First, The Prussian army was drawn up in a position with its right wing so exceedingly exposed, that it would seem hardly to warrant Marshal Blucher accepting battle in it, especially as the Duke of Wellington went early in the day to the Prussian position, and, we conclude, as a matter of course, would point out the utter impossibility of his rendering any assistance at this point, owing to the great ditance [sic] the British forces had to march before they could arrive at Quatre Bras, and the probable difficulty they might experience in maintaining their ground there against the more numerous columns of the enemy, which were evidently preparing to make a great effort to gain possession of Quatre Bras; and this is the more manifest, as by a glance at the general plan which shows the relative positions of the troops at Quatre Bras and Ligny, we must be convinced that a bold effort, perpendicular either to the right flank of the Prussians, or to the left flank of the English, successful or not, would be the most probable plan the enemy would pursue to effect a separation of the two allied armies, and upon this separation the successful termination of his campaign almost entirely depended.

     Second, When [sic] Napoleon with the French army arrived at Fleurus, and discovered the exposed situation of the Prussian right wing, and had, at the same time, the certainty that Marshal Ney had more than sufficient forces to keep the advanced guard of Lord Wellington’s army in check, it is evident that the most obvious plan to be pursued was to move direct upon Wagnele and Bry, and attack, with all the force he could muster, the Prussian right wing, which was unquestionably the weakest point. For if it be a rule of war to direct the greatest effort against the most important weak point of an enemy; if it be a rule in war to oppose the front of the attacking army obliquely to the flank of an enemy in battle; and, generally, if the merit of a plan “depends on* operating with the greatest mass of forces in a combined effort upon a decisive point,”

* Extract from Jomini.

and we believe these rules are undisputed, then it must be allowed that the French commander committed a great fault in tactics in not adopting this mode of attack, which would immediately have obliged the Prussian army to attempt a change of front, confusion would have ensued, and a certain victory have crowned the attempts of the enemy: whereas, in the mode of attack which he chose, the French army sustained severe losses in taking the villages of St. Amand and Ligny; and had not Marshal Blucher been too anxious about his right wing, after the enemy’s efforts were become manifest against his centre, and had he retained sufficient reserves on the heights between Bry and Sombref, the last movement of Napoleon, in piercing the centre of the Prussian position, would have led to his certain defeat.

     Thus closed the events of the 16th. The French troops, under the immediate orders of Napoleon, bivouacked on the Prussian position of Ligny; those under Marshal Ney on the position of Frasne; whilst the troops under the Duke of Wellington bivouacked on the field of battle of Quatre Bras. With the approach of night the weather became overcast, it was followed by rain, and the cold became severe, but the fatigue which the troops had undergone in their long march and during the action, rendered the approach of night, with all its disadvantages, most enviable.

     At three o’clock in the morning of the 17th the troops at Quatre Bras were again called to arms by the noise of some skirmishing on the outposts; all supposed that the enemy was going to try to effect what he had failed in the day before, but the firing soon ceased. Parties of men were then sent out to collect those of the wounded who had not been removed the former evening, and in this way they were occupied till nine o’clock, when a great change was made in the British line. The Brunswick, Belgian, and Nassau troops, which had been on the left of the Bois de Bossu on the former day, now moved to its right. The first brigade of guards occupied the wood with its light troops, having its reserves in the rear; the 2d brigade of guards occupied the ground contiguous to Quatre Bras; the 3d and 5th English divisions were on their left, extending in front of Sarta Mavelines, and occupying the village of Pierremont with their outposts. –– The cavalry, which had arrived on the evening of the 16th, formed line in rear of the whole. Reports were circulated that an attack was about to be made on the enemy’s position, and that it was only delayed till arrangements could be made to act in concert with the army of Marshal Blucher, when at ten o’clock news was received that the main body of the Prussian army had retreated towards Wavre. This intelligence rendered it probable that Napoleon would now move all his disposable force to attack the Duke of Wellington’s position; and as that part of the army of the Netherlands which had assembled on this point would, in that case, have been unable to maintain its ground against the enemy, without the co-operation of the Prussians, a retreat became indispensable; the cavalry formed line to cover it, and before eleven, the different divisions commenced retiring along the roads leading to the several points of a position it was intended they should occupy in front of the forest of Soignes, the principal line of retreat being along the great road leading from Quatre Bras through Genappe. As the infantry retired, the cavalry gradually followed the same track, and watched the movements of the enemy, who now began a sluggish pursuit.

     Napoleon slept on the night of the 16th at Fleurus, and early on the 17th reiterated his orders* to Marshal Ney, directing his movement upon Quatre Bras;

* See Appendix, Nos. XVI., XVII. [There is no Appendix XVII in the book. It must have been erronously ommitted.]

at the same time giving orders to the imperial guard, the 2d and 3d divisions of the 6th corps, the 2d division of the 1st corps of cavalry, and the 4th corps of cavalry, to march upon Quatre Bras by the great Namur road, with intent to attack the left wing of the English army; whilst Marshal Grouchy was directed to march in pursuit of the Prussians with the 3d and 4th corps d’armée, the 1st division of the 6th corps, the 1st division of the 1st corps of cavalry, and with the 2d corps of cavalry, and to manœuvre so as to keep the Prussians separated from the Anglo-Belgians, and constantly to keep up communication with the army under Napoleon. On arriving in front of Quatre Bras they found that the British troops had retreated, and nothing but a rear guard of cavalry, with a few pieces of artillery, retained the ground; they therefore immediately commenced the pursuit.

     The division of Gen. Subervic, consisting of the 1st and 2d lancers, and the 11th chasseurs, with a battery of horse artillery, directed by Gen. Drouot, formed the French advanced guard: it was supported by the 4th corps of cavalry under Gen. Milhaud, and after it the l st, 2d, and 6th corps of infantry, and lastly, the imperial guard. The retreat of the English infantry was covered by the 3d division, and the rear guard of the whole army of the Netherlands was formed by part of M. Gen. Grant’s brigade of light cavalry, supported by part of Lord Edward Somerset’s brigade. The 3d division retreated from Sarta Mavelines upon Bezy, and thence into the great road near Genappe; and the excellent order in which it was conducted in the broad face of day, prevented the enemy deriving any advantage from it. As the rear guard of the British cavalry was retiring from Genappe, the French advanced guard came up with it, and the Earl of Uxbridge directed the 7th hussars to charge a column of the enemy’s lancers as it debouched from the town. At this place the banks on the sides of the road are high and steep, so that the English cavalry were unable to get at the flank of the enemy’s column, which alone could derive benefit from the nature of the ground the French lancers, formed in this hollow way, presented an almost impenetrable row of pikes, and though the 7th hussars attacked them with the greatest gallantry, and the officers set the bravest example, they could not succeed in making any impression, and were driven back. A renewed effort was alike unsuccessful, and the enemy in his turn advanced to attack the English, when the Earl of Uxbridge, seeing a more favourable opportunity, ordered the horse guards to charge, and the result was the complete overthrow of the French advanced guard; thereby checking the pursuit, and giving ample time for the infantry to take up its ground in the position of Mount St. Jean, covering the approach to Bruxelles by the roads from Charleroi and Nivelles. It had commenced raining early in the day, and during the afternoon a most violent thunder-storm came on, and passed directly over the positions of the armies: it rained torrents, and the ground and road became deluged, so as to add much to the fatigue of marching. It was near seven o’clock in the evening when the French advanced guard appeared on the great road on the heights behind Belle Alliance. Their artillery commenced firing down the great road on the English rear guard a few pieces of English artillery were placed in battery, and soon silenced those of the enemy, whose only object was, evidently, to ascertain the presence of the English army, as it was much too late for a general action to take place, and it would require some hours before the main body of the French army could march into position. The English army bivouacked on the ground it occupied, which was open land, cultivated chiefly with rye, which in many places grew to the height of seven feet. Meantime, Marshal Grouchy, who was charged with the pursuit of the Prussian army, having under his orders the 3d and 4th corps d’armée, and the 3d division of the 6st corps, with the 1st division of the 1st corps and the whole of 2d corps of cavalry, had made but little progress: halting his troops around Gembloux and remaining there during the night, although, at six o’clock in the evening, he received positive information of the direction in which the Prussians had retired. Marshal Blucher was thus enabled to assemble his army, and having been joined by the 4th corps under Gen. Bulow, which on the former day had concentrated at Gembloux, he retreated on Wavres, and occupied a position there on the left bank of the Dyle. A rear guard was left on the right bank, to observe the movements of Marshal Grouchy, and give timely notice of his approach.

     During the night of the 17th the respective armies were posted as follows:

     The allied army of the Netherlands bivouacked in position on the heights of Mount St. Jean.

     The Prussian army bivouacked on the ground it had taken up near Wavres.

     That part of the French army commanded by Napoleon in person, bivouacked on the heights of Planchenoit, on the right and left of the great road.

     That part of the French army commanded by Marshal Grouchy bivouacked around Gembloux, with patroles on the road towards Wavres.

    The division of Girard, which had suffered so severely in the battle of Ligny, was employed during the 17th in rendering assistance to the wounded French, and great numbers were conveyed to Charleroi.

     It is worthy of remark how important the manœuvres of this day were to the French army, and how little advantage they derived from them. The victory of the 16th over the Prussians had compelled the Duke of Wellington to retire, in order to avoid the possibility of having the left flank of his army turned by the French troops coming from Ligny. The enemy had therefore both adverse armies in full retreat before him during the whole of the 17th, and what should have been of invaluable consequence to his success, these armies were farther apart than on the former day; and thus again offered the fairest chance for his effecting their separation. The intricate nature of the country, between the positions of the two armies, at Mount St. Jean and at Wavres, was well suited to his masking a movement upon one flank: he might therefore have moved nearly the whole of his force against one of the allied armies, without the knowledge of the other; and again, a decisive success over one of these armies might have completed their final separation. Every hour was of importance to his success, and yet we see, unaccountably, great delays took place both in the corps under Marshal Grouchy and in that under Marshal Ney; the former letting the Prussian army gain a march over him, and the latter neglecting the invaluable opportunity of attacking an army in retreat.