CHAPTER 4.
Conclusion.
Recruitment.
This dissertation has shown that the provenance of the Waterloo men
of the 28th bore little relation to the affiliation the regiment
had been officially given. However, the 28th's recruiters did have
an unofficial affiliation and appeared to have focused their attentions
on South West England, both for their directly enlisted and Home Forces
men. The proportion of the men in the 28th who were born in their
affiliated territory was far less then for both the 23rd and 2/73rd,
(no
doubt because North Gloucestershire is smaller and less populated than
either North Wales or the Highlands of Scotland), and because all three
regiments took the majority of recruits from England, the competition for
recruits from the county may have been fierce. Whilst the representation
of men from the Celtic nations within the three regiments should not be
underestimated, the fact that in all three regiments the English are in
proportions which exactly match the proportion of English people in the
United Kingdom, suggests that the army's manpower requirements were being
met by England in the correct proportions.
Colley's suggestions on the stated willingness of the men from the "Patriotic counties" to fight in the event of an invasion in the 1803 does not appear to manifest itself in any disproportionate enlistment for regular military service. However, Colley's assertion about wartime patriotism were reached by an examination of only the 1803 questionnaire, and it is possible that a surge of enlistment from the Patriotic counties did occur in 1803, but that these men had disappeared as a discernible group within the army by 1815. In addition, the fact that Colley's work was only concerned with patriotism as a motivation for enlistment in the Home Forces presents problems in applying the same standards to the motivation behind enlistment in the regular forces, as enlistment in the Home Forces rarely had the social implications for the recruit that enlistment in the regular army did.
The historical arguments about the important role of the Home Forces in providing recruits for the line have been proved correct in this dissertation, albeit at a lower proportion than historians have previously suggested, with 24% of all English recruits being drawn from the Home Forces. It was also suggested that recruitment of Home Forces men diluted the provenance of a regiment, however within the 28th the enlistment of these men does not appear to have done so, as they appear to have recruited from the Home Forces of the same counties they were recruiting from directly anyway. Whilst the importance of English recruits drawn from the Home Forces matches the suggestions of historians such as Barnett, the specific type of Home Force unit they came from often did not. Most historical references to Home Force recruits were to Militia men, however, only in the 2/73rd were the ex Home Forces men from the Militia. In the 23rd and 28th the Volunteers and the Army of the Reserve respectively provided the bulk of recruits. This would suggest that the use of the term Militia is an inaccurate reference for the exact origin of the bulk of Home Force recruits, and its perpetuation is the symptom of laziness and a lack of research. It is also interesting that each regiment rarely drew Home Force recruits from outside its particular favoured regional source, official or otherwise, and this perhaps underlines the point that once a productive source of recruits was discovered recruiters were rarely tempted to go elsewhere. It also questions assertions that Home Forces recruitment was the primary reason for the dilution of a regiment's provenance, or whether such a dilution was in fact already a side effect of the failures of the direct recruitment system. Whilst some historians have suggested that the Home Forces provided a valuable source of trained recruits, some doubts have to be raised as to whether this was a view shared by the recruiters of the 28th, as all of the 28th's Home Forces recruits had enlisted prior to 1807, which means that in the eight years prior to Waterloo no attempt was made to enlist men from either the Volunteers or the Militia. However, it is impossible to discover whether this was because of a dislike of Home Forces recruits or the 28th's inability/unwillingness to participate in a competitive market for Home Force's recruits. In my opinion, the study of recruitment suggests that the territorial affiliations awarded to regiments were found to be unworkable and ignored by recruiters, with each regiment recruiting both directly and from Home Forces, from areas that they had found to be successful in the past. This resulted in each regiment having a distinctly unique provenance, although economic conditions meant that some similarities existed between regiments, particularly with regard to the proportions of Irish, and Northern and Southern English recruits. Promotion.
The suggestion that literacy was a requirement for promotion has been proved to be true, and it has also been shown that literate individuals were more likely to have been skilled/semi-skilled in their previous employment, apart from those men originating from rural Ireland. Both literacy and skill level of previous employment are things that an individual could do little to alter once he had enlisted, the Regimental schools being introduced to educate only young soldiers and the children of soldiers; therefore, the fact that the limits to an individual's progression in the army were, to a large extent, defined not by his actions in the army but by the educational opportunities he had been given as a civilian, may have been very disillusioning. To some extent this was merely a reflection of the promotion system for officers. The basis for officer promotion was the "purchase system", whereby an individual used his civilian wealth and influence to purchase promotion. However, for officers in the Napoleonic Wars, the high casualty rate meant that vacancies in the Peninsula could not wait to be filled by replacements from England, and individuals who ordinarily would not have been able to purchase promotion, i.e., those lacking the wealth and influence, were able to advance in rank. Therefore, whilst for many officers the Napoleonic Wars presented opportunities for advancement, regardless of their lack of wealth and influence, the ordinary soldiers of the 28th found their promotion prospects still constrained by their former civilian status.
It was also shown that despite the suggested prevalence of anti-Irish sentiment within the army, being an Irishman was no disadvantage when it came to promotion. This it was felt was due both to the higher literacy rate amongst Irish recruits and because the positive aspects of stereotyping the Irish national character as being "brave and hardy" proved to be stronger than the negative aspects when it came to promotion. This dissertation also examined whether the skills and experience an individual accrued during his military service assisted his prospects of promotion. It was shown that in the majority of cases there was little difference in the length of service prior to Waterloo between Senior NCOs and Other ranks. This casts doubt on the existence of any kind of seniority-based promotion system, and suggests that merit (or literacy) was the main basis on which promotion was given. Finally, it was shown that in spite of large numbers of ex Home Forces English recruits, and the claim that they were prized for their previous military experience, they were proportionately under represented amongst the ranks of the NCOs. This casts doubt both on the value of the military training that the Home Forces provided and the claim that Home Force recruits were drawn from a superior social group to those who enlisted directly. After all, it might be expected that such a superior social group would possess proportionately greater numbers of literate and skilled/semi-skilled men than their directly recruited social inferiors. It is my opinion that an individual's opportunity for promotion in the Napoleonic British army was governed largely by his literacy on joining the army. The obvious implication of this is that talented but illiterate men, realising that their promotion prospects and the benefits thereof; i.e., improved pay and conditions and the recognition of his worth by his military peers and superiors, were negligible, would quickly become disillusioned, perhaps turning to drink and mischief and no doubt living up to Wellington's description of being the "scum of the earth". However, the level of such disillusion would be difficult to ascertain purely from the details on the WO 97, as whilst it provides an indicator of an individual's conduct in the military; i.e., his character reference on discharge, in all but a few cases individuals who appear to have enjoyed very colourful careers have had their conduct noted as "Good" on discharge.
APPENDIX 1 - A typical example of the type of WO 97 material utilized in this dissertation.
APPENDIX 2 - Data
compiled for the 284 Waterloo Men of the 28th
(North Gloucestershire) Regiment of Foot.
APPENDIX 3 - The units
which constituted the British Home Forces during the
Napoleonic Wars.