north of Memel, it ran south-east to the Niemen (or Memel) river, 25 miles east of Tilsit. Thence it ran east along the river for about 60 miles. From this point it ran nearly due south, following the Niemen nearly to its source, and thence in the same direction, to the Bug and the Austrian frontier. This, the nearest point on the frontier to Warsaw, and to the Vistula, was 90 miles east of that city.  [Back to paragraph text]

[21]  Dumas (xiv., 425-429) gives a note, furnished to him by Bennigsen, on the latter’s motives for not defending the line of the Vistula. After pointing out the inferiority of his numbers, he rightly remarks that he would have committed an unpardonable fault in attempting to defend the long line of the river above Thorn. If he attempted to defend Thorn and Warsaw, the French could cross between them, thus cutting him in two. The argument loses its force when we consider Bennigsen’s subsequent orders to Lestocq to retake Thorn after its occupation by Ney.  [Back to paragraph text]

[22]  A statement in the Arch. Hist. gives the positions of the French army on
                                 the 5th December.
      Imperial Guard, Posen.   Reserve of Grenadiers (Oudinot), Berlin.
      Bernadotte  1st Corps.   Marching on Posen, due there on 7th.
      Davout  ... 3rd Corps.   Warsaw and Blonic. Light Cavalry on left bank of Vistula
                                 from Warsaw to the Bszura.
      Soult   ... 4th Corps.   About Posen.
      Lannes  ... 5th Corps.   Sochaczew, Lowicz, and along the Vistula below the mouth
                                 of the Bszura.
      Ney     ... 6th Corps.   Opposite Thorn, and at Bromberg, etc.
      Augereau... 7th Corps.   In front of Blonie. Light Cavalry opposite Thorn, under
                                 orders to rejoin the corps.
      Reserve Cavalry—
                  Lasalle marching on Warsaw.
                  Milhaud on right bank of Vistula towards the lower Bug.
                  Wattier concentrating on Kutno.
                  Nansouty, Wiskitki, etc.
                  D’Hautponlt, Ohermulki.
                  Klein, Mosna, etc.
                  Grouchy, near Posen.
                  Beaumont near Willanow.
                  Sahuc marching on Sempolno.
                  Becker in front of Blonie.
      Several of the cavalry positions are not marked on the maps.  [Back to paragraph text]

[23]  Corr. 11,332, dated 1st December, 1806, to Murat.  [Back to paragraph text]

[24]  Hœpfner, iii. 81.  [Back to paragraph text]

[25]  Dumas, xvii. 115.  [Back to paragraph text]

[26]  Ibid., xvii. 116.  [Back to paragraph text]

[27]  Corr., 11,458.  [Back to paragraph text]

[28]  Corr., 11,465, dated 13th December, 1806.  [Back to paragraph text]
 

[29]  Corr. 11,462, dated 13th December, 1806.  [Back to paragraph text]

[30]  Corr. 11,497.  43rd bulletin.  [Back to paragraph text]

[31]  “It is time to take up our winter quarters which can only he done after we have driven off the Russians” (Corr. 11,501, to Davout, dated, Warsaw, 9th December, 1806). To Clarke he wrote from Lowicz, on his way to Warsaw, that the armies were facing each other, the French on the left, the Russians on the right bank of the Narew, and that it was possible that in a week there would be a battle which would make an end of the affair” (Corr. 11,500).
     “Not wishing to let the enemy shut us in on the Vistula, and feeling, on the contrary, the necessity to give ourselves a broader sphere in front of Warsaw and Thorn, I at once took the offensive” (Jomini, Vie de Napoleon, ii. 339).  [Back to paragraph text]

[32]  Berthier to Ney, 15th December, 1806.  [Back to paragraph text]

[33]  Berthier to Leval, 15th December.  [Back to paragraph text]

[34]  Berthier to Bernadotte, 15th December.  [Back to paragraph text]

[35]  Berthier to Soult, 15th December.  [Back to paragraph text]

[36]  Berthier to Bessières, 15th December.  The despatches in this and the for preceding notes are printed in full in Dumas, xvii., “Pièces justificatives.”  [Back to paragraph text]

[37]  Berthier to Bessières, 17th December.  [Back to paragraph text]

[38]  Berthier to Augereau, 21st December.  [Back to paragraph text]

[39]  Berthier to Davout, 22nd December.  [Back to paragraph text]

[40]  Berthier to Murat, 22nd December.  [Back to paragraph text]

[41]  Berthier to Lefebvre, 22nd December, and Berthier to Lannes, 23rd December.  [Back to paragraph text]

[42]  Berthier to Gouvion, governor of Warsaw, 23rd December. This, and the despatches quoted in the preceding five notes, are quoted in Dumas, xvii., “ Pièces justicatives.”  [Back to paragraph text]

[43]  Hœpfner, iii. 84.  [Back to paragraph text]

[44]  Ibid., iii. 82, 83.  [Back to paragraph text]