The Regimental  Secretary
The Royal Artillery Institution
Artillery House
Front Parade
R A Barracks
Woolwich, London SE 18 4BH

    The high-water mark of the French offensive had been reached in 1810, when Massena advanced into Portugal as far as the so-called "lines of Torres Vedras," the unsuspected existence of which proved to be his undoing.
    Massena's retreat from Santarem, on the Tagus (C.13), to Ciudad Rodrigo (K.7), which commenced in the night of 4-5 March, 1811, definitely ended the French attempt to conquer the Peninsula, and to drive the English Army into the sea.
    Wellington started in pursuit with all possible speed, and soon established contact with the retreating French. Rear guard "combats" took place in rapid succession :—
 

Date.	Combat.	Oman’s History of the Peninsular War.
March 11      "     12      "     14      "     15 April     3	Pombal (D.10) Redinha (D.9) Casa Nova (D.8) Foz de Arouce (E.9) Sabugal (I.8)	Vol. iv. pp. 138-9. " 141-3. " 151-3. " 156-8. " 189-97.

In these actions "A" Troop, and "I" Troop, R.H.A., were continuously engaged.

Vol. LXVII. No. 2.

These "combats" led up to the Battle of

Troop, or Brigade.	Armament.	Designation in 1938
"A" Troop (Ross). "I" Troop (Bull). Brigade (G. Thompson). Brigade (Lawson).	Five 6-Pr. guns. One 5 1/2" do.   howitzer. Six 6-Pr. guns. Six 9-Pr. guns.	"A" Battery, R. H. A. "I"             do. 18th Field Battery. 87th         do.

    Brig.-General E. Howorth's official account of the part played by the Royal Artillery in the battle is here given in full, in order to make it quite clear that only TWO guns of "I" (Bull's) Troop, commanded by 2nd Captain W. N. Ramsay, were concerned in the "affair" which has for many years been misunderstood, by assuming that the whole Troop (6 guns) took part in it.
    The misunderstanding has arisen through Major Duncan having misquoted in his History of the Royal Regiment of Artillery (3rd edition. 1879. vol. ii. p. 33) Napier's account of the incident. Napier¹ used the word "battery" but Duncan substituted "troop", without apology, or explanation—an unpardonable mistake.
    The word "battery" was not introduced as the designation of a unit in the R.A. until the year 1859.² Napier used the word as meaning any number of guns acting together, or when in position.
    2nd Lieutenant W. B. Ingilby, R.A., of Lawson's Brigade, frequently used the word "battery" in this sense, as shown by the following extracts from his Diary when describing the battle, at which he was present :—
    a. 6 May, 1811. "and our lines, formed a battery (about 200 yards in their [the French] front, precisely at this angle) of 12 guns."

    b. "The French pushed forward a large battery of guns by the Nave de Haver road," etc.
    c. "Under cover of the fire of their battery the French in vain repeatedly," etc.

    Letter from Brig.-General E. Howorth, Commanding R.A., with Wellington's army in the field, to Major-General J. Macleod, Deputy Adjutant-General, R.A. [Public Record Office, W.O. 55/1195—pages 143-6]

    I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 7 ult : expressing The Master General's¹ satisfaction at the public, and private accounts of the general good conduct of the Artillery under my command, and further desiring me to make known to Captains Bull and Ross, and the Officers and Men whose good fortune it has been to distinguish themselves, His Lordship's entire satisfaction at the flattering testimonies which the public accounts so justly attach to them.
    I request you will be so good to lay our respects at The Master General's Feet, and to assure His Lordship, that if in our humble efforts to discharge our duty, we have had the good fortune to attract his notice and approbation, it constitutes the highest pride and pleasure of our lives, and to continue to merit it, shall be the sole aim of our future conduct.
    In this Army, unfortunately, it does not always follow that merit is noticed, for in Lord Wellington's Dispatches [dated 8 May, 1811] on the Battle of Fuentes de Oñoro, fought on the 5th ult., no mention, I am told, is made of the Artillery, and that one might consequently suppose he had none, or if he had, they had not deserved his notice. I have been told, for I have riot seen the Gazette, His Lordship does mention something about the Enemies' Cannonade, but not a word of his own; upon this extraordinary occasion. I wish to mention to you, for Lord Mulgrave's information, the following circumstances, which happened relating to the Artillery in that Affair.
    The Battle commenced a little before 7 a.m. The Enemy having great superiority of Cavalry, continued advancing on our right, till they made a direct charge on two guns, then in action, belonging to Captain Bull's Brigade,² commanded by Captain Ramsay; notwithstanding these Guns were actually surrounded, and overwhelmed by the Enemies’ Cavalry, still Captain Ramsay most adroitly limbered up, in spite of all impediments and interruption, made his Detachment draw their swords

the moment they were mounted, and by acting as Cavalry, rescued themselves from this entanglement, and got fairly off without the loss of man or horse.
    Captain Lawson commanded a Nine Pounder Brigade,¹ and Captain Thompson a Six Pounder; they were drawn up nearly in line together upon the Right, and in the front of the Guards, from whence they kept up a heavy and severe fire, which checked the Enemies Cavalry, anddestroyed many of their horses; I think I counted 60 dead after the Action. Captain Lawson's Brigade suffered much, having had five men killed, each by a cannon shot, thirteen wounded, of whom five lost their legs and arms by cannon shot; 27 horses were also killed and wounded. Captain Thompson was more fortunate, he had about three men wounded, two officers and seven horses, himself thro’ the foot, Lt. Martin² through the arm; this indeed is manifested in the Gazette, and is the only notice taken of them. Considering it therefore as a duty incumbent upon me, to mention the exemplary conduct of these officers on that occasion to the Master General, I hope that the humble source of this commendation, will not lessen the merits of Captains Lawson, Thompson and Ramsay, who have by their meritorious and distinguished conduct of the Battle of Fuentes, justly acquired my good opinion, although they have not been so fortunate as to be noticed to the Public, by higher and better authority.

                                                                                   I have, etc.
                                                                                         (Sd.) E. HOWORTH,
                                                                                                              Brig.-General.

    The following extract from a letter (Public Record Office. W.O. 55/1195. page 149) is practically a post-script to Howorth's letter of 19 June, above :—

                                                                                       (Sd.) E. HOWORTH, Brig.-General,
                                                                                                                   Commanding R.A.

    Return of the killed and wounded of the R.H.A., R.A., and R.A. Drivers on 5 May, 1811, at Fuentes de Oñoro. [Public Record Office. W.O. 55/1193—p. 151.]
 

	Killed.			Wounded.
	Serjeants.	Rank & file.	Horses.	Officers.*	Rank & file.	Horses.
R.H.A. R.A. R.A. Drivers	1	1 2 2	3 9	3	1 12 3	3 21
Totals	1	5	12	3	16	24

* Captain George Thompson. First Lieutenants J. G. Martin, and R. Woolcombe.

    The following letter from Captain H. D. Ross, R.H.A., to his brother, Captain George Charles Ross, Royal Engineers, then engaged at the 1st siege (unsuccessful) of Badajoz, was originally published by the Royal Artillery Institution, in 1871, Memoir of Field-Marshal Sir H. D. Ross. It gives a good picture of contemporary incidents.

Britanniques¹received the enemy's charge in excellent style, and beat them back.
    The right of our position is now at an Atalaia² in the rear a little and to the right of Villar Formoso (J.6), and extending from that, through the rocky and enclosed country, down to the Coa, in front of Freineda (I.7). The enemy occupy the heights and woods on the other side of the river Dos Casas.
    I should have mentioned that he attempted to carry Fuentes on the evening of the 3rd, but was repulsed. Their cavalry were all drunk, and fought like madmen; but notwithstanding this, and their numbers, 4,500 (said to be), they did not do all that they ought. They charged through two of Bull's guns, who mounted his detachments and sabred a good many of them, and brought his guns oft. His loss was trifling.
    Lawson suffered more severely, both in men and horses, and had a wagon blown up by a shell entering it.
    After the 5th they remained quiet until yesterday, when nearly the whole of their army was in motion, but with what view I have not heard. It had every appearance of an intended retreat, for they moved off from their left, their columns of cavalry and infantry pointing towards the Espeja and Gallegos roads. Reynier, however, who is immediately in front of us (the 5th and 6th Divisions), remains without any alteration; and as the country is very woody, Massena may manoeuvre unperceived by us, at least for a time. No doubt, however, Lord Wellington has information from their rear of what he is about.
    General Pack³ continues the investment of Almeida, which, I fear, we shall find a more tedious operation than could be wished, situated as the two armies are. If we succeed, which there appears to be no doubt of, the boldness of the undertaking must be the astonishment of the world—a superior enemy in our front, three fortresses invested by us immediately in our rear, as well as a most difficult river, with but one bridge, and very few fords over it.
    During the night of the 7th, we entrenched the right of our position from Fuentes to the Atalaia I before mentioned, and threw up batteries for the artillery, which secured us from any impression being made by their cavalry, which evidently appears to have been the expectation of Massena.
    Our loss on the 3rd and 5th is 1,600 killed, wounded, and prisoners;

amongst the latter is Colonel Hill's¹ company of the Guards, a company of the 71st, and one of the 79th. The enemy's loss is certainly much greater, but not certainly known; the peasants say 5,000, and the prisoners acknowledge it to have been very great. In our army, I think it is generally supposed about 3,000, but it is quite impossible to form a true opinion on the subject. As you may suppose, we have been a good deal harassed for these some days past, but we are all in good health, and make no doubt of making an example of the rogues if they dare to attack us. We have been well supplied with everything, and consequently in rare spirits.

    The following précis of an article on Field Artillery Carriages in the Peninsular War, by Colonel Sir Alexander Dickson, K.C.B., which appeared in The British Indian Military Repository, vol. iii, No. 6 of July, 1824, Article 5, pp. 136-47, published in Calcutta, has probably never been seen in England.

    The equipment of field artillery during the whole Peninsular War, was with block-trailed² carriages, and four-wheeled ammunition limber waggons, according to the convenient system adopted by the British service, by which the waggon limbers, being packed and fitted exactly the same as those for the guns, the former can be substituted for the latter in time of action, without the waggons being brought much in [i.e. "under"] fire, and most disastrous consequences from explosions are thereby avoided.
    The block-trailed carriages were found much superior to the cheek-trailed or bracket carriages, in strength and durability, in facility of limbering and unlimbering, and in pointing³ whilst in action; they also admitted of more close turning in manœuvres and on the march.
    The limber-waggons were admirably adapted for stowage of ammunition, and at the same time possessed, on an emergency, the convenient means of rapidly bringing up the men to action without the risk of their being breathless from running or [of being] left behind; this, on many occasions, was highly beneficial to overtake a retreating enemy, or to fall back quickly when protecting a retrograde movement, or to move with speed from one flank to the other of a corps, as the exigency of operations might require.
    To this is to be added the great simplicity they afford to the system of field artillery, the limbers being the same as those for the guns, the wheels the same for light 6-pounders, for all ammunition limber-waggons, and for the forges and store carriages, and they will answer also for 9-pounders on an occasion: indeed I believe they are quite strong enough

for this nature, a 9-pounder with 6-pounder wheels, having for experiment been employed for a 12-month in one of the field batteries under my orders in France, and during that time the gun, three times a week, was marched 12 or 14 miles over the paved roads of that country.
    The Portuguese were so sensible of the convenience and simplicity of our system, that at a very early period of the war they adopted the construction of our carriages and limber-waggons: but having contracted their span to suit the Portuguese roads, the carriages were very easily overset, by which the perches of their limber-waggons were frequently broken: this was an inconvenience that scarcely ever happened with the English carriages, their span being 5 feet 3 inches, whilst that of the Portuguese was only 4 feet 2 inches. It is true that in some of the narrow Portuguese roads the British artillery was obliged to make a detour, whilst the Portuguese carriages could pass through; but this convenience was nothing in comparison to the damage arising from frequent overturns which often occasioned me much delay during my movements with the Portuguese.¹
    On the whole I am satisfied the British equipment, with block-trails and a universal limber, is the most perfect that has been devised by any nation, and the French are go convinced of this, that they are understood to be on the point of abandoning Gribeauval's system and of adopting that of England.
    I have to add, that during the whole period of the Peninsular war, as well as in the Waterloo campaign, the British carriages had to pass over every species of ground, from the most mountainous to the most swampy, and the Artillery made no difficulty in accompanying the Infantry in all its movements; the carriages fully demonstrated the solidity and excellence of their construction, by standing both the shocks and execrable roads, and of frequent heavy firing, without scarcely ever wanting repairs; the wheels, of course, would only wear a certain time, but the bodies of the carriages were most durable; and with regard to the perforation [of the block-trail] for the elevating screw I am certain, during the whole Peninsular war, that no block-trail was ever called in question on that account.
    Four-wheeled gun ammunition limber-waggons have been found so perfectly applicable to all natures of movements, that it is now determined to employ the same waggons in the conveyance of small-arm ammunition; they are to be drawn by 4 horses, and in a good country and [on] good roads they may convey 20,000 rounds of musket cartridges, and in a difficult country 16,000 rounds.