The French advanced guards almost immediately came in contact with the Prussian outposts, and a continued skirmish was kept up during the whole morning: the Prussians, vainly endeavouring to hold their ground against superior numbers, lost a good many men, chiefly of the 28th and 29th regiments, who were taken prisoners by the French cavalry. –– The extent of frontier which Gen. Ziethen’s corps had to cover rendered it impossible for him to oppose an adequate force to check the advance of the enemy; he, therefore, continued his retreat through Charleroi towards Fleurus, opposing however the advance of the French wherever the ground would admit, in order to give time for the assembly of the Prussian army under Marshal Blucher. The several corps of the French army advanced in the order directed, but, owing to the difficulties of the cross roads, much time was lost, and it was near mid-day before the debouche from Charleroi was secured. The second corps now passed the Sambre at Marchienne-au-pont, whilst. Gen. Pajol with the 1st corps of cavalry entered Charleroi. –– Gen. Clary drove the Prussians from the heights above the town, and patrolled the great Bruxelles road as far as Gosselies, whilst Pajol advanced upon Gilly on the road to Namur. Gen. Ziethen had occupied a position with a part of his corps on a height immediately behind Gilly, at the entrance to a wood which extends from that place nearly to Fleurus. –– Napoleon, having placed the imperial guard in a position on the height covering the approach to Charleroi, near the junction of the roads from Brussels and Fleurus, advanced to Gilly, accompanied by his four squadrons* of the guard then on service about his person.
* The squadrons of service were those on duty for the day, and consisted
of
One squadron of dragoons
of the guard,
One squadron of grenadiers-â-cheval
of the guard,
One squadron of chasseurs-à-cheval
of the guard,
And one squadron of
lanciers rouge of the guard.
–– A part of the third corps under Vandamme now coming up, he directed an attack of infantry through the village, whilst General Letort, with the squadrons of service, went round to attack the flank of the Prussians. A few pieces of artillery were placed on the height behind Gilly, and at about half past two an engagement took place. About eight battalions of the Prussians formed squares to resist the attack of cavalry under General Letort, whose impetuosity carried all before them, and the 28th and 29th Prussian regiments again suffered considerable loss: this compelled General Ziethen to retreat upon Fleurus, where he took up a position for the night. In the afternoon, Marshal Ney had arrived at the head-quarters; he was immediately entrusted by Napoleon with the command of the left wing of the army, and directed to overthrow all resistance, and establish himself in position at Quatre Bras, the point where the road leading from Charleroi to Brussels is intersected by that leading from Nivelles to Namur. The Emperor had sent the cavalry of the guard under Lefebvre Desnouettes, and the 2d corps of cavalry under General Excelmanns, to support the movement of General Clary on the Brussels road; meanwhile the 2d corps of infantry, under Reille, advanced by the cross roads from Marchienne-au-pont to Gosselies, and its movement was followed by that of the 1st corps under D’Erlon. That part of Ziethen’s corps which had been cantoned about Fontaine l’Evesque retreated by Gosselies, and thence along the Roman road towards Fleurus: it was pursued by the 9d division of the 2d corps, commanded by Baron Girard*.
* As this division under Baron Girard was separated from its corps, and engaged at the battle of Ligny, we must be careful not to confound the name with that of the commander of the 4th corps d’armée, the Count Gérard.
The remainder of the 2d corps marched towards Frasne, where, at five o’clock, it was met by the troops of Nassau, commanded by Prince Bernard of Saxe-Weimar, who succeeded in maintaining his position near Quatre Bras, against the feeble attacks of the enemy; and in this manner secured the important communication with the great road from Nivelles. In this state the events of the day closed.
We shall here offer a few remarks on this preparatory operation of the campaign.
It has been before stated that the object of the manœuvres of the day was to effectuate a separation of, and to interpose a corps between, the English and Prussian forces; and it is manifest from the result how very nearly this object had been accomplished, and there seemed every prospect that the enemy might succeed in this object even on the following day, owing to the wide extended cantonments occupied by the allies. The plan proposed was, indisputably, excellent, and the mode in which the French army had been assembled around Beaumont admirably executed, without exciting the suspicion of an immediate attack, on the part of the allies; but we will venture to assert, that, far from being taken by surprise from the attack being made on this point, it was the most probable, if not the only rational line of operation which Napoleon could have adopted. The allied generals were fully aware that the French army was making preparations to invade Belgium, and the line of operation chosen was unquestionably the most favourable for the attempt. It was the most direct line to Brussels, and not a single fort or redoubt had been constructed to check an advance along it: it was, besides, almost exactly the line of separation between the English and Prussian armies; and the nature of the country, expanding into open plains of corn fields, was well suited to the deployment of cavalry, and the French were greatly superior in this arm. It was probably through a knowledge of all these circumstances that the Duke of Wellington foresaw the necessity of having his reserve on a point which could not be taken by surprise, and which, by its position, could be moved with the least delay to the point attacked, and thus assist in checking the progress of the enemy, whilst the English on the one hand, and the Prussians on the other, should concentrate and occupy a position to cover the approach to the Flemish capital. These plans so precisely accorded with the events which afterwards occurred, that we cannot offer a better refutation of the erroneous opinions now abroad on this point, than the simple consideration of the facts. In the French accounts of the campaign, much blame has been given to Marshal Ney for not occupying Quatre Bras with all his force on the evening of the 15th, as, with the three divisions of the second corps under Reille, with the whole of the second corps of cavalry under Excelmans, and with that of the imperial guard under Lefebvre Desnouettes, he had certainly quite sufficient troops to have overthrown all resistance which could be made upon this point and, if we may be allowed to hazard an opinion, he might have advanced his outposts of cavalry as far as Genappe, on the Brussels road, and Hautain, on that leading to Nivelles. This would, at all events, have compelled the English army to have chosen some more distant place of assembly than Quatre Bras; and, in the event of his not being able to maintain these advanced outposts, much delay might have been given to the English army by contesting the ground between these places and Quatre Bras, and thus have totally shut out all hopes of succour to the Prussian army, in its position of Ligny, on the 16th of June.
On the night of the 15th of June, the French army remained in the positions stated above, and the Duke of Wellington being now confirmed in his opinion of the principal point of attack, directed the army of the Netherlands to march upon Quatre Bras. The reserve, with the Brunswick contingent, moved early in the morning of the 16th from Bruxelles and its neighbourhood, direct through the forest of Soignes, upon Quatre Bras, and the main body of the army marched laterally, parallel with the frontier, from its cantonments towards the same point. –– Marshal Blucher had assembled the 1st, 2d, and 3d corps of his army behind Fleurus, and on the morning of the 16th had taken up a position with his right wing upon Bry and his left at Sombref, at the same time occupying in force the villages of St. Amand and Ligny, situated on the Ligne, a rivulet which runs along the front of the position, in the direction of Sombref. These villages, and that of Ligny in particular, are well adapted for defence, being formed chiefly of well-built farm houses, with quadrangular courts, formed by the stables and other out-buildings attached to them: the Prussians loop-holed the walls, and each house became a petty fortress.
On the night of the 15th Napoleon had slept at Charleroi, and early on the 16th issued orders for the operations of his army. –– Marshal Grouchy, with the right wing, was directed to march by the right of Fleurus upon Sombref *,
and to occupy a position there with the 1st, 2d, and 4th corps of cavalry; he was also directed to unite under his orders the 4th corps d’armée, under Gérard † ; and the 3d corps under Vandamme †.
† See Appendix, Nos. X. And XI.
The corps of Gérard was ordered also to march by the right of Fleurus, whilst that under Vandamme was to proceed by the great road through that town. The imperial guard were moved from Charleroi, and about mid-day arrived by the great road on the plain of Fleurus, in support of the 3d and 4th corps. The 6th corps was left in reserve at Charleroi, ready to be moved upon Quatre Bras or Fleurus, as the events of the day might require, and it was not till late in the afternoon that this corps was directed upon Fleurus, too late however to be of service in the action which took place. Marshal Ney, with the left wing, was directed to march upon Quatre Bras ‡,
‡ See Appendix, Nos. XII. (XII-A; XII-B) and XIII.
uniting under his orders the 2d corps d’armée under Reille, with the exception of the division of General Girard, with the whole of the 3d corps of cavalry under Kellermann, and to overthrow all opposition: he was to be supported in this movement by the 1st corps d’armée, under Count d’Erlon, which had not then arrived on the position of Frasnes. The light cavalry of the imperial guard, under Lefebvre Desnouettes, was ordered to remain in rear of Frasnes to await further orders. The division Girard, of Reille’s corps, which had pursued the Prussians in their retreat on the former day in the direction of Fleurus, remained in bivouac that night near Wagnele, and on the 16th was retained to co-operate with Vandamme’s corps, in its attack on the village of St. Amand.