At daybreak on the 6th the battle was renewed with more vigour than on the previous day. Much to Napoleon's surprise, the Archduke, who had till then confined himself to the defensive, began to attack, and took Aderklaa from us. Soon the artillery fire extended over the whole line; never in the memory of man had the like been seen, for the number of pieces brought into action by the two armies amounted to 1,200. The Austrian left wing, under the Archduke in person, crossed the Russbach, and debouched by those columns towards Leopoldsdorf, Glinzendorf, and Grosshofen, but was stoutly resisted, and even checked, by Davout and Grouchy's cavalry by the time that Napoleon came up at the head of an enormous reserve. Seeing the extreme right of his line engaged, he had supposed for a moment that the Archduke John had joined the enemy's main army. So far was this, however, from being the case, that, as we afterwards learnt, he was at that moment at Pressburg, eight leagues from the field of battle. Deprived of the support from him which they had hoped for, the Austrian left soon repented having attacked us. Overwhelmed by superior forces, more especially of artillery, it was driven back across the Russbach, with heavy loss, by Davout, who then sent a portion of his troops across, and marched by both banks on Neusiedel. His right thus secured, the Emperor returned with his guard to the centre, and while Bernadotte attacked Wagram and Oudinot marched on Baumersdorf, he ordered Masséna to retake Aderklaa. Taken and re-taken, this village finally remained in the hands of the Austrian grenadiers, whom the Archduke led to a renewed attack, while at the same time he launched a strong column of cavalry against the Saxons under Bernadotte, routing them completely, and flinging them on Masséna's troops, who were thrown into momentary disorder. The marshal was in his carriage, and the enemy noticing it with its four white horses in the middle of the line, guessed that its occupant must be a person of importance and poured a storm of shot upon it. The marshal and those about him were in great danger; we were surrounded with dead and dying. Captain Barain, an aide-de-camp, lost an arm, and Colonel Sainte-Croix was wounded.

The Emperor, galloping up, became aware that the Archduke, in order to turn or even surround his left, was bringing forward his own right wing, which already occupied Süssenbrunn, Leopoldau, and Stadlau, and was marching on Aspern, thus threatening the column of Lobau. In order to be better seen by the troops, he got for a moment into the carriage, beside Masséna, and at sight of him order was restored. He bade Masséna change front to the rear, in order to bring his left to Aspern and front towards Hirschstetten, causing Macdonald, with three divisions, to take up the ground which Masséna left. These movements were carried out in good order, under an artillery fire from the enemy. Thus Napoleon, profiting by the concentration of his principal forees, brought up to support Macdonald, not only strong reserves of all arms, but finally the imperial guard, which took up its position in three lines in rear of the other troops.

At this moment the positions of the two armies were very curious, the opposed lines having almost the shape of two letters Z placed side by side. The Austrian left, posted at Neusiedel, was giving way before our right, while the two centres were holding their respective places, and our left wing was retreating along the Danube before the enemy's right. The chances of either side thus seemed to be about equal. Really, however, they were all in favour of Napoleon—in the first place, because it was unlikely that the village of Neusiedel, where the only means of resistance was afforded by an old fortified tower, would hold out long against the attack which Davout was delivering with his usual vigour; and it was easy to see that when this was taken, the Austrian left, being outflanked and without support, would retreat indefinitely and get separated from the centre, while our left wing, though beaten at the moment, was in its retreat coming nearer to the island of Lobau, the powerful artillery on which would check the Austrians, and prevent them from following up their success. Secondly, Napoleon, acting on inner lines, could hold a great part of his troops in reserve, and yet show a front in different directions; while the Archduke, being obliged to extend his army, in order to execute his great movement on an outer line with the view of surrounding us, was not in force at any point. The Emperor, observing this mistake, was perfectly calm, though he could read in the faces of his staff the anxiety caused by the conquering march of the enemy's right, which, always driving Masséna's corps before it, had already reached the battle-field of May 22, and after crushing Boudet's division by a formidable charge of cavalry, was threatening our rear. But the success of the Austrians was short-lived. The hundred heavy guns with which Napoleon's foresight had armed the island of Lobau opened a seathing fire upon the enemy's right, and it was compelled, under pain of annihilation, to halt in its triumphant course, and retire in its turn. Masséna was then able to reform his divisions, which had lost heavily. We thought that Napoleon would profit by the disorder into which the cannonade had thrown the enemy's right wing to attack with his reserves; Marshal Masséna, indeed, sent me to ask for instructions on this point. But the Emperor remained impassible, his eyes ever fixed on the extreme right, towards Neusiedel (which lies high and is surmounted by a tall tower, visible from all parts of the field), waiting to hurl himself upon the enemy's centre and right until Davout had beaten the left and flung it back beyond that village. A valiant defence was being maintained by the Prince of Hesse-Hommburg, who was there wounded; but at last we suddenly saw the smoke of Davout's guns beyond the tower. Beyond a doubt the enemy's left was beaten. Then, turning to me, the Emperor said: 'Quick! tell Masséna to fall upon whatever is in front of him, and the battle is won.' At the same time the aides-de-camp from all the other corps were sent off to their chiefs with an order for a simultaneous attack. At this supreme moment Napoleon said to General Lauriston, 'Take a hundred guns, sixty from my guard, and crush the enemy's column.' As soon as their fire had shaken the Austrians, Marshal Bessières charged them with six regiments of heavy cavalry, supported by part of the cavalry of the guard. In vain did the Archduke form squares, they were broken, with the loss of their guns and a great number of men. Our centre advanced in its turn, under Macdonald, and Süssenbrunn, Breitenlee, and Aderklaa were carried after a smart resistance. Meanwhile Masséna had recovered the ground lost on our left, and was pressing the enemy hard, forcing him back beyond Stadlau and Kagran; and Davout, calling Oudinot to his support, occupied the heights beyond the Russbach and captured Wagram. This decided the defeat of the Austrians: they retreated all along the line, retiring in very good order along the road to Moravia.

The Emperor has been blamed for not pursuing the defeated army with his usual vigour; but the criticism is baseless. Napoleon was hindered by many weighty reasons from launching his troops too promptly on the enemy's track. In the first place,the high road to Moravia would bring them into a rough country, divided by wooded hills, ravines, and gorges, commanded by the mountains and forests of Bisamberg, which would offer excellent defensive positions, all the more difficult to carry that the Archduke could occupy them with a large force, much of which had not been engaged, while his rear-guard was protected by powerful artillery. We might therefore expect a stubborn resistance, which, if prolonged, would lead to a night battle. Of these the chances are always uncertain, and the Emperor's victory might well be compromised.

In the second place, to ensure the assembling of the French army in the isle of Lobau by the 4th, it had been necessary to put some of the corps in movement as early as the 1st. These, in order to reach the meeting-place, had had to make forced marches, succeeded without any rest between by a battle extending over two days of very hot weather. Our troops were therefore worn out; while the Austrians, who had been for more than a month in camp, had had only the fatigues of the battle to endure. Thus, if we had attacked the Archduke in the strong position which he had taken up, every advantage would have been on his side.

But a third and still more powerful argument checked Napoleon's ardour and decided him to allow his troops time to rest on the field of battle. He had just been warned by the generals of his light cavalry placed by him to look out beyond his extreme right that an enemy's force of 35,000 to 40,000, under the command of the Archduke John, had been seen debouching at Unter Siebenbrunn, that is to say, upon what, since our change of front, had become our actual rear. The reserve provided by the Emperor would doubtless have been enough to repulse the Archduke; but one must admit that prudence would lead Napoleon not to engage his troops in the attack of the strong positions which the Archduke Charles appeared determined to defend obstinately, so long as he himself was open to an attack in rear from the Archduke John at the head of a strong and perfectly fresh force. The Emperor therefore ordered the pursuit to cease, and made his army bivouac in such a way that one part fronted to the side where the Archduke John was, and was ready to receive him if he ventured into the plain. Fearing, however, to come into contact with our victorious troops, he retreated hastily towards Hungary. If Napoleon had pursued with his usual vigour, the trophies from Wagram would probably have been more numerous, but on considering the motives which decided him to halt one cannot but praise his caution. If he had always acted with as much prudence he would have spared both France and himself great calamities.

In order to rest for a few hours after its victory, our army took up its position with its left at Floridsdorf, its centre in front of Gerpardsdorf, and its right beyond the Russbach. The Emperor's tents were pitched between Aderklaa and Raschdorf, and Masséna's headquarters were at Leopoldau. The replacement of the old Spitz bridge put the army in direct communication with Vienna, which favoured the transport of the wounded to the hospitals, and of food and ammunition to the army.

The Austrians have, not without reason, blamed the Archduke John for the delays in his march and his carelessness in carrying out the Archduke's Charles' orders. Indeed, on the evening of the 4th Charles wrote to his brother to leave Pressburg at once, and form a junction with the Austrian left at Siebenbrunn; but although John received the order by 4 A.M. on the 5th he did not march till eleven in the evening, and moved so slowly that, although he had only eight leagues to do, he took twenty hours to reach Siebenbrunn, not coming up till seven o'clock on the 6th, by which time the battle was lost and the Austrians were in full retreat. The Archduke Charles never forgave his brother for not carrying out his orders; John lost his command and was banished to Styria. 1

In the absence of pursuit, the Austrian losses were much less considerable than they might have been. Still, they admitted 24,000 killed and wounded, among the former three of their generals. One of them, Wukassowitz, had distinguished himself againet Bonaparte in Italy; the other two, Nordmann and D'Aspre, were Frenchmen in arms against their country. According to the bulletins we made 20,000 prisoners and captured 30 guns; but I believe this estimate was much exaggerated. We only took a few colours. Our loss was nearly equal to that of the enemy; Generals Lacour, Gauthier, and Lasalle, and seven colonels were killed. The enemy had ten generals, including the Archduke, wounded; the number of ours was twenty-one, among them, Marshal Bessières. Among the twelve colonels wounded three were special favourites with the Emperor—Dumesnil, Corbineau, and Sainte-Croix: the two first, who belonged to the mounted chasseurs of the guard, lost a leg apiece; the Emperor rewarded them richly. As for Sainte-Croix, who had his skin grazed by a cannon-ball, his wound was not dangerous, at which his friends rejoiced. However, if he had lost a leg he might perhaps have been living now, as well as his brother Robert, one of whose legs remains on the battle-field of Moskwa. Although Sainte-Croix had been only two months colonel, and was not yet twenty-seven, the Emperor made him major-general, Count with 25,000 francs pension, Grand Cross of the Order of Hesse, and Commander of that of Baden. On the evening of the battle the Emperor rewarded the services of Macdonald, Oudinot, and Marmont by giving each of them his marshal's bâton. It was not, however, in his power to give them the talents required to command an army, brave and good divisional generals as they were when in the Emperor's hands, they showed themselves clumsy when they were away from him, either in devising a plan of campaign, or in executing it, or modifying it according to circumstances. It was held in the army that the Emperor, not being able to replace Lannes, wanted to get the small change for him: a severe judgment, but we must remember that these three marshals played an unlucky part in the campaigns which ended in the fall of Napoleon and the ruin of the country.