On May 1 a brisk engagement took place at Poserna, in the plain rendered famous by the death of Gustavus Adolphus, and Marshal Bessières was killed by a cannon-ball. The Emperor regretted him more than did the army, which had never forgotten that it was through his advice that Napoleon had been hindered on the evening of the battle of the Moskwa from bringing his guard into action and thus completing his victory, whereby the aspect of events would have been changed and the complete destruction of the Russian troops brought about. On the day after Marshal Bessières' death, while Napoleon was continuing his march on Leipzig, he was unexpectedly attacked in flank by the allies, who had crossed the river Elster before daybreak. This battle, which was known as Lutzen, was keenly contested. The troops recently arrived from France fought with the utmost valour, the marine regiments being especially distinguished. The enemy were beaten at all points, and withdrew towards the Elbe; but the French, having scarcely any cavalry, could take but few prisoners, so that their victory was incomplete. Nevertheless, it produced a great moral effect all over Europe and especially in France, as showing that our troops had preserved all their superiority, and that nothing but the frosts of Russia had vanquished them in 1812.

The Emperor Alexander and the King of Prussia, who, after having witnessed the defeat of their armies at Lutzen, had gone to Dresden, were obliged to leave it on Napoleon's approach. On the 8th he took possession of that town, where he was soon joined by his ally the King of Saxony. After a short stay at Dresden the French crossed the Elbe and pursued the allies, coming up with their rear-guard and beating it at Bischofswerda.

The Emperor Alexander, being dissatisfied with Wittgenstein, had himself taken command of the allied forces; but, being in his turn defeated by Napoleon in the action at Burtkau, he probably perceived that he was unequal to direct the troops, for he soon ceased to lead them. The allies halted and intrenched themselves at Bautzen, but the Emperor caused Ney to turn their position, and on May 21 gained a victory which was again rendered incomplete for want of cavalry. Still the enemy had 18,000 men disabled, and fled in great disorder.

On the 22nd the French came up with the Russian rear-guard in front of the defile of Reichenbach. Napoleon's small force of cavalry was commanded by General Latour-Maubourg, who led it with such energy that the enemy were driven in and abandoned the field after heavy loss. That of the French, though not very numerous, was of a kind to be much felt. General Bruyères, an excellent cavalry officer, had both his legs shot off, and died of the wound. But the most disastrous event of that day was caused by a ball which, after killing General Kirgener, Marshal Lannes' brother-in-law, mortally wounded Duroc, the grand marshal of the palace—a man beloved by everybody, and Napoleon's oldest and best friend. He survived his wound a few hours, and the Emperor went to him and evinced the deepest feeling. His despair was most touching; the witnesses of that heartbreaking scene observed that, when obliged to leave his friend to resume the command of the army, Napoleon, on parting from him, bathed in tears, appointed a meeting in a 'better world.'

Meanwhile the French army, following up its success, had reached Silesia, and occupied Breslau, the capital, on June 1. Then the allies, the Prussians most of all, struck with alarm at their critical position, and recognizing that, for all their big words, they were unable by themselves to stop the French, wished to gain time, in the hope that Austria might make an end of her hesitation and join forces with them. They sent, therefore, to sue for an armistice, which might, it was said, through the mediation of Austria, lead to a definite treaty of peace. Napoleon thought it right to grant this armistice, and it was signed on June 4, to last till August 10.

While Napoleon was marching from victory to victory, Marshal Oudinot got beaten at Luckau, losing 1,100 men. The Emperor's hope was that during the armistice his reinforcements would come up, and be at hand if a fresh campaign should be necessary. In spite of this, however, several of the generals regretted that the Emperor had not followed up his advantages. They said that if the armistice gave us the time to bring up our reserves it would do the same for the Russians and Prussians. The Swedes were already on the march to assist them, and they had hopes of the Austrians, who, though not ready at that moment, would have more than two months to mobilise their large army.

When I heard at Mons of the victories of Lutzen and Bautzen, I was vexed at not having shared in them; but my regret was diminished when I learnt that my regiment had not been there. It was, in fact, still in front of Magdeburg. M. Lacour, an old aide-de-camp of General Castex, was in command of it as senior major. He was a brave officer; but had half-educated himself with the help of books, which gave him a self-conceit out of keeping with soldierly ways. I shall have to speak later on of the loss which his want of skill in command brought on the regiment. At the depôt I admitted as second major M. Pozac, a brilliant officer in all respects, who had won a sword of honour at Marengo.

Towards the end of June the task of organizing the new levies was completed, and the colonels were ordered to return to their duty with the army. I had therefore to part from my family, with whom I had been spending happy days; but honour and duty had to be obeyed, and I took the road back to Germany. I went, in the first place, to Dresden, whither the Emperor had summoned all the colonels to question them as to the composition of the new detachments. In regard to this I learnt a thing which nearly broke my heart. I had organised four splendid squadrons of 150 men apiece. The two first, and luckily the finest, had joined the regiment; but the third had by the Emperor's orders been taken off to Hamburg, and drafted into the 26th Chasseurs, one of the weakest regiments in the army. This was quite regular, and I submitted without a murmur. But it was otherwise when I was informed that the fourth squadron, having come under the notice of Jerome, King of Westphalia, at Cassel, had taken his fancy so much, that he had on his own authority embodied it in his guard. I knew that the Emperor, angry at the liberty taken by his brother in thus carrying off his soldiers, had ordered them to resume their journey at once, and I hoped to get them back; but Jerome got at some of the Emperor's aides-de-camp, and they represented that as the King of Westphalia's guard was composed of untrustworthy Germans, it would be well to let him have a French squadron on whom he could count; that, further, the King had just given them handsome uniforms at his own cost; and, lastly, that even without this squadron the 23rd Chasseurs would be one of the strongest regiments in the French cavalry. Anyhow, my squadron was incorporated in the Westphalian bodyguard, object as I might. I could not reconcile myself to this loss, and thought it very unjust that I should thus be deprived of the fruit of all my trouble.

I rejoined my regiment not far from the Oder. It was cantoned with the rest of Exelmans' division near the little town of Freistadt. M. Wathiez, my new brigadier, had been my captain in the 25th Chasseurs, and was always very kind to me. We were quartered in a comfortable château, named Herzogwaldau, in the centre of the village which my troopers occupied. While we were staying there a curious incident took place. A man named Tautz, the only bad character in my regiment, got very drunk, and threatened an officer, who put him under arrest. He was tried and condemned to death; and the sentence was approved. When the guard, under the regimental staff-sergeant, Boivin, went to fetch Tautz out to be shot, they found him in his cell perfectly naked, pleading the extreme heat. The staff sergeant, a brave soldier, but of intellect not equal to his courage, instead of making the culprit dress, merely made him put on a cloak. When they reached the drawbridge across the broad moat of the citadel, Tautz flung the cloak in the faces of his guard, jumped into the water, swam across, and, reaching the shore, went off to join the enemy on the other side of the Odor. He was never heard of again. I reduced the staff-sergeant for his lack of vigilance; but he soon regained his epaulettes by an act of courage which I shall presently have to recount.

The new squadrons brought up the strength of the regiment to 993, nearly 700 of whom had been in the Russian campaign. The newly joined men were strongly built, and nearly all had served in the legion of the department of Jemmapes, which had made their training easy. I blended them with the old squadrons. Both sides were preparing for the struggle; but the enemy had used their time to raise up a powerful adversary for us, when they persuaded Austria to march.

The Emperor Napoleon, accustomed by many victories not to count up his foes, thought himself as invincible as ever when he found himself in Germany at the head of 300,000 men; nor did he sufficiently take into account the elements composing the forces with which he was about to meet a hostile coalition of all Europe. As I have said, the material of the French army had never been finer; but since only a few of the new regiments contained men who had ever fought before, and the effects of the disastrous Russian campaign were still felt, our magnificent troops formed an army which was better adapted to use for the purpose of demonstrations for securing peace than in actual warfare; and most of the superior officers who had a near view of the regiments were of opinion that they needed several years of peace.

If from examining the French army one passed to those of their allies, one could find nothing but slackness, unwillingness, and a wish for an opportunity of betraying France. It was therefore, on all accounts, to Napoleon's interest to make terms; and to this end he ought, in the first place, to have brought back his father-in-law, the Emperor of Austria, to his side, by restoring to him Dalmatia, Tyrol, and a part of the other provinces which he had taken from him in 1805 and 1809. A few similar concessions to Prussia would have quieted the allies; who, it appears, offered Napoleon to restore the colonies taken from France, and to guarantee to him all the territory bounded by the Rhine and the Alps, as well as Upper Italy; but he would have to give up Spain, Poland, Naples, and Westphalia.

These proposals were reasonable enough; nevertheless, after conferring with the foreign diplomatists commissioned to treat with him, Napoleon treated Metternich with rudeness, and dismissed him with no concessions. It is even asserted that on seeing them leave the palace at Dresden he added, 'What a beating we are going to give them!' He seemed to forget that their armies were nearly three times as numerous as the forces which he had to oppose to them; for against the 320,000 men whom he had in Germany the allies could set nearly 800,000.

The Emperor's fête fell on August 15, but as the armistice ended on the 10th, he ordered it to be kept earlier, and the festivities of 'St. Napoleon's Day' were held in the cantonments. This was the last time that the French army celebrated its Emperor's birthday. There was little enthusiasm; for even the least foreseeing of the officers realised that we were on the eve of great changes, and their forebodings were reflected in the minds of the subalterns. Yet each was ready to do his duty, though with small hope of success, for we were vastly inferior to the enemy in numbers. Our allies of the Confederation of the Rhine were wavering, and the Saxon General Thielmann with his brigade had already gone over to the Prussians. So there was much uneasiness and little confidence among our troops.

Just then we heard that General Moreau had returned to Europe. After his condemnation in 1804, in consequence of Pichegru's conspiracy, he had gone to America. Now his hatred of Napoleon made him forget his duty to his country, and he tarnished his laurels by joining the ranks of the enemies of France. But the new Coriolanus soon suffered the penalty which his conduct deserved.

Meanwhile a vast circle was forming round the French army. A Russian corps was in Mecklenburg; Bernadotte, with a force of Swedes, Russians, and Prussians, occupied Berlin; the two main armies of Russia and Prussia were in Silesia; 40,000 Austrians at Linz, and their main force at Prague. Behind this front line, numbering altogether 560,000, were immense reserves.

On our side, 70,000 men, concentrated near Dahmen, were to act against Bernadotte; Marshal Ney guarded part of Silesia. Another corps was near Zittau. Saint-Cyr occupied Pirna, and covered Dresden; round which capital was posted the imperial guard, ready to give help where it was wanted. Even adding the garrisons left in fortresses, Napoleon's forces were infinitely less numerous than those of the enemy.

Our army was divided into fourteen infantry corps, so called, though each contained at least one brigade of cavalry. The generals commanding them were Vandamme, Victor, Ney, Bertrand, Lauriston, Marmont, Reynier, Prince Poniatowski, Augereau, Rapp (who was invested in Danzig), MacDonald, Oudinot, Davout, Saint-Cyr. Lastly, the guard was under the immediate orders of the Emperor. The cavalry proper formed five corps: their commanders being Latour-Maubourg, Sebastiani, Arrighi, Kellermann, Milhau. The cavalry of the guard was under General Nansouty. While the army approved some of these selections, such as those of Davout, Ney, Augereau, Reynier, Saint-Cyr, it was sorry to see important commands given to such men as Oudinot, who had committed several blunders in the Russian campaign; Marmont, who had recently lost the battle of the Arapiles through over-haste; Sebastiani, who seemed unequal to the task; and it lamented that the Emperor should be testing the strategic powers of Lauriston and Bertrand in a critical campaign. The first was a good artilleryman, the second an excellent engineer; but neither had as yet handled troops in the field, so it was clear that they would not be able to lead an army corps. Probably Napoleon recollected that when he was appointed commander-in-chief of the Army of Italy, the fact that he had never had more than a few battalions under him did not prevent him from managing an army, and so thought that Lauriston and Bertrand would do the same. But a universal genius like Napoleon is very rare, and he could not expect to meet with such in these new commanders. In this way his personal affection towards those generals led him into the same error which he had already committed when he entrusted an army to the artilleryman Marmont. It is vain to argue on this point. The history of war shows that theory will not make a commander-in-chief; and that, with very rare exceptions' a man must have commanded a regiment of infantry or cavalry as colonel if he is to be in a position to handle masses of troops well. Very few men are capable of serving this apprenticeship as general officers, still fewer as commanders-in-chief. Louis XIV. never entrusted the command of a body of troops in the field to Marshal Vauban, and if he had offered it to him it is to be presumed that Vauban would have refused it and confined himself to what he understood, the attack and defence of fortresses. Marmont, Bertrand, and Lauriston had not the like modesty, and Napoleon's affection for them prevented his heeding any of the remarks made on this point.

Murat, who had gone to Naples after the Russian campaign, rejoined the Emperor at Dresden. The Coalition—that is to say, the Austrians, Russians, and Prussians—opened the campaign by a piece of bad faith unworthy of civilised nations. Although, according to the latest convention, hostilities were not to recommence before August 16, they attacked our outposts on the 14th, and set the greater part of their troops in movement in consequence of Jomini's treachery. Up to that day only two Saxon generals, Thielmann and Longuereau, had debased themselves by going over to the enemy; the uniform of a French general had so far been clear of such a stain: This was inflicted upon it by a Swiss, General Jomini. That wretch had been a mere clerk in the office of the ministry of the Helvetic Republic, on a salary of 1,200 francs, when General Ney was sent to Berne in 1800 by the First Consul to arrange with the Swiss Government about the defences of that state, which was then our ally. The duties of the clerk Jomini, which had to do with keeping the register of the forces of the Republic, brought him in contact with Ney, who was thus able to judge of his talents, which were great. Yielding to his entreaties, Ney got him admitted as lieutenant, and soon after as captain in a Swiss regiment formed for the French service. His liking for him increasing, he got him made a French officer, took him as aide-de-camp and gave him the means of publishing his works on the art of war—works which, though they have been overpraised, are certainly not without merit. Thanks to this powerful protection, ,Jomini rose rapidly, and when hostilities recommenced, in 1813, was a major-general, and chief of the staff to Ney. Then, however, seduced by the brilliant offers of the Russians, and forgetting his duty to the marshal, the Emperor, and his adopted country, he deserted; taking with him statements of the strength of the army and notes relating to the plan of campaign. Fearing, moreover, lest Napoleon, on hearing of his flight, should change his plans, he urged the allies to resume hostilities two days before the date fixed. To the general surprise of Europe, Alexander rewarded his treason by making him his own aide-de-camp; an act which so shocked the Emperor of Austria, that one day, when dining with Alexander, seeing Jomini among the guests, he said audibly: 'I know that sovereigns sometimes have to employ deserters, but I do not see how they can admit them to their staff and their table!' 1

Jomini's treason was a most disastrous blow to Napoleon, since many of his army corps were attacked while concentrating and obliged to surrender important positions for want of time to arrange for the defence of them. Meantime, the Emperor, finding the enemy forewarned and on their guard to prevent his intended march on Bohemia, resolved to attack the Prussians in Silesia, and to make the French forces who had been compelled to retire before Blucher resume the offensive in that quarter. On August 20 he reached Lowenberg and attacked a considerable force of the Coalition; and after various actions lasting over three days the enemy retired, with a loss of 7,000 men, behind the Katzbach.

During one of the numerous engagements of those days,' Wathiez's brigade, while pursuing the enemy, was stopped by a broad and muddy brook flowing into the Bober. The only way of crossing was by two wooden bridges a quarter of a league apart, and swept by the Russian artillery. The 24th Chasseurs, now commanded by Colonel Schneit, attacked the left-hand bridge with its wonted intrepidity; but the 11th Dutch Hussars, which was sent to carry that on the right, behaved less well. In vain did its colonel, M. Liégeard, the only Frenchman in the regiment, call on his troopers; all were too much alarmed to stir. My regiment was in the second line, awaiting its turn; and as it got nearly as many balls as the 11th, I hastened forward to help the colonel of that regiment in persuading his men to charge, as the only means of silencing the fire. My efforts, however, being vain, and as it was clear that the cowardice of the Dutchmen would entail heavy loss on my regiment, I took my men to the front and was just about to send them forward, when I saw the left-hand bridge break under the first section of the 24th, drowning many men and horses. The Russians had prepared this catastrophe by ingeniously sawing through the beams which held up the flooring of the bridge. At the sight of this unfortunate accident I became afraid that the enemy would have set a similar trap at the bridge towards which my column was moving, so I halted there a moment to examine. It was a difficult business, for not only were the enemy's guns trained on that bridge, but it was open to the fire of one of his battalions. Just as I was about to call for a volunteer to undertake the duty, with the certainty of finding one, Staff-sergeant Boivin, whom I had reduced for letting the condemned man escape, dismounted and came up to me, saying that it was not fair that one of his comrades should be killed in reconnoitring the bridge, and begging me to let him do it in order to retrieve his fault. This noble determination pleased me, and I said: 'Go, sir, and you will find your epaulette at the other end of the bridge.'

Boivin advanced calmly in the thick of the fire, examined the flooring, went under the bridge, and came back to assure me that all was sound. I reinstated him; and, remounted, he placed himself at the head of the leading squadron. The Russians retired without awaiting our attack. Next month, when the Emperor reviewed the regiment and made several promotions, I got M. Boivin appointed sub-lieutenant.

Our new general, M. Wathiez, gained the esteem and affection of the troops in these fights. General Exelmans, commanding the division, was only known to us by public report, which affirmed him to be a man of brilliant valour, but often lacking in the judgment which a commander should have. We had a proof of this in the following incident. Just as the division was executing a retreat, which my regiment had to cover, General Exelmans, under the plea of setting a trap for the Prussian advance- guard, ordered me to place at his disposal my picked troops, and my twenty-five best sharpshooters. He put Major Lacour in command of them, and then posted these 150 men in the middle of a plain surrounded by woods, and, after forbidding them to stir without his orders, went off and forgot all about them. The enemy came up, and, seeing the solitary detachment, halted, suspecting an ambush. To make sure, they sent a few men one by one into the woods to right and left, and, hearing no shots, increased the number till our troopers were completely surrounded. Some of the officers observed to Lacour that his retreat was being cut off. Lacour, a brave soldier, but not original, stuck to the letter of his orders. It did not occur to him that General Exelmans might have forgotten him, and that it would be as well to send and let him know, or at least reconnoitre the ground by which he might retreat. He had been told to stay there, and stay he would, whether his men were killed or taken.

While Major Lacour was carrying out his orders in the style rather of a sergeant than of a field officer, the division was retiring. General Wathiez and I, not seeing the detachment return, and not knowing where to find Exelmans, who was galloping across country, began to feel very uneasy. I obtained permission from the general to go back for Major Lacour, and, starting with a squadron at full gallop, I got up in time to witness a terrible sight for a colonel who loved his men. After overlapping both flanks and even the rear of our detachment, the enemy attacked it in front with infinitely superior forces, so that 700 or 800 Prussian lancers surrounded our 150 men, who, to complete their misfortunes, had no way of retreat save a wooden foot-bridge over a deep mill-stream. Our troopers could only march in single file, so that there was a block, and my picked company lost several men. Some of them then perceived a large courtyard, and, thinking that it opened upon the stream, and that they would find a bridge there, entered it, followed by the whole detachment. The stream did indeed run along the yard, but at that point it formed the milldam, the banks of which were sustained by large slippery slabs, rendering the approach exceedingly difficult for horses, and giving a great advantage to the enemy, who had closed the gates of the courtyard in order to make sure of capturing the French. At this critical moment I appeared on the other side of the stream with my squadron. I made the men dismount, four of them leaving their horses in the charge of one; the remainder, armed with their carbines, hastened towards the foot-bridge. This was guarded by a squadron of Prussians, but having remained on horseback, and with no firearms but pistols, they could not resist the fire from our carbines, and were forced to retire some hundred paces, leaving about forty killed and wounded on the ground. Those of my troopers who were shut up in the courtyard thought to take advantage of this respite to force the great gate; but I called out to them to do nothing of the kind. It would have done them no good, for in order to join me they would have been obliged to cross the foot-bridge on horseback, which they could only have done in single file, offering their flank and rear to the Prussians, who would promptly have charged and exterminated them. The bank was planted with riverside trees, among which infantry could defy a large number of cavalry in perfect safety. I therefore placed my dismounted men as skirmishers along the stream, and. as soon as they were in touch with the courtyard of the mill, I ordered those who were within it to dismount also and take their carbines; then, while a hundred of them kept the enemy off with their fire, the remainder could pass the horses along over the bridge.

While this movement was being executed in perfect order the Prussian lancers, furious at seeing their prey on the point of escaping, tried by a vigorous attack to throw our retreat into disorder. But their horses were hampered by the willow branches, by pools of water, and numerous holes, and, being scarcely able to walk over the muddy ground, never succeeded in reaching our skirmishers, whose fire, well aimed at a short distance, caused them considerable loss. However, the Prussian officer who commanded the charge pushed boldly on to the middle of our line and shot one of my best officers, Lieutenant Bachelet, through the head. I regretted him keenly, but he was promptly avenged by his men, for several bullets laid the Prussian officer dead beside him.

The fall of their leader, their heavy loss, and their inability to touch us determined the enemy to retire. I took up my wounded and retreated unpursued. In this deplorable affair my regiment lost an officer and nine troopers killed and thirteen prisoners, among the latter Lieutenant Maréchal. The loss of these twenty-three men grieved me the more that it was needless, and fell entirely on the bravest men of the regiment, most of whom were marked for decoration or promotion. I was never able to console myself for this check, and it put the finishing stroke to our dislike of Exelmans. He got off with a reprimand from General Sebastiani and the Emperor, to whom he had been recommended by his friendship with Murat. Old General Saint-Germain, a former colonel of the 23rd Chasseurs, and indeed the man who had made the regiment, for which he had preserved a great regard, said openly that Exelmans deserved an exemplary punishment. A quarrel ensued, and they would have come to blows had not the Emperor personally intervened. Major Lacour, whose bad management had so largely contributed to the disaster, lost my confidence from that day forth.