Tillet, with better judgment than his unhappy comrades, started in uniform, with his sword. Following at first the deep gorge of the Dos Cases stream, up to his waist in the water he crept slowly from rock to rock, hiding himself behind them at the least sound, until he was near the ruined Fort Concepcion. There, leaving the stream, he crawled on all fours through the full corn, and at length reached the outworks of Almeida, being received there at dawn on the 17th by the French outposts. The letter which he bore to General Brénier contained the order to blow up the ramparts, and retire forthwith on Barba del Puerco, whither Reynier's troops were to precede him. The arrival of his emissary was to be announced to Masséna by salvos of the heaviest guns, and on hearing these the marshal made the necessary preparations for retreating on Ciudad Rodrigo, being assured of the imminent demolition of the ramparts. These operations take some time, as the ramparts must be mined, the chambers of the mines charged, ammunition, artillery and gun-carriages destroyed, and so on. We had therefore to wait till the noise of the cannon let us know that Brénier was evacuating the place, and the two armies remained facing each other for four days without any further action. The English asked for a suspension of hostilities to bury the dead—a homage to brave warriors which all civilized nations ought to practice. In the plain the English corpses were by far the more in number; but it was quite otherwise in the village, where the enemy had fought sheltered by houses and garden-walls. Many wounded were picked up on both sides; among ours was Captain Septeuil, an aide-de-camp to Berthier, who had, like Canouville, been sent from Paris to Masséna. He was still more unlucky, for his leg was smashed by a round-shot, and had to be amputated on the field. He bore the operation bravely and is still living.

Seeing the French army remain stationary in front of him for several days, and doubtless hearing the salvos from Almeida, Wellington perceived that Masséna intended to facilitate the escape of the garrison. He therefore reinforced the blockading division, and gave General Campbell, who was in command of it, orders so well devised that if they had been duly carried out Brénier and his troops would have had small chance of escape. At midnight on the 10th a long, dull, explosion announced to the French army that Almeida existed no longer—at least, as a fortress. In order to puzzle the allies, General Brénier had kept them occupied for several days past on the side opposite to that by which he intended to make his escape. This was carried out without disaster, and it was the same at first with his retreat, which he led, guiding himself by the moon and the direction of the streams. He had come within a short distance of General Heudelet's division, which Masséna had sent to meet him, when he fell in with a Portuguese brigade. He attacked and dispersed it, continuing his retreat swiftly; but General Pack, warned by the sound of musketry, hastened up from Malpartida and pursued our columns, firing. Quickly, too, General Cotton's cavalry made a vigorous attack on the rear-guard, causing it some loss. Our people at length caught sight of the bridge of Barba del Puerco, and Heudelet's division advancing to meet them. Believing themselves saved, they gave vent to their joy; but it was written that the soil of Portugal was yet to be watered with French blood.

The last of our columns had to pass through a defile opening into a quarry among steep and pointed rocks. The enemy was pressing on from all sides, and several sections of our rear-guard were cut off by the English cavalry. Seeing this, the French soldiers climbed nimbly up the steep sides of the ravine, and escaped the English cavalry, only to fall into another danger. The Portuguese infantry pursued them on the heights, pouring a murderous fire into them. When at length our men, on the point of being succoured by Heudelet's division, thought that they were in sight of safety, the earth suddenly failed under their feet, engulfing part of them in a yawning chasm, at the foot of a huge rock. The head of the pursuing Portuguese column incurred the same fate, rolling pell-mell into the gulf with our people. Heudelet's division succeeded in forcing the allied troops back beyond the sight of this disaster, and when the foot of the precipice was explored, a fearful sight appeared. Three hundred French and Portuguese soldiers lay there, dead or horribly mutilated. Some sixty French and thirty Portuguese alone survived this terrible fall. Such was the last incident in the laborious and unlucky campaign of the French in Portugal. They never entered the country again. Masséna's army, leaving the battlefield of Fuentes d'Oñoro, retreated towards Ciudad Rodrigo, and went into cantonments, the English not following. We learnt, later on, that Wellington, angry with General Campbell for having, as he said, by neglect of his orders allowed the garrison of Almeida to escape, had brought that general to courtmartial, and that Campbell, in despair, had blown his brains out. 1

Scarcely was the French army in quarters where it could rest and recruit, than Masséna began to think of reorganising it, with a view to a fresh campaign. The work was, however, barely set on foot, when Marshal Marmont arrived from Paris. Though he held his appointment to the commander-in-chief, he presented himself at first as Ney's successor in the command of the 6th corps; then, a few days later, when he was sufficiently acquainted with the state of affairs, he produced his commission, and handed to Masséna the Emperor's order, recalling him to Paris. This unforeseen disgrace, announced in such a way indicating that the Emperor did not approve his conduct of the operations, was a crushing blow to Masséna, but he was compelled to surrender the command to Marmont; and, taking leave of the army, he retired, in the first place, to Salamanca, after a very lively altercation with General Foy, whom he accused of having made common cause with Ney to do him a disservice with the Emperor.

On learning how vigorously General Brénier had led the retreat of the garrison of Almeida, the Emperor appointed him lieutenant-general. He rewarded also Tillet's devotion and courage with the Cross of the Legion of Honour and a pension of six hundred francs. This second favour was, in later days, the subject of a discussion in the Chamber. Tillet had become a sergeant, and had obtained a retiring pension under the Restoration. It was proposed to dock him of this by applying the law but General Foy eloquently pleaded the soldier, and he kept both his pensions.

Masséna stayed a short time at Salamanca, and proceeded to Paris. On his arrival, he called upon the Emperor, who, under the plea of urgent affairs, refused for a whole month to see him. His disgrace was complete. No doubt, Masséna had committed very grave mistakes, especially in his march upon Lisbon; but it must be admitted also that the Government had done very wrong to abandon his army in a country so bare of resources as Portugal, and not to secure his communications by means of troops echelonned between his army and the Spanish frontier. At any rate Masséna rose in the opinion of his troops during the expedition undertaken to relieve Almeida. Not only was his strategy often very fine, but he showed much activity, having no more anxiety about Mme N—, whom he had left at the rear, and being able to give all his attention to the war. Still, I shall take leave to point out several faults which he committed during that expedition. In the first place, it was undertaken with insufficient means of transport, both for provisions and ammunition. It has been said that draught-horses were wanting; this is true, but there were plenty of mules in the district, which might have been requisitioned for a few days. Next was the fatal mistake occasioned by the red coats of the Hanoverians. As the same had already happened at Busaco, Masséna should have made them wear their grey overcoats before sending them into Oñoro to fight the English. By this amount of foresight, he would have retained the whole village; as it was, we lost the upper part, and could not retake it. Thirdly, when Masséna was master of a great part of the plain, and of the whole course of the Dos Casas, except the point where it passes through Fuentes d'Oñoro, he was, as I think, quite wrong to lose precious time and many men in seeking to drive the English entirely out of that strongly-intrenched village. I think that it would have been better worth while, following the example of Marlborough at Malplaquet, to have left a brigade to observe Oñoro, out of range of its fire, and to hold the garrison, and to have advanced. They would have thought themselves on the point of being surrounded, and would have been compelled to abandon the position, and rejoin Wellington, or run the risk of having to capitulate after the defeat of the English army. The important thing for us was to beat the main body of the enemy's troops in the open country. Unluckily, however, it is a principle with the French never to leave an intrenched position behind them in battle. This habit has often been fatal to us here, and, above all, at Waterloo, where we persisted in attacking the farms of La Haye-Sainte and Hougoumont, instead of masking them with a division, and marching upon the already severely-shaken English lines. We should have had time to destroy them before the Prussians came up, and to secure the victory, after which the defenders of the farms would have had to lay down their arms, as our troops had to do at Malplaquet. The fourth mistake with which Masséna may be blamed, at the battle of Fuentes d'Oñoro, was not making sure that there were a sufficient number of cartridges in his wagons. Failing this, he should have fetched them from Ciudad Rodrigo, which was not more than three leagues from the point where we were going to fight. This lack of foresight was one of the principal causes of our failure. Fifthly, if Masséna had still possessed the firmness of which he so often gave proof at Rivoli, Genoa, and Zurich, he would have put General Reynier under arrest for disobedience to orders, and the command of the second corps would have passed to General Heudelet, who would have pushed the English hard and promptly. But Masséna did not venture to take such vigorous action; the conqueror of Souvaroff had lost his energy, and let himself be defied with impunity, and the blood of his soldiers was shed to no advantage and with no glory.

It forms no part of my purpose in writing these memoirs to relate the various phases of the War of Independence in the Peninsula; but before quitting that country, I ought to point out the chief causes of the reverses sustained there by the French, in spite of the fact that our troops nowhere showed more zeal, more patience—above all, more valour.

It is needless again to go over the events of 1808 and the following year, but it may be observed that if after the expulsion of the English, under Sir John Moore, from Spain, the Emperor had himself been able to go on directing the operations, the Peninsula must have quickly succumbed. The Cabinet of London had, however, cleverly raised a new and potent enemy, and when Austria declared war, Napoleon was compelled to leave the task of repressing the insurrection in the hands of his lieutenants. King Joseph's lack of military capacity prevented any concentration of command, and complete anarchy reigned among the marshals and the various corps commanders, each confining himself to the defence of the provinces occupied by his troops, and refusing any aid to his colleagues who governed the neighbouring districts. The most peremptory orders from the Emperor were unable to produce any co-operation, there was no obedience, and each asserted that he himself needed all the resources at his disposal. Thus Saint-Cyr was nearly crushed in Catalonia without the support of a single battalion from Suchet, who was governing Aragon and Valencia; Soult, as you have seen, was left alone in Oporto, while Victor refused to obey the order to join him. Soult, in his turn, allowed Masséna to wait for him for six months in vain at the gates of Lisbon; finally, Masséna could not obtain help from Bessières to beat the British before Almeida. I could quote many more examples of selfish disobedience, but it must be admitted that the main fault lay with the Government. It was natural that, in 1809, the Emperor should have left Spain in order to meet the most pressing danger, but why, when peace was concluded in the north, did he not see the importance of returning to drive the English from the Peninsula? The most surprising thing is, that with all his genius he should have thought it possible to direct from Paris the movement of armies 500 leagues away, in a country where bearers of despatches were liable to be stopped by swarms of insurgents, and commanders-in-chief thus compelled to remain for months without news or orders. If the Emperor could not come himself, he should have entrusted the chief command of all the armies in the Peninsula to one of his best marshals, with power severely to punish disobedience. Napoleon had no doubt made Joseph his titular lieutenant, but he, a man of gentle disposition, clever and well-educated, but having no knowledge of the art of war, had become the plaything of the marshals. They did not execute his orders, and considered his very presence with the army as a hindrance. The worst mistake into which the King's good-nature led him was that of opposing the Emperor's wish with regard to Spanish soldiers captured in battle. Napoleon ordered them to be sent into France as prisoners of war, in order to diminish the numbers of our enemies in the Peninsula, while Joseph, hating to fight against men whom he called his subjects, would defend the Spaniards against us. When they were captured they were ready enough to cheer for their good King Joseph and ask to serve among his troops. He actually created a numerous army, composed exclusively of prisoners whom he had taken, well paid, well fed, and well equipped. They were loyal to Joseph as long as things went well, but at the first reverse they deserted in thousands and went off to join their insurgent compatriots until they were taken prisoners again. Then they again begged to enlist in Joseph's regiments. More than 150,000 men changed sides in this way, and as Joseph had them promptly re-clothed when they came back in rags, the Spaniards nick-named him 'the head of the army clothing department.' The French troops objected strongly to this system, and the Emperor often expressed his discontent with it, but he could never succeed in stopping it. He, on his side, contributed much to the perpetual recruiting of the enemy, for not wishing to reduce too much the French army in Germany, he called on his allies to furnish part of the contingents stipulated for in the treaties, and sent these troops to the Peninsula in order to spare French blood. His motive was doubtless laudable, but circumstances made the application of this system injurious to our cause. It is all very well to employ foreign troops in a short campaign, but it is a different thing when it is a question of fighting for several years against an enemy like the Spaniards and Portuguese who were always harassing you and could never be got at. Nothing but an ardour such as is never found in auxiliary troops can enable men to endure the fatigues of this kind of warfare. Thus not only did the troops which the Emperor obtained from his allies serve badly enough in our ranks, but they deserted daily in heaps. Italians, Swiss, Saxons, Bavarians, and other Germans were soon formed into regiments by our enemies, and the Poles passed in such numbers into the well-paid and well-fed English army, that Wellington was able to form a strong Polish legion, which fought the French without scruple.

But, in my opinion, the principal cause of our reverses, though one which has never been pointed out by any soldier who has written on the Peninsular War, was the immense superiority of the English infantry in accurate shooting, a superiority which arises from their frequent exercise at the targets, and in a great measure also from the formation in two ranks. I know that a great many French officers deny that this latter cause is a true one, but experience has shown that soldiers confined between the first and third rank nearly always fire in the air, and that the third rank cannot take aim at an enemy who is hidden from them by the two ranks in front. It is asserted that two ranks do not offer sufficient strength to resist cavalry, but the English infantry can in a moment form four deep to receive a charge, and our squadrons were never able to catch it in two ranks, though as soon as it has to fire it quickly resumes this formation.

However this may be, I am convinced that Napoleon would in the end have established his brother triumphantly on the throne of Spain if he had been content to finish this war before going to Russia. The Peninsula received no support, save from England, and England, in spite of the recent successes of her armies, was so exhausted by the incessant demands of men and money for the Peninsula, that the House of Commons was on the point of refusing the necessary subsidies for a new campaign. But at the moment of our return from Portugal rumours had got about of the design formed by Napoleon of attacking Russia at home, and the English Parliament authorized the continuance of the war. It was not fortunate for us, for the misunderstandings which I have noticed still prevailed among our commanders. Marshal Marmont got beaten by Wellington at the Arapiles, King Joseph lost the battle of Vittoria, and these reverses compelled our armies towards the end of 1813 to re-cross the Pyrenees and abandon entirely the country which had cost them so much blood. I judge that in the six years from the beginning of 1808, the French lost in the Peninsula 200,000 men killed or dead in hospital, to which one must add 60,000 lost by our various allies.

The English and the Portuguese lost also considerably, but the Spaniards most of all, by reason of the obstinacy with which they withstood the siege of many of their towns. The vigour of these famous defences, particularly that of Saragossa, has thrown such lustre over the Spaniards that the delivery of the Peninsula has generally been attributed to their courage, but this is a mistake, for without the support of English troops the Spaniards would never have resisted the French. One immense merit they have, which is that they are never discouraged. Their confidence, often deceived, cannot be destroyed. Our soldiers used to compare them to flocks of pigeons, which fly away at the least sound to return a moment later. As for the Portuguese, justice has never been done to the share which they took in the war. Less cruel, far better disciplined, and more calmly courageous than the Spaniards, they formed in Wellington's army several brigades which, when led by English officers, were in no way inferior to the British troops; but being less boastful than the Spaniards they have said less about their exploits, and have acquired less renown.

But let us return for a moment to June 1811, when Masséna resigned his command. The war in the Peninsula was so disagreeable and so toilsome that every man longed to get back to France. The Emperor, knowing this, and wishing to keep his army up to its full strength, had decided that no officer was to leave Spain without special leave, and the order recalling Masséna authorized him to bring away only two aides-de-camp, and to leave the others at Marshal Marmont's disposal. He, having his staff complete, and knowing none of us, was no more anxious to keep us than we to stay with him. He assigned us no duties, and we passed some three weeks at Salamanca drearily enough. The time seemed, however, less long to me than to my companions, because I employed it in committing my recollections of the recent campaign to paper. I have found these notes very useful in writing these memoirs.

In consideration of my wound the minister at last sent me leave to return to France. Some others of Masséna's staff having also been permitted to leave the Peninsula, we joined a detachment of 500 grenadiers, who were on their way to reinforce the imperial guard. General Junot and his wife the duchess also took advantage of this escort. We travelled easily on horseback, with fine weather. On the journey some eccentric conduct on the part of Junot made me anxious as to his future. 2We reached the frontier, and I could not but smile when I thought of the evil omen which I had drawn from my encounter with the black jackass on the Bidassoa bridge when last I entered Spain. The campaign had nearly been my last, but I was in France and should see my mother and another who had become very dear to me. So forgetting past troubles, I hastened on to Paris, arriving in July, after an absence of fifteen toilsome months. Contrary to my expectation the marshal received me well, and I learnt that he had spoken very kindly of me to the Emperor. So on my first appearance at the Tuileries, the Emperor expressed his satisfaction with me, spoke with interest of Miranda de Corvo, and asked how many wounds I had now had. 'Eight, sir,' I answered. 'Well, they are eight good quarterings of nobility for you,' rejoined the Emperor.