The majority of people who are serving or have served in the British army would no doubt echo Haythornthwaite's assertion that the "most important element of a regiment was its non-commissioned officers, the link between the officers and privates".¹ However, the subject of what type of person got promoted to be a non-commissioned officer and why, henceforth to be referred to as an NCO, has to date received only a cursory examination by historians of the period. This chapter will briefly describe the rank structure amongst enlisted men, before examining the influence on promotion of such factors as literacy, previous civilian employment, nationality, length of service and previous military service.

Rank Structure of the Enlisted Men.

    As can be seen from table 3:1 below the most junior and numerous military rank was that of Private. Drummers were an important part of line infantry battalions, as they "not only beat time to keep the battalion in step, but transmitted orders on the battlefield when drumbeats were more audible than words".² However, the rank of Drummer did not enjoy any higher status than Private, and an examination of the records of the Drummers of the 23rd, 28th and 2/73rd reveals that it was apparently a role soldiers would occupy for a short period, (perhaps three or four years), before returning to the ranks as a Private. The first rung on the promotion ladder was Corporal, but little evidence exists as to what specific duties men of this rank had to undertake. It is possible that it was used to introduce men to the burdens of responsibility and authority prior to promoting them to Sergeant, or perhaps as a means of inserting a form of buffer against any growth in familiarity between the Sergeants and the men. It can be seen in table 3:1 that Sergeants and Colour Sergeants, (the latter rank introduced in 1813 to financially reward exceptional Sergeants, and no doubt help resolve problems of seniority which occurred when a company had more than one Sergeant), were the most senior enlisted ranks at company level, whilst at battalion/regimental level Sergeants held appointments such as Paymaster Sergeant, Armourer Sergeant, Drum Major Sergeant, Quarter Master Sergeant. Finally, the most senior and influential NCO rank was that of Sergeant Major, of which each battalion or regiment had one. For the purposes of this dissertation Privates and Drummers will be referred to collectively as "Other ranks", Corporals as "Junior NCOs", and Sergeants and above as "Senior NCOs".

TABLE 3:1. The organisation of the Rank and File of the 28th Foot at Waterloo, by Company.
 

Rank/ Co.	1Coy	2Coy	3Coy	4Coy	5Coy	6Coy	7Coy	8Coy	9Coy	10Coy	Total No. of men in each Rank.
Sgt. Major	1										1
Arm. Sgt	1										1
QM Sgt	1										1
Pay Sgt	1										1
Drum Maj. Sgt	1										1
C.Sgt	1	1					1	1	1	2	7
Sgts	3	1	4	2	4	2	1	4	2	4	27
Cpls	2	4	4	5	3	5	3	4	6	4	40
Dmrs	3	2	4	2	2	1	3	2	4	4	27
Ptes	43	51	42	53	47	44	53	41	41	50	465

Source: WO 100/15A 28th (North Gloucestershire) Regiment of Foot.

Achieving Promotion.

    Haythornthwaite suggests that in the Napoleonic British army "promotion to NCO rank was not hard to achieve for a man whose personal habits and intelligence made him stand out from his fellows".³ Whilst Oman argues that all that was required for promotion was "a modicum of education and a sense of duty".⁴ Therefore it might be assumed that promotion was based largely on intelligence and character and to a lesser extent on education. However, both Haythornthwaite and Bartlett point to education, and specifically literacy, as the single most important quality required for promotion to Sergeant, curiously both ignore the requirements for promotion to Corporal. Whilst literacy is an obvious requirement for Senior NCOs holding regimental appointments, Haythornthwaite argues that at company level Sergeants were required to keep the clerical records and that literacy was therefore essential.⁵ In addition, Bartlett suggests that the 1807 publication of a drill manual for NCOs entitled; Rules and Regulations for the Manual and Platoon Exercises, Formations, Field Exercise, and Movements, of His Majesty's Forces, For the use of the Non-Commissioned Officers of the British Army,indicates that for part of their duties NCOs were expected to be literate.⁶ Bartlett also argues that the 1811 establishment in each battalion of Regimental Schools under a Sergeant Schoolmaster, to teach reading and writing to young soldiers and the children of soldiers, was an indicator that at the higher levels of the army the need for literate soldiers had been recognised. However, Bartlett suggests that there is "little evidence concerning such schools and certainly nothing that would suggest if they were able to raise the level of literacy'.⁷ Bartlett is no doubt correct to doubt the efficacy of the Regimental Schools programme, as whilst the 2/73rd appears to have had a Sergeant Schoolmaster, no such individual can be identified for either the 23rd or 28th.

The Influence of Literacy on Promotion in the 28th Foot.

    Bartlett suggests that "it is not possible to assess the level of literacy within the Army during the period under discussion"; i.e., the Napoleonic Wars.⁸ Certainly the authors of such works as The 2/73rd at Waterloo and Medal Rolls-23rd RWF-Napoleonic Period, were more concerned with recording personal details than recording whether the individual soldiers were literate or not. Therefore, the study of literacy amongst the men of the 28th Foot is the first serious attempt to study literacy amongst the soldiers of the Napoleonic British army. For the purposes of this dissertation decisions regarding an individual's literacy or illiteracy have been decided on whether he signed or made a mark on his WO 97.In Education, Literacy and Society, 1830-1870, Stephens suggests that a signature alone may not indicate the individuals' ability to write anything else other than their name, and that illiterates may have learnt the trick of signing their names for official purposes.⁹ These arguments are valid, particularly when one considers that they are being made with reference to civilian documents such as marriage registers, perhaps the only time when a civilian would be called upon to furnish a mark or signature. In contrast, the military system of repeatedly issuing and signing for equipment would no doubt have enabled many illiterates to become quite practised in printing & recognising their own name. However, it is Stephens's opinion that signature literacy is "a good indication of ability to write, if indifferently and that those who could write could certainly read", and that whilst signature evidence is imperfect, it does appear to reflect genuine trends in education and literacy throughout the nineteenth century.¹⁰ Finally, Stephens suggests that the proportions of those who marked though able to sign and vice versa are likely to have been too small to have had more than a marginal effect on figures.¹¹

    It can be seen from table 3:2 that the overall literacy rate for the 28th Foot was 41%, however there is a substantial difference in the distribution of literate men across the three different rank groups. Whilst only 32% of Other ranks were literate, 63% of Junior NCOs and 96% of Senior NCOs were literate. The difference in literacy between Junior and Senior NCOs appears to suggest that the expectations of what a Corporal and a Sergeant were required to do was different, for example a large proportion of Corporals would be unable to read the 1807 drill manual, or maintain clerical records. In light of the apparent pre-requisite of literacy for promotion the assertions made by Bartlett and Haythornthwaite appear to be confirmed. However, the apparent over-riding requirement of the 28th for literate Senior NCOs does raise a number of issues: Firstly, that it would appear that an militarily talented but illiterate Private had little real chance of getting promoted above the rank of Corporal. This questions the perception of the role of the Senior NCO within a regiment, and whilst the skills of soldier-warrior and soldier-administrator are by no means mutually exclusive, it is apparent that by limiting the choice of Senior NCOs to men drawn from only the 32% of the Other ranks the 28th was restricting its ability to fully utilise the skills of all its men. Secondly, from a study of this size and limited to one unit it is not possible to judge whether the promotion of men primarily on the grounds of literacy was merely the policy of the officers of the 28th or a reflection of an armywide practice. Finally, it is also possible that men were promoted to Senior NCO rank and then educated to fulfil the requirements of that rank. However, the lack of an apparent Schoolmaster Sergeant in both the 23rd and the 28th beggars the question of who would do the educating, and even if a Regimental school were present it is difficult to envisage the battle scarred and begrizzled Peninsular War veterans of the 28th sitting side by side with the children and younger soldiers to receive their tutoring.

TABLE 3:2. Literacy levels by rank in the 28th Foot, (for all men who are known to have either marked or signed their name on WO97).
 

Rank	Signed Own Name	Marked Own Name	% of Literate Men in Rank
Senior NCOs	25	1	96%
Junior NCOs	17	10	63%
Other Ranks	72	150	32%
Total	114	161
As a %	41%	59%

Source: Figures for the 28th compiled from WO 97/468-475.

The Influence of Previous Civilian Employment on Promotion.

    If a skill brought from civilian life, such as literacy, could influence an individual's success in the army, then it is worth examining if other previously learnt skills were equally useful in contributing to promotion. The soldiers of the 23rd, 28th and 2/73rd claimed a wide variety of civilian occupations on entering the regular army. However, any occupation based study runs into difficulty attempting to place trades into broad skills groups, as the skill levels of individuals in their previous employment is difficult for the historian to ascertain. A large number of men in all three regiments gave their previous profession as weaver, however it is impossible to discover whether an individual was a skilled artisan, a weaver's assistant or a runaway apprentice. The case of a soldier of the 28th makes a telling point about the proficiency of individuals in their previous employment. Private Luke O'Burne of Number Nine Company gave his previous civilian employment as a musician, yet his WO 97 records that in over 21 years of military service he never once served as a Drummer. In contrast, the Drum Major Sergeants of the 23rd and 28th gave their previous employment as a shoemaker, weaver and a labourer, the 23rd having two Drum Majors. It may be, of course, that Private O'Burne joined the 28th in order to escape from an unhappy musical career, determined never to play another note. It is perhaps more probable that his level of skill in his previous occupation was so low that the 28th no more considered employing him as a Drummer than they would a labourer with no discernible musical experience. Therefore, it is difficult to assess whether an individual is merely proficient in their trade or a master of it. Consequently, for the purposes of this dissertation all recruits who gave any type of trade as their occupation will be categorised as "skilled/semi-skilled", whereas those who gave their previous employment as labourer will be categorised as "unskilled". In table 3:3 below it can be seen that in all three regiments the proportion of NCOs who claimed to have come from a skilled/semi-skilled occupational background is higher than that for the Other ranks. In the 23rd and 28th there is in fact a significant difference, 11 % and 18% respectively, whereas in the 2/73rd the difference is much reduced at only 3%. These figures would appear to suggest that an individual's previous civilian employment did (to a greater or lesser degree depending on his regiment), influence his promotion prospects. In combination with the proven relationship between promotion and literacy, as shown in table 3:2, the figures in table 3:3 indicate that possession of a superior civilian social status, if defined by possession of an education and a skilled/semiskilled job, was a significant contributory factor in a soldier achieving promotion.

TABLE 3:3. The skill level of previous employment of NCOs and Other Ranks.
 

Regiment	Rank	Skilled/ Semi-skilled	Unskilled	Total	Proportion of Skilled/Semi-skilled in each Regiment's Rank group (as a %)
23rd Foot	NCOs	43	31	74	58%
	Other Ranks	279	313	592	47%
28th Foot	NCOs	43	31	74	58%
	Other Ranks	80	119	199	40%
2/73rd Foot	NCOs	16	19	35	46%
	Other Ranks	136	180	316	43%
Total	All Ranks	597	693	1290	46%

Source: Figures for the 23rd and 2/73rd compiled from The 2/73rd at Waterloo and Medal Rolls-23rd RWF-Napoleonic Period. Figures for the 28th compiled from WO 97/468-475.

    It could be argued that an individual's literacy is related to the increased skill level of his previous civilian employment, and that accounts for the higher proportion of NCOs in all three regiments whose civilian occupation was categorised as skilled/semi-skilled rather than unskilled. Table 3:4 below suggests that a higher level of skill in an individual's previous employment meant that they were more likely to be literate than their unskilled counterparts. Consequently, if skilled/semi-skilled men can be found as NCOs in greater proportions than unskilled men then it is probably due to their increased levels of literacy.

TABLE 3:4 Literacy in relation to skill level of previous civilian employment amongst the enlisted men of the 28th Foot.
 
 

Skill level of Previous Employment			As a Percentage
Skilled/Semi-skilled	Literate	53	50%
	Illiterate	54	50%
	Total	107	100%
Unskilled	Literate	60	38%
	Illiterate	100	62%
	Total	160	100%

Source: Figures for the 28th compiled from WO 97/468-475.

Nationality and Promotion.

    It has been proven in chapter 1 that Irish born soldiers could be found in large proportions in all three regiments. Ideally then they might be expected to be found in equal proportions amongst the NCOs of the three regiments as they would be amongst the Other ranks. However, considering the proclivity of negative national stereotyping of the Irish amongst the Napoleonic soldier writers it is worth examining as to whether this resulted in inequalities in the promotion system.

    Writing in 1970 the historian Corelli Barnett refers to Irish troops as being "hardy and brave", but also "ignorant, mad for drink, violent, and without self discipline".¹² However, he merely appears to be repeating earlier negative views. Wellington himself when questioned about his Irish birth is alleged to have quipped "because a man is born in a stable that does not make him a horse", an obvious reference to the Irish as being animalistic.¹³ The memoirs of the Napoleonic British soldiers also reveal a less than positive portrayal of and attitude to Irish soldiers. Blakeney of the 28th reveals that during the Peninsular campaign the most renowned of all the Irish regiments, the 88th Foot (Connaught Rangers), were referred to as "the Connaught Robbers" by their own divisional commander General Picton.¹⁴ In addition, Hathaway quotes Surtees, a prominent memoir writing officer of the 95th Foot, as suggesting that an Irish soldier with a fondness for alcohol "had the curse of his country upon him".¹⁵ Any study of Irish recruits must of course mention the possible differences in attitude towards, and treatment of the Irish Catholics and Irish Protestants. Only a handful of Napoleonic writers detail any differences between the two groups. Benjamin Harris of the 95th recounts bitter fighting between Irish Catholic and Protestant recruits, but this was apparently only prior to joining their regiment and thereafter any distinctions between the two are lost.¹⁶ In fact, the only memoirs to describe any specifically anti-Catholic behaviour are those of Private Charles O'Nell of the 28th, an Irish Catholic soldier who served in the regiment during the later stages of the Napoleonic Wars. O'Neil claims to have received 300 lashes for refusing, as a Catholic, to attend a regimental Church of England service in the period 1810-1811.¹⁷ It is difficult to assess whether O'Neil's punishment was for refusing the order to attend what was no doubt a regimental parade, or whether it is a symptom of a deeper sectarian intolerance amongst the Protestant soldiery towards Catholicism. What it does suggest though is that only four or five years prior to Waterloo, Irish Catholics were not being treated with any kind of understanding in the 28th. However, as a source O'Neil is less than reliable on a number of grounds: Firstly, and by his own admission, after his discharge from the army his activities in Ireland led to him being "advised to leave the country with all possible haste" by persons unspecified.¹⁸ He then emigrated to Montreal; however, claiming not to feel safe in the British provinces he moved to the United States.¹⁹ These events suggest that O'Neil might have been involved in some form of Irish Nationalist or anti-British activity, and this must be taken into account when referring to his memoirs. In addition, O'Neil's assertion to have been seriously wounded whilst serving with the 28th at Waterloo can not be confirmed from the primary sources available. His claim that his Waterloo wound entitled him to a pension is not verified by the presence of a WO 97. His name is absent both from the 28th's provisional list of Corporals and below who served with the regiment in the period 16th to 18th of June 1815, (WO 12/4430), and from the later WO 100/15A Waterloo Roll. Finally, the WO 12/4430 Muster and Paylist for the 28th Foot for the period 25th of May until the 24th of June has Private Charles O'Neil as being absent from the regiment on recruiting duty in Armagh, a fact which Bernard Cornwell, the author of the well known Sharpe books, singularly fails to mention in his introduction to the 1997 reprint of The Military Adventures of Charles ONeil. Therefore, considering the dubious validity of O'Neil's evidence and the impracticalities of any attempt to differentiate between ethnic and religious groups no attempt shall be made to differentiate between Ireland's religious and ethnic factions, and the focus of this particular study will be the influence of an individual's Irish nationality on his promotion prospects. An examination of figure 3:1 below shows that both the 23rd and 2/73rd appeared to have proportionately more Irish NCOs than they had Irishmen serving in their units. It is known that both units received large drafts of English recruits in the period 1812-1814, and it therefore could be suggested that these Irish NCOs were a remnant of an earlier period in the regiment's history when its national provenance was very different, (particularly in the case of the 23rd Foot where it will later be seen that the NCOs were much senior in service to the enlisted men). Nevertheless, the figures for the 23rd and the 2/73rd appear to indicate that whatever the feeling toward the Irish when it came to promotion being an Irish soldier was no obstacle. If anything it would appear that in the 23rd and 2/73rd being Irish was a positive advantage. This may be because the stereotypical view of the personal qualities possessed by Irish soldiers, particularly with regard to being "hardy and brave", overrode the negative qualities when it came to promotion. However, in the 28th Foot the situation appears to be slightly different. Figure 3:1 shows that whilst the 28th had proportionately more Irish within its ranks than either of the other regiments, these men were not represented equally within the ranks of the regiment's NCOs. It is possible that the proportion of Irish NCOs in the 28th only appears to be lower due the limited size of the study. Indeed, an examination of the 28th's most senior NC0s; i.e., the Sergeant Major, Colour Sergeants and those Sergeants with regimental appointments, reveal that five out of eight were born in Ireland, including the Sergeant Major himself. Whilst this seems to dispel any theory of an anti-Irish sentiment within the 28th, the personal details on the WO 97 do not include any reference to a soldier's religious denomination, and it is possible that O'Neil's comments on the presence of intolerance towards the religious beliefs of Catholic soldiers were correct and that the bulk of NCOs were in fact drawn from the ranks of the Protestant Irish.

FIGURE 3:1 A comparison in the proportion of all enlisted Irishmen serving in a regiment and their presence amongst the ranks of the NCOs.

Source: Figures for the 23rd and 2/73rd compiled from The 2/73rd at Waterloo and Medal Rolls-23rd RWF-Napoleonic Period. Figures for the 28th compiled from WO 97/468-475.

    It is possible of course that the Irish in the 28th were not getting promoted in relation to their proportions in the ranks because they were not either as literate or as skilled as their English counterparts, the two qualities previously shown to be important factors in promotion in the 28th Foot. Previously in tables 3:2 and 3:3 the proportion of both literate and skilled/semi-skilled Other ranks in the 28th was shown to be 41% and 40% respectively. It can be seen from table 3:5 below that the Irish were proportionately more literate than the rest of the 28th Foot, and therefore if literacy was the primary factor governing promotion in the 28th then one could expect to see proportionately more and not less Irish NCOs.

TABLE 3:5. Literacy and skill level of previous employment amongst the Irish Soldiers of the 28th Foot, (using the details of men for whom either birthplace, literacy or previous employment are known).
 

Rank	Literate	Illiterate	Total	Skilled/Semi-skilled	Unskilled	Total
Sr NCOs	8	0	8	6	2	8
Jr NCOs	8	3	11	1	9	10
Other Ranks	35	60	95	33	62	95
Total	51	63	114	40	73	113
As a %	45%	55%	100%	35%	65%	100%

Source: Figures for the 28th compiled from WO 97/468-475.

    A comparison between the literacy and skill level of previous employment of Irish and English soldiers in the 28th may reveal the reasons for the lower proportion of Irish NCOs in the unit. Table 3:6 below shows that English soldiers were proportionately less literate but more skilled than their Irish comrades in table 3:5 above. The differences in proportions of skilled/semi-skilled men in each national group may be a reflection of the fact that Ireland's largely rural economy lacked the numbers of alternative employment titles to "Labourer", and that this has resulted in their disproportionate representation in the unskilled category in table 3:5. This also provides a reminder of how imprecise a science the attempt to categorise skill levels is.

TABLE 3:6. Literacy and skill level of previous employment amongst the English soldiers of the 28th Foot.
 

Rank	Literate	Illiterate	Total	Skilled/Semi-skilled	Unskilled	Total
Sr NCOs	16	1	17	9	8	17
Jr NCOs	8	6	14	7	7	14
Other Ranks	39	89	128	51	77	128
Total	63	96	159	67	92	159
As a %	40%	60%	100%	42%	58%	100%

Source: Figures for the 28th compiled from WO 97/468-475.

Length of Service and Promotion.

    Considering the links between promotion and skills transferred from an individual's civilian life, such as literacy/skill level of previous occupation, it is worth examining whether the length of service a soldier accrued in his military career might contribute towards his prospects of promotion.

    It can be seen from table 3:7 below that in the 28th and 2/3rd the difference in average length of service prior to Waterloo between both Senior and Junior NCOs and the Other ranks is slight. This would appear to indicate that in these two units seniority, or length of service, was not a particularly important factor, and therefore promotion on the basis of time served as opposed to merit, however that merit is decided, was not apparently the practice of either regiment. The length of service of Senior NCOs in the 23rd Foot are similar to those of the 28th, however, the Other ranks of the 23rd are vastly junior to those of the 28th. This would appear to indicate that at some point the 23rd received a large number of casualties, and the regiment had to be reconstituted around an experienced cadre of NCOs. In fact Fletcher suggests that the 23rd did receive severe losses in the battles of Albuera and Badajoz in 1811.²⁰ The men of the 2/73rd are junior in service across all rank groups to the two other regiments, which is understandable considering the unit was only formed in 1809. However, if length of service was considered an important requirement for an NCO, then the 2/73rd would no doubt have transferred in experienced Private soldiers, on promotion, from units such as the 28th Foot. This would have led to the 2/73rd having NCOs with an average of nine years service rather than four. The fact that they do not appear to have done so indicates that either regiments jealously guarded their experienced men, refusing to let them go to other units, or that length of service was not an important a factor in promotion. One consequence of this attitude is that units such as the 2/73rd entered action largely bereft of the undoubtedly calming influence of experienced soldiers, and this of course can have implications for a unit's operational capability.

TABLE 3:7. The length of service in a regiment by the time of Waterloo (in years).
 

Regiment	Senior NCOs	Junior NCOs	Other Ranks
23rd Foot	10	8	5
28th Foot	11	11	9
2/73rd Foot	4	4	3

Source: Figures for the 23rd and 2/73rd compiled from The 2/73rd at Waterloo and Medal Rolls-23rd RWF-Napoleonic Period. Figures for the 28th compiled from WO 97/468-475.

Previous Military Service and Promotion.

    It has already been established that a large number of the Englishmen in the 23rd, 28th and 2/73rd were recruited directly from the Home Forces. If as Barnett suggests, Home Forces recruits were highly prized for their military experience and were drawn from a militia composed of the "respectable working class", then it might be natural to expect them to be found in larger proportions amongst the ranks of the NCOs than their directly recruited and no doubt "less respectable" peers.²¹

    Previously in chapter 2, table 2:7 revealed that the Home Forces provided the larger proportion of English recruits. Table 3:8 below does not indicate that these recruits had that much success in acheiving promotion, as they compose only 40% of all NCOs. That 54% of all recruits provided 40% of all NCOs does not appear to endorse the benefits of either previous military experience or superior respectability. However, a closer examination of table 3:8 reveals that 60 of the 84 ex Home Forces NCOs are from one regiment-the 2/73rd-whereas the majority of NCOs from the 23rd and the 28th were men with no previous military experience prior to enlistment. Thus it would appear that in both the 23rd and 28th ex Home Forces soldiers were in fact no more likely to get promoted than their directly recruited peers. The number of men who had reenlisted after being discharged after serving in another regular unit is low; however, this is to be expected in an army were until 1806 enlistment was for life. More interestingly is the column on table 3:8 which deals with NCOs who had been transferred into the three regiments from other regular army units. The fact that a relatively new unit such as the 2/73rd had less "transferred" NCOs in it than the 23rd suggests that units were unwilling to send their experienced soldiers to new units, even if such a transfer would be beneficial to those soldiers' careers. Finally, table 3:8 appears to indicate that previous Home Forces service was of little importance when it came to promotion. If the militia truly was composed of the "respectable working class", then it might be assumed that such respectable abilities as literacy and skilled/semi-skilled previous employment should have combined with their previous military experience to ensure their rapid promotion in whatever unit they enlisted in. The fact that English ex Home Forces men, whilst representing a sizeable proportion of the manpower of the 23rd and 28th, are not found in much greater proportions amongst the ranks of the English NCOs in either regiment casts doubt on whether the Home Forces recruits really were that more "respectable" or different than those recruited directly, or whether those responsible for recruitment in such regiments as the 23rd and the 28th valued the previous military experience that ex Home Forces recruits had accrued. The only way to discover whether men from the Home Forces were that different in literacy and skill level than their directly recruited counterparts would be to do a study comparing the two groups. However, such a study has to date never been undertaken and would no doubt be lengthy, as it would have to take into account the fact that different regiments apparently recruited from different Home Forces sources, and very often from different regions at different times.

TABLE 3:8. Previous military service of English NCOs.
 

Regiment	NCO Rank Group	Previous Home Forces Service	Previous Regular or Royal Marine Service	No Previous Military Service	Transferred from another Regular Regiment
23rd Foot	Senior NCOs	4	0	31	1
	Junior NCOs	6	0	38	4
28th Foot	Senior NCOs	7	1	15	1
	Junior NCOs	7	0	19	1
2/73rd Foot	Senior NCO	30	1	3	4
	Junior NCOs	30	0	8	0
	Total	84	2	114	11
	Total as a % of all NCOs for whom status of previous military service is known	40%	1%	54%	5%

Source: Figures for the 23rd and 2/73rd compiled from The 2/73rd at Waterloo and Medal Rolls-23rd RWF-Napoleonic Period. Figures for the 28th compiled from WO 97/468-475.

References:

1.  Haythornthwaite The Armies of Wellington, p53.

2.  Ibid p81.

3.  Ibid p53.

4.  Oman Wellington's Army 1809-1814, p217.

5.  Haythornthwaite op cit, p53.

6.  Bartlett The Development of the British Army During the The Wars with France, 1793-1815, p166.

7.  Ibid p185.

8.  Ibid p184.

9.  Stephens Education, Literacy and Society, 1830-1870, p3.

10.  Ibid p3.

11.  Ibid p3.

12.  Bartlett op cit, p241.

13.  Longford Wellington: The Years of the Sword, p149.

14.  Blakeney A Boy in the Peninsular War, p268.

15.  Hathaway (ed) Costello: The True Story of a Peninsular War Rifleman, p322.

16.  Hibbert (ed) The Recollections of Rifleman Harris, p6.

17.  O'Neil The Military Adventures of Charles O'Neil, p44.

18.  Ibid p257.

19.  Ibid p257.

20.  Fletcher Wellington's Regiments: The Men and their Battles, p147.

21.  Barnett Britain and Her Army, 1509-19 70, p241.