Recruitment.

During the Napoleonic Wars of 1803-1815 most regiments had at least two battalions, with the role of the "home" battalion being to act as a regimental depot providing both administration and drafts of troops for the overseas battalion.¹ Haythornthwaite suggests that most recruits were gathered by recruiting parties sent "to range about likely venues enlisting whomsoever they could".² If such units did indeed merely send parties out to "range about" then it could be expected that they would draw the majority of their recruits from the locality in which they resided, thus making the examination of the origin of recruits much easier. However, the majority of published regimental histories do not detail the location of such "home units", emphasising instead the movements of the active service/overseas battalions. Where information is available, it is often a brief "returned home", or "stationed in England", leaving the historian unable to accurately discover the unit's exact location. This situation is undoubtedly exacerbated by the fact that many units were divided into independent detachments, to undertake the role of internal policing in lieu of an established police force. Consequently, links between the residence of a depot unit and the area of origin of its recruits are hard to determine and even when the location of a depot can be verified it does not necessarily follow that its recruiting teams will be deployed in its locality, (e.g. according to W012/4430 in 1815 the depot of the 28th Foot was in Hillsea, Hampshire, yet all its recruiting parties were in Ireland).

    The soldiers of Britain's regular army had always been viewed with suspicion and hostility by the bulk of the populace for a number of reasons: Resentment towards the regular enlisted soldiery had its roots in the hated rule of the Major Generals during the English Civil War, being further reinforced by the armies role as an unpopular law enforcement agency during times of civil unrest. This situation was exacerbated by the fact that lack of a large scale barrack building programme meant that soldiers were often billeted on the local citizenry, who were in turn obliged to provide the often bored and boisterous soldiery with food and drink. Consequently, in a nation devoid of a conscription system which would have exposed a larger and broader section of society to military life, regular military service became a livelihood in which only the worst members of society participated.³ Within this context Wellington's legendary remarks that "soldiers were in general the scum of the earth, who enlisted for drink or to escape the consequences of having fathered illegitimate children" are probably a reasonable reflection of how wider society viewed the enlisted ranks of its regular army.⁴ This public disapproval of army service had seen the British army fail to attract much needed recruits during the American War of Independence, and in response to this in 1782 a large number of line infantry regiments received a county/territorial designation, "attempting to aid recruiting by associating the regiment with an area from which it was henceforth to draw the majority of recruits".⁵ However, such links had apparently declined by the start of the Napoleonic Wars despite the army's attempts to restore them with the 1796 publication of the Regulations and Instructions for the Carrying on of the Recruiting Service, which stated that, "Regiments of Infantry are to send their Recruiting Parties to those Counties of which they bear the Name, by which means it is hoped that they will acquire a local Interest that may materially assist them in obtaining Men".⁶ Nevertheless, the scheme was expanded and by the early 1800s nearly all line infantry units had a territorial affiliation, whether it was in their title or not, (for instance the 23rd Foot had been linked to Wales as early as 1702, but it was not until 1804 that they were given specific counties for recruiting purposes).⁷ If military service proved unpopular in the county to which they had been linked, then army recruiters were forced to look in places where men were not so averse to a life in the army. Permission was often given to send recruiting parties into great population centres such as Bristol, London and Dublin where the ranks of the rootless urban poor provided a fertile recruiting ground, but did not necessarily provide recruits with a provenance that matched their regiment's territorial affiliation.⁸

    Barnett argues that there was "plenty of military zeal and spirit in Bntain", but that it did not extend to joining the regular army.⁹ Because of the threat of invasion a variety of domestically based military units had grown up in Britain, such as the Volunteers, the Militia and the Fencibles, (hereafter to be referred to en mass as Home Forces). They provided a socially acceptable alternative to the regular army and allowed the provincial gentry and the middle classes to pour their military enthusiasm into organisations which they could retain under local control, (Appendix 3).¹⁰ Many in the regular army viewed Home Force units as a valuable pool of trained military manpower. Because of this Militia units became the focus of attention for army recruiters and a large number of men who had enjoyed their brief period of military life did volunteer for regular service, (Barnett suggests 40% of army recruits were Militiamen).¹¹ Whilst many Militia commanders resented what they perceived as the poaching of their best men, the majority did attempt to accommodate the army recruiters. In 1806, 1809 and 1811 successive War Secretaries called on the militia to furnish volunteers for the line & a total of approximately 67 000 ex-militia men enlisted.¹² In an effort to limit army reliance on the Militia for recruits, other formations were raised with the specific intention of feeding the line with recruits.¹³ The "Army of the Reserve", (henceforth to be referred to by the abbreviation AR), was raised in 1803, 30 000 men enlisted for service in the British Isles, of whom 19 000 eventually volunteered for regular service. The high proportion of volunteers may have been because, unlike the Home Forces, the AR was centrally recruited and controlled, and the troops were arguably more susceptible to the direct influence of the recruiters. However, the number of men raised fell far short of the 50 000 envisaged and the AR was unofficially discontinued in 1806.¹⁴

    A final source of recruits to the regular army was Ireland, Barnett suggests that the removal of the ban on catholic recruits in the 1780s had led to an influx of Irish peasants into the army.¹⁵ This was no doubt assisted by overpopulation and an economic recession within Ireland, with Speirs arguing that in the first quarter of the nineteenth century Ireland provided approximately half of the British armies non-commissioned officers and men.¹⁶

    The 1798 Defence of the Realm Act assessed the number of able bodied males in the population who were willing to fight the French in the event of an invasion of Britain. A further survey in 1803 provided the authorities with what Colley describes as "a map of war patriotism".¹⁷ In the counties on the western and southern coasts of England, (specifically listed as Gloucestershire, Somerset, Devon, Wilts, Hampshire, Sussex and Kent, thereafter to be referred to as the "patriotic counties"), approximately 50% of all able-bodied men indicated their willingness to fight in the event of an invasion.¹⁸ Colley argues that this was due to both the vulnerability of these counties to French attack and to the strong sense of military tradition that existed within them.¹⁹ Therefore, it could be assumed that the stated willingness of the men of these counties to defend their country, should have made its presence felt within the ranks of the regular army.

Recruitment in Gloucestershire.

    It can be seen from table 2:1 below that there were proportionately no more Gloucestershire born men in the 28th Foot than in either the 23rd or 2/73rd. A closer examination of their personal records reveals that the two were born in areas that could be considered part of North Gloucestershire, (specifically Badgeworth and Stroud), proving that some recruiting was indeed carried out by the regiment in its affiliated territory on at least two separate occasions, (the two being recruited directly in 1802 and 1814 respectively). The three men of the 2/73rd Foot were enlisted from non-Gloucestershire militia units, so their presence in the 2/73rd cannot be seen as evidence of other units recruiting in the county. However, it does indicate the lack of a close connection between local militia units and their affiliated infantry regiments, in that the three men, all of whom were in differing militia units, (Warwicks, Worcestershire and Staffordshire), chose not to go into the line regiments of those counties. Of the six men of the 23rd Foot four were recruited directly from Gloucestershire in the years 1800, 1805, 1807 and 1813. This confirms that recruiting was certainly going on in Gloucestershire throughout the Napoleonic Wars, but that the recruiters of the 28th Foot were either not as active or as successful as those of other regiments. It also calls into question the commitment of individual regiments to their affiliated counties and the value of giving regiments what were to become unwanted or impracticable affiliations in the first place.

TABLE 2:1. Gloucestershire born men in the 28th Foot and other regiments.
 

Regiment	Number of men with known birthplaces.	Number of Gloucestershire born men in the regiment	As a % of the regiment with a known birthplace.	As a % of known Englishmen in the regiment.
23rd Foot	659	6	1%	2%
28th Foot	282	2	1%	1%
2/73rd Foot	326	3	2%	1%

Sources: Figures for the 23rd and 2/73rd compiled from The 2/73rd at Waterloo and Medal Rolls-23rd RWF-Napoleonic Period. Figures for the 28th compiled from WO 97/468-475.

Territorial, Regional and National Recruitment Affiliations.

    Table 2:2 below appears to indicate that the Scots and Welsh regiments enjoyed more success in recruiting from their affiliated territory than their English counterparts did, with English regiments paying only limited attention to recruiting from their allotted territory. One reason for the apparent success of the Scots and Welsh regiments may be that the geographical territory they had been allotted, whilst admittedly being less well populated than many areas, was considerably larger and poorer than either County Durham or North Gloucestershire. In addition, the geographical remoteness of such areas as Wales and Scotland may have deterred recruiters from English regiments from attempting to find men there, particularly as Ireland already provided a ready source of recruits. Alternately, it may be that both County Durham and Gloucestershire were the focus of intense unofficial recruiting by a number of regiments, forcing both the 28th & 68th to look for recruits elsewhere.

TABLE 2:2. Comparisons of territorial affiliations between regiments.
 

Regiment	Affiliated Territory.	Number of men with known birthplaces.	Number of men from affiliated territory.	As a % of the regiment's known men.
23rd Foot	North Wales	659	71	11%
28th Foot	North Glos.	282	2	1%
68th Foot	County Durham	250	9	4%
2/73rd Foot	Highlands	326	32	10%

NB All percentages rounded up to the nearest whole number.
Sources: Figures for the 23rd and 2/73rd compiled from The 2/73rd at Waterloo and
Medal Rolls-23rd RWF-Napoleonic Period. Figures for the 68th Foot reproduced from The Armies of Wellington by PJ Haythornthwaite, p75. Figures for the 28th compiled from WO 97/468-475.

    On examining figure 2:1 below it can be seen that the proportion of Englishmen in all three units remains fairly constant at about 60%. However, whilst the proportions of Irish, Scots and Welsh soldiers in each regiment varies, it never goes much higher than approximately 40%.

FIGURE 2:1. The nationality of recruits.
 
 

Sources: Figures for the 23rd and 2/73rd compiled from The 2/73rd at Waterloo and Medal Rolls-23rd RWF-Napoleonic Period. Figures for the 28th compiled from WO 97/468-475.

    The proportion of Englishmen in each of the three regiments, as shown in figure 2:1, also reflects the population distribution within the United Kingdom.. In table 2:3 below it is possible to see that the population of England in the years 1801 and 1811 is over half of that of the rest of the kingdom, containing approximately 60% of the population in the United Kingdom in both years. The fact that the population density of the English within the United Kingdom is apparently reflected within the ranks of all three regiments undermines attempts to limit the study of regimental affiliations to individual counties or countries and suggests the existence of some form of "British" regiment. Whilst the 23rd and 2/73rd maintained some kind of relationship with their affiliated territories, they appear to have seen England as the source of the majority of their troops, (naturally perhaps when one considers that it is where the bulk of the population resided). It could be suggested that in all three cases the probable function of recruitment from Ireland was to top up troop levels within the regiment after both England and the affiliated territories had been combed for men. The 28th Foot having no interest in either Wales or Scotland merely recruited in England and then Ireland. However, such a practice would be difficult to prove as it would require an examination and comparison of the enlistment dates of the differing nationalities. The numerical dominance of the English in both the 23rd and 2/73rd calls into question the strength of the link between those regiments and their affiliated territories. The 73rd Foot was a relatively junior regiment, (founded in 1786), and therefore it is arguable that a strong territorial connection had not had time to develop. Indeed the weak link between the 2/73rd and the Highlands is confirmed by the fact that from 1809 onwards the regiment voluntarily gave up its right to wear Highland garb in an attempt to attract non-Scottish recruits.²⁰ However, the 23rd Foot had been affiliated to Wales as early as 1702, and therefore it could be expected that sufficient time had elapsed for some form of bond to have developed between the regiment and the Principality.

TABLE 2:3. Estimated population of the United Kingdom,. 1801-1831 (in millions).
 

	1801	1811	1821	1831
England	8.5	9.6	11.4	13.1
Wales	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.8
Scotland	1.6	1.8	2.1	2.4
Ireland	5.2a	5.9a	6.8	7.8
Total:	15.8	17.9	20.9	24.1

^a These are estimates as the first full Irish census was not attempted until 1821.
Sources: British History 1815-1906 and Abstract of British Historical Statistics.

    Thus far it has been proved that men from the 28th Foot's affiliated county were no more represented in that regiment than they were in either the 23rd or 2/73rd. It is therefore important to assess whether there is an "unofficial" affiliation between the 28th and any other English region.

    Table 2:4 below indicates that the overwhelming majority of the 28th Foot's English recruits for whom the birthplace is known came from South West England, particularly the counties of Somerset and Devon. These counties are adjacent and provide such a proportionately large number of men, that it could be suggested that the recruiters of the 28th Foot deliberately focused on them. Indeed, Robert Blakeney, a serving officer with the 28th in the period 1805 to 1812, supports the existence of some form of connection between the 28th Foot and Devon, recalling in his memoirs that he was sent there on recruiting duty in 1805.²¹ In addition, the fact that the next highest number of Englishmen comes from another South West county, Cornwall, further indicates a connection between the 28th Foot and that region. It might therefore be safe to assume that if the 28th Foot had an unofficial affiliation with any part of England then it was with the South West. It also proves that, in the 28th Foot at least, men drawn from Colley's "patriotic counties" far outnumbered those recruited from the rest of England. However, it is impossible to ascertain whether the increased number of men from these "patriotic counties" are present because of strong patriotic feelings, or merely because the recruiters of the 28th only targeted South West counties. It is also possible that these men merely represent a large influx of Home Forces men from Devon and Somerset who joined the 28th at the same time.

TABLE 2:4. The County origin of the 28th Foot's Englishmen.
 

Patriotic Counties	Number of Men	Other Counties	Number of Men
Gloucestershire	2	Cornwall	27
Somerset	41	Lancashire	1
Devon	71	Durham	1
Wiltshire	5	Cheshire	2
Hampshire	1	Dorset	1
Sussex	0	Leicestershire	2
Kent	1	Oxfordshire	1
		Northamptonshire	1
		Buckinghamshire	2
		Surrey	1
		Essex	2
		Staffordshire	2
		Huntingdonshire	1
Total:	121 men	Total:	44 men

Sources: Figures for the 28th compiled from WO 97/468-475.

    One way of confirming the validity of the claim of the men of the "patriotic counties" to be referred to as just that, is to assess whether the same proportion of men from those counties can be found within the ranks of the Englishmen of the 23rd and 2/73rd.

    Table 2:5 below reveals that the Northern English counties, although the most populous provided proportionately the least men. This would appear to indicate that the English counties furthest removed from the continent of Europe felt less threatened by events there, and therefore were less willing to enlist in the regular army to fight. However, the apparent reluctance of males from the North of England to enlist in the regular army may have also been for economic reasons. The late eighteenth century had seen the areas' coalfield and manufacturing centres expand to become England's "dynamic industrialising region", and wage levels in Lancashire and Yorkshire had risen so that in nearly every sector of employment the Northern worker was being paid more than his Southern counterpart.²² Thus, considering the army's reputation as being a hard employer, paying minimum wages there was little economic incentive for the Northern male to enlist. Whilst the proportion of men drawn from the Patriotic, Midland and Southern counties are approximately the same there is a substantial difference in population between the Southern counties, (3 million people), and the Patriotic and Midland counties, (1.7 and 1.9 million respectively). It would appear that amongst the English soldiers of all three regiments those drawn from the Patriotic counties were in fact no more patriotic than men from the Midlands. The increased distance of the counties that constitute the Midlands region from the threat of French hostility, appears to question "fear of invasion" as a primary factor in influencing enlistment into the regular army. It could be argued that the Southern counties, having a similar proportion of men enlisted as the Patriotic and Midland counties, presents an unaccountable anomaly in table 2:6. However, an examination of the numbers of men in each regiment that are drawn from the Southern region, shows that in all three regiments, they are the second largest regional group. This may indeed suggest that "fear of invasion" made men from the South of England natural targets for recruiters. Alternately, it may simply be economic factors working in reverse, in that in contrast to the North of England, the economic situation in the South meant that many men had little to lose financially by enlisting in the army. Recruiters would no doubt have been aware of this and focused their attention accordingly. Table 2:5 below shows that both the 28th and 2/73rd appear to have limited the recruitment of the majority of their English soldiers to only one region, in contrast to the 23rd which has apparently maintained a similar level of recruitment from three out of four regions. This suggests that each of the three regiments possessed very different recruiting practises within England, and this prevents any accurate conclusions being drawn vis a vis the influence of such factors as "threat of invasion" and "tradition of military service" on recruitment, leaving the verdict on the patriotism of the Patriotic counties as unproved. It could be suggested that the expressed willingness of the citizens of the Patriotic counties to defend their land in 1803, was probably not able to overcome the existing dislike of regular army service. Consequently, if the patriotism did manifest itself in any form of military service, then it did so in either the Home Forces or by enlistment in regiments other than those examined by this dissertation.

TABLE 15. The regional distribution of English soldiers.
 

Area/Regt.	23rd Foot	28th Foot	2/73rd Foot	Total	As a % of the total of English Soldiers	Approx. population of region, in millions, in 1811
Patriotic Counties	55 men	122 men	24 men	201 men	26%	1.7
Northern Counties	126 men	4 men	20 men	150 men	20%	4.0
Midland Counties	102 men	5 men	98 men	205 men	27%	1.9
Southern Counties	116 men	36 men	55 men	207 men	27%	3.0
Total:	399 men	167 men	197 men	763 English

Sources: Figures for the 23rd and 2/73rd compiled from The 2/73rd at Waterloo and Medal Rolls-23rd RWF-Napoleonic Period. Figures for the 28th compiled from WO 97/468-475. Population figures derived from: "Abstract of British Historical Statistics" by Mitchell and Deane, p20.

    In the interests of brevity rather than providing an extensive table including the details of each individual county, I have placed counties into the following regional groups, each of which contains only counties in which soldiers of the three regiments are known to have been born in:

Patriotic Counties.
Gloucestershire, Somerset, Devon, Wiltshire, Hampshire, Sussex, Kent.

Northern Counties.
Cumberland, Lancashire, Yorkshire, Northumberland, Durham, Cheshire, Westmoreland.

Midland Counties.
Leicestershire, Northamptonshire, Staffordshire, Rutland, Lincolnshire, Nottinghamshire, Derbyshire, Warwickshire, Worcestershire, Shropshire, Herefordshire.

Southern Counties.
Suffolk, Oxfordshire, Buckinghamshire, Essex, Hertfordshire, Norfolk, London, Surrey, Middlesex, Cornwall, Dorset, Huntingdonshire, Berkshire, Cambridgeshire, Bedfordshire.

The Extent of Recruitment from the Home Forces.

    In his highly regarded and oft quoted work Wellington's Army 1809-1814, Sir Charles Oman argues that the major reason the local designation of an infantry regiment had no very close relation with the actual provenance of the men,

"was due to the fact that the larger half of the recruits were raised not in the normal old fashion, but by volunteers from the embodied militia, and that in this system practically no attempt was made to confine the choice of militia men wishing to join the regular army, to their territorial regiment".²³

    To some extent Corelli Barnett supports Oman's comments on the extent of recruitment from the Home Forces, by the regular army. Barnett suggests that "some forty percent of army recruits came from the militia", which whilst contradicting Oman's "larger half", still remains a sizeable proportion of army recruits.²⁴ Both writers refer to recruits as coming from the Militia, however, a variety of types of irregular forces actually saw service in the period 1793-1815, of which the Militia was but one. As no references are provided it is difficult to ascertain whether Barnett's and Oman's references to "Militia men" are specifically about men who had served in a Militia unit, (as opposed to a Volunteer, Fencible or AR unit), or a general reference to all men who enlisted for the regular army after service with Home Forces units. Consequently, the term "Home Forces recruit" will be used to describe the origin any soldier who has enlisted into the army from any domestically based irregular military units.

    In table 2:6 below, it can be seen that the removal of men recruited from the Home Forces appears to change the provenance of the 28th Foot considerably. The numerical dominance of men from the Patriotic counties is shown to have been primarily due to a large influx of ex Home Forces recruits from that region, whilst the numbers for the Southern counties and Ireland remain the same, (indicating that they were all recruited directly). Soldiers recruited directly from Ireland outnumber the total recruited directly from the whole of England, Scotland and Wales, serving to underline the importance of that country as a source of recruits. However, the fact that a large number of the men in the Southern counties total were directly recruited from Cornwall, (27 men), and the majority of those left in the Patriotic counties table were recruited directly from Somerset and Devon, (12 and 24 men respectively), indicates that within England the majority of the 28th Foot's direct recruitment was still from the South West of England, and reinforces the regiment's previously detailed links with the South West of England. Finally, whilst the 35% of recruits to the 28th enlisted from the Home Forces does not match Oman's "greater half", it is closer to the figure Barnett suggested, and therefore confirms the importance of the Home Forces as a source of English recruits.

TABLE 2:6. The 28th Foot, the extent of the influence of Home Force recruits.
 

Region of Origin	Men Directly Recruited	Recruits from the Home Forces	Total
Patriotic Counties	22	100	122
Northern Counties	4	0	4
Midland Counties	5	0	5
Southern Counties	34	0	34
Wales	0	0	0
Scotland	1	0	1
Ireland	116	0	116
Total	182	100	282
As a %	65%	35%	100%

Sources: Figures for the 28th compiled from WO 97/468-475.

    An examination of the recruitment origin of the men of the 28th Foot alone can not be viewed as authentication of Barnett's arguments about the strength of any Home Forces presence within the ranks of the regular army. However, when the details for the men of the 28th are supplemented by those which are compiled for men from the 23rd and the 2/73rd then, as table 2:7 shows below, a larger and perhaps more accurate picture of the strength of the Home Forces in the regular army can be seen. Table 2:7 below shows that in all three regiments men enlisted directly from the Home Forces represent 54% of all recruits, above both Barnett's 40% and the 28th's 35%. This suggests Barnett has in fact under estimated the Home Force's importance as a source of recruits. The figures for recruits from the Southern, Central and Midlands regions show that approximately half of them did enlist from the Home Forces, a figure closer to that suggested by Oman and contrasting clearly with the recruitment origins of North English, Welsh and Irish recruits, the majority of whom appear to have been recruited directly from civilian life. The figures for soldiers from the Northern counties and Wales are complied from a single unit, the 23rd Foot, and therefore could be interpreted as merely being representative of that regiment's particular recruiting practice. In contrast, Irish troops were present in varying numbers in all three units, (see figure 2:1), and it appears that recruitment from Ireland was predominantly direct rather than via Home Force units. Without a detailed examination of the status of the Home Forces in Northern England and Ireland it is impossible to speculate as to why this discrepancy in numbers occurs. What can be ascertained is that for recruits from certain areas previous military service in the Home Forces was not apparently the major factor in encouraging enlistment in the regular army that it was in others.

TABLE 2:7. The extent and influence of Home Force recruits within all three regiments, (for whom both birthplace and previous military service are known).
 

Region of Origin	Directly Recruited	Recruits from the Home Forces	Total
Patriotic Counties	63	130	193
Northern Counties	26	96	122
Midland Counties	83	110	193
Southern Counties	104	101	205
Wales	38	159	197
Scotland	22	12	34
Ireland	218	52	270
Other	2	0	2
Total	556	660	1222
As a %	76%	24%	100%

Sources: Figures for the 23rd and 2/73rd compiled from The 2/73rd at Waterloo and
Medal Rolls-23rd RWF-Napoleonic Period. Figures for the 28th compiled from WO 97/468-475.

    Table 2:8 below shows that all three regiments gained the majority of their recruits from differing sources within the Home Forces. Men who had served in the Fencibles are present in all three units, but in such small numbers as would be expected considering that the Fencibles were disbanded in 1803. The 28th's large number of AR men can probably be explained by the fact that in the period of the AR's existence, (1803-1806), the 28th raised a second battalion, (disbanded 1814), and had to find recruits to replace those lost on campaign with the first battalion. It was revealed previously that whilst the proportion of ex Home Forces men in all three regiments was 24%, the proportion in the 28th was 35%. This slightly higher figure initially appears to suggest that the recruiters of the 28th favoured the Home Forces as a source of men slightly more than the recruiters of either the 23rd or 2/73rd. However, table 2:8 below shows that the majority of the 28th's Home Force recruits had seen service in the AR rather than the Militia or Volunteers. This appears to confirm that both battalions of the 28th received large numbers of AR recruits in the period 1803-1806, and that even by 1815, following years of campaign service, the extent of their presence within the 28th could still be seen. This explanation whilst accounting for the presence of the AR men, does not account for the absence of any men from the Militia or Volunteers. It may be that either the service details were omitted from the WO 97 source, that the recruiters of the 28th did not have a very high opinion of Militia and Volunteer recruits, or in the atmosphere of intense competition that existed for such ready trained men, the 28th was either unwilling or unable to compete with the bounties offered by other regiments. The 23rd Foot contains numbers of men from both the Militia and the Volunteers, however, the former are so outnumbered by the latter as to suggest that the significance of their presence is negligible. Like the 28th, the 23rd also formed a second battalion in the early 1800s, (also disbanded in 1814), and it might be expected that some AR men might have found their way into the ranks of the 23rd. However, the fact that they did not appears to reinforce the view that once a regiment's recruiters had found a source of men they persevered with it to the exclusion of all other potential sources. Finally, the large numbers of Militia found within the ranks of the 2/73rd can be explained by the fact that when the unit was formed in 1808, the AR had been run down and the bulk of the Volunteers transferred to the Local Militia. Consequently, at that period the Militia represented the only real supply of readily trained men, which the unit would have needed in order to reach operational status as quickly as possible.

TABLE 2:8. The previous military service of English soldiers recruited from the Home Forces.
 

	Fencibles	Militia	Volunteers	Royal Army of the Reserve	Total
23rd Foot	2	14	156	0	172
28th Foot	1	0	0	99	100
2/73rd Foot	2	225	0	0	227
Total	5	239	156	99	499

Sources: Figures for the 23rd and 2/73rd compiled from The 2/73rd at Waterloo and Medal Rolls-23rd RWF-Napoleonic Period. Figures for the 28th compiled from WO 97/468-475.

References:

1.  Haythornthwaite The Armies of Wellington, p77.

2.  Ibid p46.

3.  Ibid p45.

4.  Ibid p44.

5.  Ibid p75.

6.  Bartlett The Development of the British Army During the Wars with France, p120.

7.  Glover That Astonishing Infantry: The History of the Royal Welch Fusiliers, p39.

8.  Oman Wellington's Army 1809-1814, p209.

9.  Barnett Britain & Her Army: 1509-1970, p257.

10.  Ibid p257.

11.  Ibid p257.

12.  Ibid p258.

13.  Bartlett op cit, p116.

14.  Ibid p116.

15.  Barnet op cit, p241.

16.  Spiers The Late Victorian Army: 1868-1902, p131.

17.  Colley Britons: Forging the Nation, p293.

18.  Ibid p292.

19.  Ibid p292.

20.  Mileham The Scottish Regiments, 1633-1996, p186.

21.  Blakeney A Boy in the Peninsular War, p5.

22.  Rule A lbion's Peop1e: English Society 1714-1815, p175.

23.  Oman op cit, p209.

24.  Barnett op cit, p257.